Solo v. United Parcel Service Inc..

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Michigan
DecidedJuly 20, 2022
Docket2:14-cv-12719
StatusUnknown

This text of Solo v. United Parcel Service Inc.. (Solo v. United Parcel Service Inc..) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Solo v. United Parcel Service Inc.., (E.D. Mich. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN Southern Division

BLEACHTECH LLC, individually and on behalf of all others similarly Case No. 14-12719 situated, Honorable Denise Page Hood Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC., an Ohio Corporation,

Defendant. _____________________________/

ORDER AWARDING FEES, COSTS AND SERVICE AWARD

On May 16, 2022, Plaintiff filed its Motion for Attorney Fees, Approval of Service Award, and for Reimbursement of Expenses (“Motion for Fees”) (ECF No. 151). Plaintiff and Class Counsel also filed declarations to enable the Court to evaluate the fairness, adequacy and reasonableness of the proposed attorney fees, costs, and Service Award. Following Notice to the Settlement Class, no objections to the proposed fees, costs, and Service Award were filed. This matter came before the Court on June 28, 2022, for a Final Approval Hearing pursuant to the Court’s Preliminary Approval Order dated April 8, 2022. The Court carefully reviewed all of the filings related to the Settlement, including the Motion for Fees and heard argument on the Motion for Final Approval and the Motion for Fees. After full consideration of the Motion for Fees and the presentations of the

Parties, the Court specifically concludes that the proposed fees, costs, and Service Award are fair, adequate, and reasonable, and an acceptable amount to compensate Plaintiff and Class Counsel for litigating the claims filed for the benefit of the

Settlement Class. The Court therefore: (a) grants the Motion for Fees; (b) authorizes the payment of the Service Award to Plaintiff; and (c) awards attorneys’ fees and costs to Class Counsel (“Order Awarding Fees”).

The Court now makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law, and HEREBY ORDERS AND ADJUDGES THAT: 1. All of the definitions contained in the Settlement Agreement (attached

to the Final Approval Order as Exhibit A) shall apply to this Order Awarding Fees and are incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein. Further, the Court incorporates herein and accepts the factual allegations contained in the Motion for Fees.

2. An award of attorneys' fees in common fund cases need only be “reasonable under the circumstances.” Weitz & Luxenberg P.C. v. Sulzer Orthopedics, Inc., 398 F.3d 778, 780 (6th Cir. 2005). The Sixth Circuit permits

calculation of attorneys’ fees under either the percentage of the fund method (counsel receive a percentage of the total settlement fund) or the lodestar method (multiplying the number of hours spent on the litigation by law firm members by

their hourly rate). Rawlings v. Prudential-Bache Properties, Inc., 9 F.3d 513, 515- 16 (6th Cir. 1993). In weighing the benefits and shortcomings of each method, the Sixth Circuit in Rawlings concluded: “For these reasons, it is necessary that district

courts be permitted to select the more appropriate method for calculating attorney's fees in light of the unique characteristics of class actions in general, and of the unique circumstances of the actual cases before them.” Id. at 516. The Sixth Circuit has observed that “[t]he percentage of the fund method has a number of advantages; it

is easy to calculate; it establishes reasonable expectations on the part of plaintiffs' attorneys as to their expected recovery; and it encourages early settlement, which avoids protracted litigation.” Id.

3. In applying the percentage method, “commonly, fee awards in common fund cases are calculated as a percentage of the fund created, typically ranging from 20 to 50 percent of the fund.” In re Rio, 1996 WL 780512 at *16 (citing Wise v. Popoff, 835 F. Supp. 977, 980 (E.D. Mich. 1993). District courts in the Sixth Circuit

begin with a “benchmark percentage” ranging between 20-50%. In re Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. Sec. Litig., 643 F. Supp. 148, 150 (S.D. Ohio 1986); In re Telectronics Pacing Sys., 137 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1046 (S.D. Ohio 2001) (noting that

the range of reasonableness has been designated as between 20% and 50% of the common fund). These courts then generally apply the factors enumerated in Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 102 F.3d 777 (6th Cir. 1996), discussed and applied below, to

determine the reasonableness of a requested fee. 4. Class Counsel’s request for 33 1/3 % of the common fund created by their efforts is well within the benchmark range and in line with what is often

awarded in this Circuit. See e.g., Bessey v. Packerland Plainwell, Inc., 4:06-cv-95, 2007 WL 3173972, at *4 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 26, 2007) (awarding one-third of settlement fund as attorneys’ fees and holding that “[e]mpirical studies show that, regardless whether the percentage method or the lodestar method is used fee awards

in class actions average around one-third of the recovery”) (internal question omitted). The fee requested here is also in line with the fees awarded in other overdraft fee class actions throughout the country.

5. In evaluating the reasonableness of a fee request, courts in the Sixth Circuit evaluate the following factors: (1) the value of the benefit rendered to the plaintiff class; (2) the value of the services on an hourly basis; (3) whether the services were undertaken on a contingent fee basis; (4) society’s take in rewarding

attorneys who produce such benefits in order to maintain an incentive to others; (5) the complexity of the litigation; and (6) the professional skill and standing of counsel involved on both sides. Bowling, 102 F.3d at 780. As discussed below, each of

these factors supports the requested fee here. The Value of the Benefit Rendered to the Class 6. As noted above, the Settlement establishes a common fund of

approximately $5,700,000, and Notice has been disseminated to approximately 90% of the nearly 2,150,00 members of the Settlement Class. If the Court approves the Settlement, Plaintiff and the Settlement Class will recover over fifty percent (50%)

of their most probable damages (Covered Packages shipped in the second half of 2013) and a lesser amount of other claims (Covered Packages shipped before the second half of 2013) when basing it on the Settlement Fund alone. However, when considering UPS’s separate payment of up to half of the costs of Notice and

Settlement administration, the percentage recovery is significant. As discussed above, this is an extraordinary result given the obstacles facing Plaintiffs. As the action has resulted in significant benefits to Settlement Class Members, this factor

weighs heavily in favor of the requested fee award. The Value of the Services on an Hourly Basis 7. The collective lodestar of all Class Counsel is $3,063,068 based on counsels’ ordinary rates. An award of $1,894,400 represents a multiplier of -.38

(i.e., 62% of the lodestar amount), which is well within the range adopted by courts in the Sixth Circuit. See In re Cardinal Health Inc. Sec. Litig., 528 F. Supp. 2d 752, 767-78 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (“Most courts agree that the typical lodestar multiplier” in

a large class action “ranges from 1.3 to 4.5.”). Given the nature, complexity, and potential duration of this action, as detailed above, the risk of non-recovery, the value of the social benefit, and the results in light of the obstacles, the multiplier is

appropriate and reasonable.

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Related

In Re Cardinal Health Inc. Securities Litigations
528 F. Supp. 2d 752 (S.D. Ohio, 2007)
Wise v. Popoff
835 F. Supp. 977 (E.D. Michigan, 1993)
In Re Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc.
137 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (S.D. Ohio, 2001)
Rawlings v. Prudential-Bache Properties, Inc.
9 F.3d 513 (Sixth Circuit, 1993)
Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc.
102 F.3d 777 (Sixth Circuit, 1996)
In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation
218 F.R.D. 508 (E.D. Michigan, 2003)

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