Solomon v. Val Leasing Co.
This text of 282 A.D.2d 519 (Solomon v. Val Leasing Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants William Cheng and Pauline Cheng appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Thomas, J.), dated June 22, 2000, which, upon reargument, denied their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
Upon reargument, the plaintiff submitted sufficient evidence in opposition to the appellants’ motion to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether he sustained a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see, Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957). The affirmation of the plaintiff’s expert stated that he determined, upon examination, that the plaintiff sustained a permanent disability in his cervical and lumbar spines and had some loss of range of motion. The expert quantified those limitations. This evidence was sufficient to raise an issue of fact with regard to the plaintiffs allegation that he sustained a serious injury (see, Ventura v Moritz, 255 AD2d 506; Torres v Micheletti, 208 AD2d 519). Bracken, P. J., S. Miller, McGinity and Schmidt, JJ., concur.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
282 A.D.2d 519, 722 N.Y.S.2d 808, 2001 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3629, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/solomon-v-val-leasing-co-nyappdiv-2001.