Solomon v. Allen, No. 93 67811 S (Mar. 18, 1994)

1994 Conn. Super. Ct. 3051
CourtConnecticut Superior Court
DecidedMarch 18, 1994
DocketNo. 93 67811 S
StatusUnpublished

This text of 1994 Conn. Super. Ct. 3051 (Solomon v. Allen, No. 93 67811 S (Mar. 18, 1994)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Solomon v. Allen, No. 93 67811 S (Mar. 18, 1994), 1994 Conn. Super. Ct. 3051 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994).

Opinion

[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.] MEMORANDUM OF DECISION The plaintiff, Jonathan Solomon, commenced this action for dissolution of his marriage to the defendant, Nancy Allen, by writ, summons and complaint, dated November 24, 1992. The defendant filed her answer and cross-complaint on April 28, 1993.

After a full trial, the parties present and represented by counsel, based upon a preponderance of the credible, relevant and legally admissible evidence, the court finds, concludes, rules and enters its awards as follows:

The plaintiff and the defendant whose maiden name was CT Page 3052 Nancy Allen, intermarried on September 2, 1990 at New York City, New York.

One of the parties has resided continuously in the State of Connecticut for at least one year prior to this action.

There is one minor child, legal issue of the marriage, namely, Claire Marie Solomon, who was born July 20, 1992.

No other minor children have been born to the defendant since the date of this marriage.

No party to this action is receiving aid from any governmental agency.

The marriage of the parties has broken down irretrievably.

The plaintiff is 37 years old and has been continuously employed in the computer field since his graduation from Brandeis University in 1978. He is in excellent health. In 1989, before the parties were married, they were living together and the plaintiff was employed by Cadcraft in Old Saybrook, Connecticut. The plaintiff held an ownership interest in this company. During the summer of 1990, the plaintiff was offered a position with a company, now know as Softdesk, in New Hampshire. As part of the transaction, the plaintiff was to receive an option for 600 shares of Softdesk stock. He consulted with the defendant, with whom he was then living, and both agreed that he should accept the position. The parties married a short time after he accepted this employment. (The original 600 shares of Softdesk went through two ten for one stock splits and are now 60,000 shares).

On December 2, 1991, approximately 18 months after he commenced his employment and exactly 15 months after the parties were married, the plaintiff, after discussing his actions with the defendant who concurred with his decision, executed a stock option agreement with Softdesk whereby he acquired the right to purchase up to 6,000 shares of Softdesk at no additional financial contribution by him. Paragraph 3 of the option agreement state in part: ". . . the Company will deliver to you stock certificates for the number of shares you have acquired; issued in your name or, at your option, in your name and another person's name as joint tenants." (Emphasis added). CT Page 3053

On February 12, 1992, the plaintiff sent a letter to Softdesk exercising this option and expressly and specifically, without reservation or qualification, directing that the stock be issued in his name and his wife's name, as joint tenants. At that time the defendant was pregnant with the parties child.

The parties discussed the exercise of this option prior to the letter of February 12, 1992 and the defendant was aware of the plaintiff's intent that this stock be issued jointly in their names. Both parties, intended, understood and expected that the stock would be issued jointly. Both parties understood and expected that Softdesk would comply with the written instructions, and no further instruction to the contrary were given by the plaintiff to Softdesk.

At some later date, the plaintiff discovered that, contrary to his instructions to Softdesk, the stock had not been issued jointly but had been issued in his name alone, which fact he concealed from the defendant.

This matter proceeded to trial on January 6, 1994 at which time the plaintiff submitted a financial affidavit to the court showing 6,000 shares of Softdesk stock, valued at $6,000.00. This affidavit was amended in writing at the commencement of trial to reflect a 10 for 1 stock split which had previously occurred and which resulted in an increase to 60,000 shares, which were still valued by the plaintiff at $6,000.00. The defendants financial affidavit of January 6, 1994, also listed the same 6,000 shares of Softdesk at a value unknown.

The defendant was unaware of the 10 to 1 stock split resulting in the 60,000 shares shown on the plaintiffs' amended financial affidavit of January 6, 1994, until that information was conveyed at the start of the trial.

On February 17, 1994, during the course of the trial of this case, a public offering of 2,300,000 shares of Softdesk stock, including 10,800 of the 60,000 shares, was effectuated on the NASDAQ Stock Exchange. The 10,800 shares were sold at a gross price of 11.50 per share, resulting in net proceeds, after underwriting discount, of $115,506.00. By agreement of the parties, this amount is presently held in escrow by plaintiff's attorney.

There remains a total of 49,200 of the shares which cannot CT Page 3054 be disposed of, pursuant to the terms of the public offering statement, until August 17, 1994. On February 25, 1994, this stock was trading on the NASDAQ exchange at 16.25 per share.

The court attributes the entire fault for the breakdown of this marriage to the plaintiff husband. His reluctance and hesitation before the marriage, his early disenchantment after the marriage, his adulterous relationship during his wifes [wife's] pregnancy and his abandonment of his family shortly after his daughters' birth clearly indicates to the court that he bears the onus for the failure of this marriage.

Both parties are well educated, hard working and talented individuals. Both are outstanding and highly successful in their careers. The defendant is a harpist with an international reputation. She is head of the harp department at both the Juillard School and Yale University. She performs internationally and has numerous recordings of her work. She is also in good health and earns approximately $65,300 per year.

The plaintiffs talents and career were outlined above. His financial affidavit indicates an income of approximately $60,000 per year.

The parties purchased property at 11 Clinton Avenue in Old Saybrook, Connecticut before their marriage. The premises are highly encumbered with very small equity value. The parties have other assets including bank accounts, stock and personal property which shall be enumerated below.

Obviously, the major asset to be considered are the Softdesk shares. Although the plaintiff claims full ownership, his actions and the circumstances surrounding said stock belie such a stance.

This court expressly finds that by letter dated February 12, 1992, the plaintiff made an unqualified, irrevocable and absolute gift of one-half the value of said shares when he exercised his option and ordered and instructed Softdesk to issue said shares jointly in both his name and the defendants. The fact that Softdesk, inadvertantly [inadvertently] or otherwise failed to follow the plaintiffs instructions cannot defeat the completed gift. It would be bizarre to conclude that a gift between two parties could be defeated by the actions of a third party who has no interest, relationship or responsibility in the donative CT Page 3055 process except to follow the instructions of the optioner/donor given pursuant to the option agreement.

It is established law that a completed gift is irrevocable. Manyek v. Manyek, 29 Conn. Sup. 1 (1970). "A gift is a transfer of property without consideration." Guinan's Appeal, 70 Conn. 342,347.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Flynn v. Hinsley
113 A.2d 351 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1955)
Driscoll v. Norwich Savings Society
93 A.2d 925 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1952)
D. M. Read Co. v. American Bank & Trust Co.
148 A. 130 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1930)
Burbank v. Stevens
131 A. 742 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1926)
Meriden Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. Miller
90 A. 228 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1914)
Nogga v. Savings Bank
65 A. 129 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1906)
Manyak v. Manyak
268 A.2d 806 (Connecticut Superior Court, 1970)
Guinan's Appeal from Probate
39 A. 482 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1898)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
1994 Conn. Super. Ct. 3051, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/solomon-v-allen-no-93-67811-s-mar-18-1994-connsuperct-1994.