IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS
NO. AP-77,109
ROBERT SOLIS, Appellant
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
ON DIRECT APPEAL FROM CAUSE NO. 164780601010 IN THE 230TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT HARRIS COUNTY
FINLEY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which RICHARDSON, NEWELL, KEEL, MCCLURE, and PARKER, JJ., joined, and in which SCHENCK, P.J., joined except for Part VII, and in which YEARY, J., joined except for Part IV. WALKER, J., concurred.
OPINION
In October 2022, Appellant was tried for and convicted of capital murder
pursuant to Section 19.03(a)(1) of the Penal Code for committing the murder SOLIS — 2
of Harris County Sheriff’s Deputy Sandeep Dhaliwal during a traffic stop. See
TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.03(a)(1). On the basis of the jury’s answers to the
statutorily required special issues, Appellant was sentenced to death. See TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 37.071, § 2(b), (e). Direct appeal to this Court is
automatic. Id., § 2(h). Appellant raises eight points of error. Finding no
reversible error, we affirm Appellant’s conviction and sentence of death.
I. Facts
a. Guilt Phase Evidence
Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence and the
reasonable inferences from it showed the following. On September 27, 2019,
Dhaliwal was a certified peace officer employed by the Harris County Sheriff’s
Office (HCSO) as a patrol deputy. Shortly before noon, he was on duty, wearing
his HCSO uniform and monitoring an intersection in a residential area of
northeast Houston for traffic violations.
From his clearly marked patrol car, Dhaliwal observed a silver Nissan
Altima sedan fail to come to a complete stop at an intersection. Dhaliwal
activated his patrol car’s lights and siren, which automatically activated the
vehicle’s dashcam, and initiated a traffic stop. Following his training and
HCSO policy, Dhaliwal activated his bodycam before approaching the Nissan, SOLIS — 3
and he touched the rear of the vehicle with his hand to leave his fingerprints
on the car.
Unbeknownst to Dhaliwal, Appellant was driving the Nissan, which he
had borrowed from his sister earlier that day. Appellant was a convicted felon
with an active warrant for his arrest due to a parole violation. Appellant was
also armed with his sister’s loaded semiautomatic handgun and two spare 10-
round ammunition magazines. As Appellant stopped the Nissan in response to
the lights and siren, he told his passenger and neighbor, Jennifer Saiz, about
his outstanding warrant. Appellant predicted that he was “going to jail[,]” and
he repeatedly expressed that he did not want that to happen.
During his interaction with Dhaliwal, Appellant claimed not to have any
identification with him, lied about his name and date of birth, and falsely
claimed to be in the military and to live in another state. Appellant also
claimed not to know his address, driver’s license number, or social security
number. Because Saiz knew Appellant was lying to Dhaliwal and she
suspected that Appellant was about to be arrested on the warrant, she asked
the deputy if she could leave. Dhaliwal allowed Saiz to do so, and she got out
of the car, began walking to her house, and called her boyfriend Larry Covey
to pick her up. Saiz testified that she was familiar with Dhaliwal, who
regularly patrolled the neighborhood. She agreed that while she was present SOLIS — 4
during the traffic stop, Dhaliwal was “the same polite, kind and respectful man
he always was.”
After Saiz left, Dhaliwal radioed for a mobile fingerprint scanner to be
brought to his location, informed Appellant that he was detained until his
identity could be verified, and walked back to his patrol car. While Dhaliwal
was standing next to the patrol car, turned away from Appellant and writing
on his notepad, Appellant exited the Nissan holding his sister’s loaded
handgun. He brought the weapon to eye level, pointed it directly at Dhaliwal,
and then ran at Dhaliwal and shoved him against the patrol car. Although
Dhaliwal raised his arms in submission, Appellant shot the deputy in the head
at close range, inflicting a fatal injury. After shooting Dhaliwal, Appellant
rushed back to his sister’s car and drove away. At trial, Appellant’s sister
identified Appellant’s voice on Dhaliwal’s bodycam video and Appellant as the
person shown on a still photo from the video, holding her handgun and getting
back into the Nissan immediately after the shooting.
Within moments of killing Dhaliwal, Appellant began calling Saiz and
then Covey. Appellant separately told each of them that he had shot Dhaliwal,
and in an apparent effort to distance himself from his sister’s car, asked them
for a ride. Saiz and Covey both refused to help Appellant. SOLIS — 5
Appellant subsequently drove the Nissan to a nearby shopping center,
parked the car in the parking lot, took the keys, and walked around the center
for a period of time. He ultimately dumped his sister’s handgun and the two
spare ammunition magazines in a trash can outside an ice cream shop that
was next to a children’s daycare center. The handgun was still loaded, with a
bullet in the chamber. 1 Appellant then entered the ice cream shop, hid his
sister’s car keys in a potted plant inside the business, and called her to tell her
where she could retrieve the keys.
Meanwhile, an intensive multi-agency manhunt was underway for
Dhaliwal’s shooter. Investigators searching for the Nissan quickly located it at
the shopping center where Appellant had left it, and they began cordoning off
the area, restricting entry and egress. Officers who later processed the Nissan
for evidence found Dhaliwal’s fingerprints on the rear of the vehicle.
Appellant, who had been lingering inside the ice cream shop for
approximately thirty minutes without purchasing anything, repeatedly asked
1 Investigators recovered the pistol and ammunition, and the State’s firearms expert
testified that the pistol fired the shot that killed Dhaliwal. In addition, various areas of the pistol, including the trigger, were swabbed and tested for DNA. The State’s DNA analyst testified that a mixture of DNA from two individuals was found on the trigger, and that mixture was “approximately eight quadrillion times more likely to have originated from [Appellant] and another individual than to have originated from two other individuals.” The analyst further testified that the results of this analysis “provide[d] very strong support for the proposition that [Appellant] was a contributor to the DNA obtained from” the trigger. SOLIS — 6
the owner about the heavy police presence forming outside. Appellant also
pretended to be a shop employee by moving tables to the business’s patio,
although the owner did not ask Appellant for assistance and did not want
Appellant’s help.
Eventually, Appellant approached one of the law enforcement officers
securing the perimeter at this secondary scene, asking the officer what was
happening and whether Appellant could leave. When the officer noticed that
Appellant matched the shooter’s description, he asked Appellant to identify
himself. The officer detained Appellant after he gave a false name. Once
detained, Appellant became argumentative and aggressive, refused to submit
to gunshot residue testing, and clenched his hands so that officers could not
fingerprint him using a mobile fingerprint scanner. Shortly thereafter,
Appellant was taken into custody, but not before blowing a kiss at one of the
arresting officers.
Appellant testified in his own defense and admitted that he shot and
killed Dhaliwal, but he contended that it was an accident. Appellant, who
disputed that he had actually committed a traffic violation, told the jury that
he decided to place Dhaliwal under a citizen’s arrest for falsely imprisoning
him. Appellant testified that he then accidently shot Dhaliwal in the head
when the deputy “jerked pretty quickly” while Appellant was trying to reach SOLIS — 7
the deputy’s handcuffs. On cross-examination, Appellant admitted that
Dhaliwal was a peace officer acting in the line of duty at the time of the
shooting. Appellant further confirmed that Dhaliwal was “very polite” and
“very respectful” to him during the traffic stop but stated that he nonetheless
perceived “microaggressions” from the deputy that prompted him to attempt
the citizen’s arrest. The jury implicitly rejected Appellant’s accident defense by
finding him guilty of capital murder as alleged in the indictment.
b. Punishment Phase Evidence
At the punishment phase, the State introduced evidence of Appellant’s
juvenile and adult criminal record, as well as his prison disciplinary record and
unadjudicated bad acts. Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s
answers to the punishment phase special issues, this evidence and the
reasonable inferences from it collectively showed as follows.
Appellant was forty-seven years old when he murdered Dhaliwal, an act
for which Appellant evidenced no remorse, and the capital offense was the
culmination of a lengthy history of escalating violence and antisocial behavior.
As a fourteen-year-old, Appellant sexually assaulted his mother’s romantic
partner Shauntel Lyons while she was recovering from a severe and painful
burn injury. Due to the injury itself and the effects of her pain medication,
Lyons was unable to fight Appellant off; he “[p]ut his penis in [her] and raped SOLIS — 8
[her].” 2 As an older juvenile, Appellant was placed on deferred adjudication for
burglarizing a string of homes and stealing property that included handguns.
Around this same time, Appellant was arrested for unlawfully carrying a
weapon—a .380 semiautomatic pistol and two fully loaded magazines of
ammunition—and he later committed felony theft.
While Appellant was in his twenties, he statutorily raped and repeatedly
physically assaulted the mother of his three children, hog-tied his own mother,
set his sister’s room on fire, and fired a gun toward the foot of one of his sons.
In 2002, when Appellant was twenty-nine years old, he shot a man and then
engaged in an hours-long armed standoff with police in which he used his four-
year-old son as a human shield. Appellant was convicted of aggravated assault
and aggravated kidnapping as a result of this incident and sentenced to twenty
years in prison. Numerous correctional officers who encountered Appellant
during his imprisonment testified to his entitled, combative attitude and
disciplinary infractions. These infractions included creating disturbances,
possessing weapons and contraband, fighting, and assaulting a prison guard.
2 As we will discuss in further detail regarding point of error one, Appellant represented himself at trial. At the end of cross-examining Lyons, Appellant personally “conced[ed] to the State that the event” (i.e., his sexual assault of Lyons) “happened.” SOLIS — 9
Appellant’s misdeeds continued after his 2014 release from prison on
parole under a “Super Intense Specialized Program,” which required him to
wear a GPS tracker and adhere to various conditions. Appellant’s maternal
aunt and her husband provided him with a job, free corporate housing,
transportation to his required appointments, and other significant support.
Appellant did well until his GPS monitor was removed, when his attitude and
conduct changed for the worse. Appellant rewarded his aunt and uncle for their
support by stealing approximately $20,000 from his uncle’s company. When
his uncle confronted Appellant about the missing funds and terminated his
employment, Appellant—who bragged about having weapons—threatened,
“[I]f you ever try to take me down, I’ll take you down with me.”
When he was terminated from his uncle’s company, Appellant was
already involved in a financially-exploitative relationship with Alyssa
Ascenscio, whose husband had recently died from cancer. Ascencio was left
with two young children—one of whom (Ascenscio’s daughter M.A.) had also
been diagnosed with cancer shortly before the husband’s death—and a
considerable sum of money in insurance proceeds. Appellant openly disparaged
Ascencio to his friends and relatives and stated that he had no romantic
feelings for her. However, Appellant pretended to Ascencio that he did have
such feelings, and he readily accepted her many expensive material gifts. After SOLIS — 10
being terminated from his uncle’s company, Appellant moved in with Ascencio
and her children.
Appellant thereafter gained such psychological control over Ascencio
that he manipulated her into transferring significant amounts of money to him
under the pretense that he would use the funds to start a business. Appellant
instead spent these funds on online gambling, prostitutes, martial arts lessons,
and material items he desired. Appellant also manipulated Ascencio into
buying him firearms and large quantities of ammunition and transferring
valuable items of her personal property into his name.
In late 2016, Ascencio’s assets were largely gone as a result of Appellant’s
machinations, and she was depressed and anxious over her future and how she
would provide for her children. In December 2016, Appellant, impatient with
Ascensio’s emotional state, assaulted her. He struck her numerous times and
threatened her with a semiautomatic pistol. He repeatedly asked Ascencio if
she wanted to die and fired a bullet next to her head while forcing her to say
that she did want to die.
Some days later, after receiving support from her relatives and friends,
Ascensio filed a police report. In early January 2017, Ascensio also provided
Appellant’s parole officer with an affidavit detailing the December 2016
assault. Shortly afterward, a “blue warrant” for Appellant’s arrest issued, and SOLIS — 11
he absconded from parole. 3 Then, in mid-January 2017, Appellant murdered
Ascencio in her home to prevent her from testifying at his parole revocation
hearing, and he staged her body to look like she had committed suicide. 4
M.A., who was in fifth grade at the time, witnessed Appellant’s terrifying
December assault on her mother and testified that he also pointed a gun at her
during the incident. In addition, M.A. found her mother’s body after the staged
suicide. M.A. further testified that Appellant sexually abused her while he was
living under her mother’s roof.
The State also presented evidence that Appellant orchestrated a drug
smuggling and distribution ring while in jail awaiting trial in this case. More
specifically, Appellant enlisted individuals inside and outside the jail to assist
him with obtaining and distributing “spiced paper” (paper infused with various
illicit drugs) to other jail inmates for profit. In at least one instance, as a lesson
and show of power, Appellant arranged for paper infused with toxic chemicals
instead of the desired drugs (a “Trojan Horse”) to be sent to an inmate-
3This is the same warrant Appellant was seeking to avoid when he murdered Dhaliwal. 4 The State presented evidence showing Appellant’s motive and opportunity to kill
Ascensio, as well as evidence that he had previously expressed a willingness to do so. The State additionally presented testimony from two different witnesses, who each stated that Appellant admitted to them that he had been present in Ascencio’s home and arguing with her at the time of her death. One of these witnesses also testified that Appellant admitted to her that he had shot Ascensio. SOLIS — 12
customer who owed him money.
The State additionally presented testimony from clinical and forensic
psychologist Dr. Christine Reed, who reviewed Appellant’s jail, prison,
medical, and mental health records as well as the evidence of the capital
offense. Because she did not personally interview Appellant, Reed testified that
she did not feel comfortable diagnosing him. However, Reed explained that she
was privy to Appellant’s prior diagnoses and that her review of his records
allowed her to refute or confirm them.
Reed discounted low intelligence as an explanation for Appellant’s
behavior; Appellant had an above-average IQ, and he had done well when he
took college courses in prison. Instead, Reed noted, Appellant was diagnosed
with Antisocial Personality Disorder (ASPD), and his history amply supported
that diagnosis. Reed also testified that she would be very comfortable with
Appellant being diagnosed with Narcissistic Personality Disorder as well, or
with narcissistic traits being added to his ASPD diagnosis. Reed testified that
both personality disorders are extremely resistant to treatment and that,
among other things, narcissists can lash out in violent ways when challenged.
Reed also assessed Appellant using the Hare Psychopathy Checklist
(PCL-R) based on her review of his records. Reed testified that Appellant
scored a 35 out of 40, and that a score above 30 indicated psychopathy. She SOLIS — 13
explained that people whose PCL-R scores indicate psychopathy are at greater
risk for criminal behavior, including violent reoffending.
Appellant personally cross-examined the State’s punishment phase
witnesses, but he presented no witnesses of his own. After considering the
evidence presented at both phases of trial, the jury returned an affirmative
answer to the future dangerousness special issue and a negative answer to the
mitigation special issue.
II. Legal Sufficiency—Guilt Phase
In his third point of error, Appellant challenges the legal sufficiency of
the evidence to support his capital murder conviction. 5 Appellant appears to
assert that the evidence was legally insufficient to support his capital murder
conviction because five of the State’s guilt phase witnesses (Priscilla Garrison,
Tracy Lewallen, Hoang Nguyen, Michael Reddicks, and Elias Rivera)
“provided no direct evidence” of the offense “and no identification” of Appellant
as the perpetrator. Without acknowledging our holdings to the contrary,
Appellant conclusorily asserts that “circumstantial actions should not be
considered when judging the sufficiency of the evidence.” 6
5 We address Appellant’s points of error out of order because we generally first address the issue that would afford Appellant the greatest relief. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.3. 6 To the extent Appellant intends to raise any other arguments, those arguments are
inadequately briefed. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). SOLIS — 14
a. Applicable Law
When reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction, we consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the
verdict and determine whether any rational juror could have found the
essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19 (1979); Braughton v. State, 569 S.W.3d 592,
607–608 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). The Jackson standard recognizes the trier of
fact’s role as the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence after
drawing reasonable inferences from the evidence. Adames v. State, 353 S.W.3d
854, 860 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). “We presume that the factfinder resolved any
conflicting inferences in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that resolution.”
Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at 608. “As a reviewing court, we may not reevaluate
the weight and credibility of the evidence in the record and thereby substitute
our own judgment for that of the factfinder.” Id. Therefore, on appellate review,
we determine whether the necessary inferences made by the trier of fact are
reasonable based on the cumulative force of all of the evidence. See id.
b. Analysis
Appellant’s challenge to the legal sufficiency of the guilt phase evidence
to support his conviction for capital murder lacks merit. We have repeatedly
held that “[c]ircumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in SOLIS — 15
establishing the guilt of an actor, and circumstantial evidence alone can be
sufficient to establish guilt.” See, e.g., Acosta v. State, 429 S.W.3d 621, 625 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2014); see also Gardner v. State, 306 S.W.3d 274, 285 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2009) (“[T]he State may prove [a] defendant’s identity and criminal
culpability by either direct or circumstantial evidence, coupled with all
reasonable inferences from that evidence.”). “[I]t is not necessary that every
fact and circumstance point directly and independently to the defendant’s
guilt; it is enough if the conclusion is warranted by the combined and
cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances.” Acosta, 429 S.W.3d
at 625 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Further, Appellant ignores the fact that Dhaliwal’s dashcam and
bodycam videos, which were published to the jury, captured the traffic stop,
clear images of the driver involved, and almost all aspects of the fatal assault
on the deputy. 7 The jury could have reasonably determined from this evidence
alone that Appellant was the driver involved in the traffic stop and that he
intentionally and knowingly murdered Dhaliwal by shooting him in the head.
In addition, at trial, Appellant’s own sister viewed a still photo from the video
7 The video did not show Appellant actually shooting Dhaliwal because Dhaliwal’s
bodycam was front-facing, and Appellant pushed the deputy’s chest against the side of the patrol car. However, the dashcam and bodycam footage captured Appellant’s armed approach and retreat, between which the shot that killed Dhaliwal can be heard on audio. SOLIS — 16
and identified Appellant holding her firearm and getting back into her car
immediately after the fatal shot rang out. She also identified Appellant’s voice
on Dhaliwal’s bodycam video. Appellant also ignores the testimony that,
immediately after the offense, he separately told two different people (Saiz and
Covey) that he (Appellant) had just shot Dhaliwal. And, fatal to Appellant’s
sufficiency challenge, Appellant expressly admitted that he shot and killed
Dhaliwal, knowing that Dhaliwal was a peace officer who was then acting in
the line of duty.
In sum, the cumulative force of the evidence was more than sufficient for
the jury to reasonably find every element of the charged offense beyond a
reasonable doubt, including Appellant’s identity as the shooter. We overrule
Appellant’s third point of error.
III. Legal Sufficiency—Future Dangerousness
In his fourth point of error, Appellant challenges the legal sufficiency of
the evidence to support the jury’s affirmative answer to the punishment
phase’s “future dangerousness” special issue. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art.
37.071, § 2(b)(1). Instead of applying the Jackson standard to the facts of his
case, 8 Appellant focuses on the testimony of three punishment phase witnesses
8 To the extent Appellant is attempting to make a different argument, it is inadequately briefed. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). SOLIS — 17
(Lyons, Harry Hill, and M.A.) and in a conclusory fashion seems to complain
about either the admissibility of their testimony or the degree of credibility he
believes the jury should have afforded it. 9 After leveling these criticisms at
Lyons’s, Hill’s, and M.A.’s testimony, Appellant closes with the conclusory
statement, “When considered with evidence from the guilt phase about the
nature of this offense, a rational juror could not have found that the appellant
would commit future criminal acts of violence that would constitute a
continuing threat to society.” Appellant never explains how the complained-of
testimony implicates the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s
affirmative finding on the future dangerousness special issue.
The future dangerousness special issue requires the jury to determine
9 As previously discussed, Lyons testified that Appellant sexually assaulted her when
he was about fourteen years old. The sum total of Appellant’s argument regarding Lyons’s testimony is the statement, “This claim was unreported and allegedly occurred many years before this trial.” Appellant fails to acknowledge that he personally admitted in open court that “the event” happened. See supra n.2. Appellant next conclusorily (and incorrectly) asserts that he had no opportunity to cross-examine Hill. When Appellant was prosecuted in 2002 for aggravated assault and aggravated kidnapping, Hill (the shooting victim) testified at the trial and was cross-examined by Appellant’s counsel. Hill was deceased by the time of Appellant’s capital murder trial, but his direct and cross-examination testimony from the 2002 trial was read into the record. Appellant lastly complains of M.A.’s testimony that Appellant physically assaulted her mother and sexually abused M.A. Appellant conclusorily calls M.A.’s testimony “[t]he most egregious and unsupported/unreported allegation.” He fails to acknowledge that M.A.’s testimony is evidence supporting the allegation. SOLIS — 18
“whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts
of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society.” TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. art. 37.071, § 2(b)(1). This special issue reflects an “essentially . . .
normative” inquiry that focuses on the individual defendant’s character for
violence, “not merely the quantity or quality of the institutional restraints”
imposed upon him. Coble v. State, 330 S.W.3d 253, 268–69 (Tex. Crim. App.
2010). “That is, this special issue focuses upon the internal restraints of the
individual, not merely the external restraints of incarceration.” Id. at 269.
In answering the future dangerousness special issue, the jury is entitled
to consider all of the evidence admitted at both the guilt and punishment
phases of trial. Devoe v. State, 354 S.W.3d 457, 461 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). The
jury may consider a variety of factors in reaching its answer. See Green v. State,
713 S.W.3d 865, 878 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025). These factors include the
circumstances of the offense and the events surrounding it, including
forethought and deliberateness in its execution; the existence and severity of
past crimes; the defendant’s age and personal circumstances at the time of the
offense; psychiatric evidence; and character evidence. Id. The jury may
additionally consider escalating patterns of violence and disrespect for the law.
Id. In some instances, the circumstances of the offense and the events SOLIS — 19
surrounding it may be sufficient in themselves to sustain an affirmative
answer to the future dangerousness special issue. Devoe, 354 S.W.3d at 462.
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s
affirmative answer to the future dangerousness special issue, we employ the
Jackson standard, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
verdict. See Green, 713 S.W.3d at 878; see also Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. We
determine whether, based on the evidence and reasonable inferences from it,
any rational trier of fact could have believed beyond a reasonable doubt that
there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence
that would constitute a continuing threat to society. Green, 713 S.W.3d at 878.
Appellant’s complaints about Lyons’s, Hill’s, and M.A.’s testimony are
misplaced in the context of a legal sufficiency analysis. In a legal sufficiency
analysis, “we consider all of evidence admitted, whether proper or improper.”
Conner v. State, 67 S.W.3d 192, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); cf. Smith v. State,
499 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (“Even evidence that is improperly
admitted is considered in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to
support a conviction[.]”). Further, we may not substitute our judgment for that
of the factfinder by reevaluating the weight and credibility of the evidence.
Garcia v. State, 667 S.W.3d 756, 762 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023). SOLIS — 20
Having thoroughly reviewed the evidence presented at both phases of
Appellant’s trial, we find that it amply supported the jury’s affirmative answer
to the future dangerousness special issue. In addition to introducing evidence
of Appellant’s murder of Deputy Dhaliwal, the State introduced evidence that
Appellant had committed another murder—Ascenscio’s—to prevent her from
testifying at his parole revocation hearing. The parole revocation hearing had
been initiated due to a prior assault that Appellant had perpetrated on
Ascenscio by firing a gun next to her head. The State also introduced evidence
that Appellant staged Ascenscio’s body to look like Ascenscio had committed
suicide, showing a lack of remorse by Appellant. Moreover, the State
introduced additional evidence of Appellant’s past crimes, including prior
convictions for aggravated assault and aggravated kidnapping and juvenile
adjudications for a string of home burglaries. The State further introduced
evidence of Appellant’s prison records, from as recently as the months leading
up to this trial, most notably that he orchestrated a drug smuggling ring and
tried to poison another inmate who owed him money. Lastly, the State
introduced psychiatric testimony indicating that Appellant had psychopathic
traits. The evidence of Appellant’s future dangerousness was staggering.
Based on the evidence introduced at Appellant’s trial, a rational trier of
fact could have believed beyond a reasonable doubt that there was a probability SOLIS — 21
that Appellant would commit future criminal acts of violence that would
constitute a continuing threat to society. Green, 713 S.W.3d at 878. We
overrule Appellant’s fourth point of error.
IV. Request to Withdraw Waiver of Counsel
In his first point of error, Appellant alleges that the trial court abused
its discretion by denying his request to withdraw his prior waiver of counsel.
Appellant appears to assert that the trial court’s decision violated both his
Sixth Amendment right to counsel as well as Code of Criminal Procedure
Article 1.051(h). We also understand Appellant to ask us to consider reviewing
“[Article] 1.051(h) case[s]” de novo rather than under an abuse-of-discretion
standard. 10
a. Factual Background
In his briefing, Appellant provides limited facts regarding the
circumstances in which he waived his right to counsel and later attempted to
withdraw that waiver. However, the record shows that, in the last few months
before trial in this case was scheduled to begin, Appellant repeatedly expressed
unhappiness with his appointed counsel. A consistent theme of Appellant’s
complaints regarding counsel, who had represented him for roughly three
10 To the extent Appellant intends to raise any other claim, it is inadequately briefed.
See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). SOLIS — 22
years at that point, was that they were violating his rights under “McCoy.”
Appellant claimed that counsel would not “discuss anything other than
mitigation” and refused to focus their efforts on achieving Appellant’s goal of
being found not guilty of capital murder (or, apparently, any lesser offense).
See McCoy v. Louisiana, 584 U.S. 414 (2018) (holding that “a defendant has
the right to insist that counsel refrain from admitting guilt, even when
counsel’s experienced-based view is that confessing guilt offers the defendant
the best chance to avoid the death penalty”). 11 Appellant also asserted that
counsel were working in tandem with the district clerk and court coordinator
to prevent him from complaining to the trial court about counsel, so that
counsel could hide their alleged deficiencies and continue making money from
Appellant’s case.
Appellant repeatedly asked the trial court to remove counsel, raised the
possibility of representing himself when the trial court declined to appoint
different counsel, and asked the trial court for time to consider the option of
self-representation. Indeed, Appellant spent approximately two months
raising the prospect of self-representation with the trial court while
simultaneously refusing to commit to either proceeding with appointed counsel
11 We note that the record before us contains no indication that appointed counsel
intended to insist that Appellant plead guilty to the charged offense or that they otherwise intended to concede his guilt at trial. SOLIS — 23
or proceeding pro se. It was not until the last day of jury selection, when trial
was already underway, that Appellant affirmatively indicated that he wished
the trial court to remove his appointed attorneys and allow him to represent
himself.
The trial court then held a Faretta 12 hearing at which it admonished
Appellant about the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation,
informed him that it would not appoint stand-by counsel, and admonished him
that he would not be allowed to obstruct the orderly proceedings of the court
or interfere with the fair administration of justice. Appellant thereafter waived
his right to counsel. The trial court dismissed appointed counsel from the case,
and Appellant represented himself at trial from that point forward. 13
During the guilt phase, Appellant engaged in the following behavior. He
argued that the discovery material the State had previously provided to his
appointed attorneys was inadmissible because the State had not also provided
12 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818–19 (1975) (recognizing a Sixth Amendment
right to self-representation). 13 Appellant does not contend that he was improperly allowed to represent himself.
See Williams v. State, 252 S.W.3d 353, 355–56 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (explaining that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel includes the reciprocal right to self- representation; once the right is clearly and unequivocally asserted, the trial court must inform the defendant about the dangers and disadvantages of self- representation so that the record establishes that the waiver of counsel is intelligently and voluntarily made); see also Faretta, 422 U.S. at 818–19. Further, the record supports the trial court’s finding that Appellant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his right to counsel. SOLIS — 24
it to Appellant personally. Although trial was underway, Appellant essentially
asserted that the discovery process should start over because he was
representing himself. He also alleged that the trial court’s staff were thwarting
him from filing legal documents. 14 Further, he complained that he did not have
access to prior counsel’s witness list, although the trial court noted that witness
lists were available in the clerk’s file.
Appellant also filed three motions for continuances, all of which were
denied. He filed the first motion for continuance immediately after the trial
court granted his request to proceed pro se. Although trial had already begun,
Appellant claimed to need additional time to prepare for his defense. On the
fourth day of the State’s case-in-chief, Appellant argued his second motion for
continuance, claiming that he was “nauseous” and “light-headed,” and that he
had vomited blood into a trash can. The prosecution vigorously disputed that
assertion, as did the bailiff, who stated that, at most, Appellant had spat some
saliva into a trash can. The trial court moreover made a record that it had not
seen vomiting of any kind in the courtroom. Appellant made his third motion
for continuance during his case-in-chief, claiming that he needed additional
14 However, Appellant’s own witness indicated that Appellant was still represented
by counsel when she attempted to file the documents on his behalf. See Jenkins v. State, 592 S.W.3d 894, 902 n.47 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (“A defendant has no right to hybrid representation, and, as a consequence, a trial court is free to disregard any pro se motions presented by a defendant who is represented by counsel.”). SOLIS — 25
time so that he could subpoena witnesses whom he had already cross-
examined. Given the circumstances, the prosecution expressed its belief that
Appellant’s request for time was actually intended to “drag out” the trial. The
trial court agreed, denying Appellant’s request and describing it as “a tactic for
delay.”
Although the record contradicted his assertion, Appellant also
repeatedly claimed that he could not prepare for his trial because he had no
access to pens. He also contended that his work product had disappeared while
he visited the jail infirmary. After the State rested its guilt phase case-in-chief,
Appellant orally moved the trial judge to recuse himself due to the judge’s
alleged failure to provide Appellant with the time and material necessary to
prepare a defense. 15
Then, at the end of the guilt phase charge conference and immediately
before closing arguments were set to begin, the trial court asked if Appellant
had any other objections to the charge beyond the ones he had already made.
This exchange ensued:
15 The trial court briefly acknowledged the oral motion and proceeded with trial.
Appellant’s oral motion required no action by the trial court because the oral request did not comply with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18(a), which requires (among other things) that a motion to recuse to be in writing. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 18(a). SOLIS — 26
[APPELLANT]: No, Your Honor. However, at this time I would like to withdraw myself from my case and request appointed counsel.
[PROSECUTOR]: I think this is just for delay at this point, Judge.
THE COURT: Mr. Solis, we had a hearing. You’ve knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived your right to counsel. I instructed you at that time that you were not to use that as an attempt to delay or disrupt this court’s proceedings.
[APPELLANT]: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: I believe at this point your request at the time of closing is specifically to delay and disrupt these proceedings. Your request is denied at this time. I will reconsider if it become[s] pertinent based upon the jury’s verdict.
Appellant did not object to the trial court’s ruling or make any other response.
After the jury returned its verdict finding Appellant guilty of capital
murder, the trial court polled the jury and then excused it from the courtroom.
The trial court subsequently addressed Appellant.
THE COURT: At this time, Mr. Solis, I have considered your request for the appointment of counsel. I cannot appoint new counsel. You have freely, voluntarily and intelligently waived the effective assistance of counsel in this case. The Court has reached out to your former counsel, who have spent three years in preparing your defense. However, they SOLIS — 27
believe, that based upon your dismissing them, that they are now conflicted out and they have declined to continue representing you even in punishment. At this point, because you have freely, voluntarily and intelligently waived the assistance of counsel, you must continue to proceed pro se.
[APPELLANT]: Okay.
THE COURT: The Court will be in recess.
The punishment phase began later the same day. In the jury’s presence,
the State read a punishment enhancement paragraph from the indictment
which alleged that Appellant had previously been convicted of aggravated
assault with a deadly weapon. When the trial court asked Appellant for his
plea regarding the enhancement, he responded:
Not true, Your Honor. And also, Your Honor, at this time I would like to object to your refusal of counsel to represent me in the sentencing phase and forcing me to proceed and be present for these proceedings when I asked to absent myself.
The trial court did not respond to Appellant’s statement. It instead
directed the State to proceed with its opening argument, which the State did.
The withdrawal issue was not raised again during Appellant’s trial.
b. Appellant’s Statutory Claim
We turn first to Appellant’s assertion that the trial court abused its
discretion under Article 1.051(h), which states: SOLIS — 28
A defendant may withdraw a waiver of the right to counsel at any time but is not entitled to repeat a proceeding previously held or waived solely on the grounds of the subsequent appointment or retention of counsel. If the defendant withdraws a waiver, the trial court, in its discretion, may provide the appointed counsel 10 days to prepare.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 1.051(h). We have recently held that the Article
1.051(h) right to withdraw a prior waiver of counsel is not absolute. See
Huggins v. State, 674 S.W.3d 538, 548–49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023) (concluding
that the statutory language “at any time” does not mean “under any
circumstances” and that a defendant may not use his right to counsel to
manipulate the court).
We conclude that Appellant has failed to preserve this aspect of his first
point of error for appellate review. Appellant did not identify a legal basis for
his initial request or later objection, and we do not believe that a statutory
basis for it would have been obvious to the trial court or opposing counsel. See
Vasquez v. State, 483 S.W.3d 550, 554 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (explaining that
litigants need not employ specific words or technical considerations to avoid
forfeiting their complaints; however, a general or imprecise objection will not
preserve error for appeal unless the legal basis for the objection is obvious to
the court and to opposing counsel); see also Lankston v. State, 827 S.W.2d 907,
909 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (“[A]ll a party has to do to avoid the forfeiture of a
complaint on appeal is to let the trial judge know what he wants, why he thinks SOLIS — 29
himself entitled to it, and to do so clearly enough for the judge to understand
him at a time when the trial court is in a proper position to do something about
it.”). Because Appellant failed to preserve his Article 1.051(h) allegation for
appellate review, his associated argument—concerning the proper standard of
review for such claims—is moot.
c. Appellant’s Sixth Amendment Claim
In his first point of error, Appellant claims he was denied effective
assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment.
i. Appellant’s claim is inadequately briefed
We preliminarily conclude that Appellant’s Sixth Amendment argument
is inadequately briefed. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i) (“The brief must contain a
clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate
citations to authorities and to the record.”). Appellant sets forth some law
regarding a defendant’s waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and
the withdrawal of such a waiver. However, Appellant fails to apply the law he
provides to the limited facts of the case he sets forth. Appellant merely makes
conclusory statements about what the trial court did or did not review in
denying his request to withdraw his prior waiver of counsel, as well as
conclusory statements about the result to which Appellant believes he is
entitled. Moreover, in his briefing for this point of error, Appellant rambles SOLIS — 30
from topic to topic and his arguments are often incoherent. Further, his
briefing features incomplete sentences and missing or inaccurate citations to
case law.
ii. Merits
Out of an abundance of caution, we nevertheless will review Appellant’s
Sixth Amendment contention. After such review, we conclude that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion.
“It is beyond dispute that ‘[t]he Sixth Amendment safeguards to an
accused who faces incarceration the right to counsel at all critical stages of the
criminal process.’” Marshall v. Rodgers, 569 U.S. 58, 62 (2013) (quoting Iowa
v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 80–81 (2004)). “It is just as well settled, however, that a
defendant also has the right to ‘proceed without counsel when he voluntarily
and intelligently elects to do so.’” Id. (citing Faretta, 422 U.S. at 807). “To
resolve the tension that can exist between these two principles when a
defendant who elected to proceed pro se later demands an attorney, there is
broad consensus that, once waived, the right to counsel is no longer
unqualified.” United States v. Kerr, 752 F.3d 206, 220 (2d Cir. 2014) (collecting
cases).
That is, the exercise of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel “is subject
to the necessities of sound judicial administration. Trial courts have the duty, SOLIS — 31
and discretion, to maintain the orderly flow and administration of judicial
proceedings, including the exercise of a defendant’s right to counsel.” Medley
v. State, 47 S.W.3d 17, 23 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2000, pet. ref’d) (internal
citation omitted); see also Marquez v. State, 921 S.W.2d 217, 223 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1996) (“The control of the business of the court is vested in the sound
discretion of the trial judge.”). Although a waiver of the right to counsel may
generally be withdrawn, a “defendant does not have the right to repeatedly
alternate his position on the right to counsel and thereby delay trial or
otherwise obstruct the orderly administration of justice.” Medley, 47 S.W.3d at
23; see also Culverhouse v. State, 755 S.W.2d 856, 861 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988)
(“A defendant may not use his right to counsel to manipulate the court or to
delay his trial.”). Moreover, “[a] defendant does not have a constitutional right
to choreograph special appearances by counsel.” McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S.
168, 183 (1984).
Here, it was on the cusp of guilt-phase closing arguments that Appellant
attempted to withdraw his prior waiver of his right to counsel. Given the
timing of the request alone, it was reasonable for the trial court to conclude
that Appellant’s request was made for the purpose of delay. Moreover,
Appellant’s behavior leading up his last-minute request to reclaim the right to
counsel provides additional support for the reasonableness of the trial court’s SOLIS — 32
conclusion. Appellant fails to show that the trial court would have been
unreasonable to conclude that his request reflected the culmination of a
pattern of behavior designed to manipulate the court and delay his trial.
Further, Appellant has not shown that the trial court abused its
discretion when it revisited the issue and declined to appoint counsel for the
punishment phase. At Appellant’s insistence, the trial court had already
dismissed appointed counsel from the case. The record shows that the trial
court nevertheless contacted these attorneys to ask whether they would be
willing to resume representing Appellant, but they were not, citing what they
viewed as a conflict of interest. Further, there was no standby counsel at the
ready. Appellant has not shown that, under these circumstances, the trial
court would have been unreasonable to determine that appointing new counsel
at this point during the trial would inevitably result in lengthy delay that
would obstruct the orderly administration of justice.
Having concluded that Appellant’s first point of error was either
inadequately briefed or that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we
overrule it.
V. Challenge for Cause
In his second point of error, Appellant alleges that “the trial court
reversibly erred and abused its discretion by improperly denying [his] SOLIS — 33
challenge for cause.” Appellant’s allegation is inadequately briefed because he
fails to identify the challenge for cause that he believes the trial court
erroneously denied. See TEX R. APP. P. 38.1(i).
In addition, our review of the record reveals that the trial court did not
deny any of the defense’s challenges for cause. Thus, Appellant’s claim appears
to have no basis in fact and may be properly characterized as frivolous. Cf.
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) (superseded by statute)
(explaining that a complaint is frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis in
either fact or law).
Further, Appellant concedes (and the record confirms) that he did not
use all of his fifteen statutorily allotted peremptory challenges. See TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. art. 35.15(a) (allotting the parties in capital cases fifteen
peremptory challenges each). Therefore, even if Appellant could show that the
trial court actually denied a defense challenge for cause, and that the trial
court abused its discretion by doing so, he would not be able to show that the
ruling harmed him. See Newbury v. State, 135 S.W.3d 22, 30–31 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2004) (“[H]arm from the erroneous denial of a defense challenge for cause
focuses on whether a peremptory challenge was wrongfully taken from the
defendant.”) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted); see also
Comeaux v. State, 445 S.W.3d 745, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (stating that to SOLIS — 34
establish harm regarding the denial of a causal challenge, the appellant must
show, among other things, that he exhausted his peremptory challenges, and
the trial court denied his request for additional strikes). We overrule
Appellant’s second point of error.
VI. Extraneous Offense Evidence
In his fifth point of error, Appellant alleges that the trial court reversibly
erred and abused its discretion when it admitted extraneous offense evidence
during the punishment phase of his trial. Appellant invokes Rule of Evidence
403 and asserts that the trial court should not have admitted certain
punishment phase testimony given by Lyons, Deputy Daniel Turner, Janice
Peters, Brian Vaclavik, and M.A. because the testimony was unfairly
prejudicial. See TEX. R. EVID. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant evidence if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of
the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury,
undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”). However,
Appellant did not preserve this claim for appellate review because at trial, he SOLIS — 35
failed to lodge Rule 403 objections to the testimony at issue. 16 See TEX. R. APP.
P. 33.1(a)(1)(A).
Further, Appellant has inadequately briefed this point of error. See TEX.
R. APP. P. 38.1(i). After summarizing the allegedly objectionable testimony
given by these witnesses, Appellant conclusorily asserts that the testimony
was unfairly prejudicial because it “insinuated” that Appellant committed
certain bad acts (such as sexually assaulting Lyons, sexually abusing M.A.,
and murdering Ascencio) and suggested that money motivated him to kill
Ascencio. At no point does Appellant explain why this evidence was unfairly
prejudicial; he simply asserts that it was. See Martinez v. State, 327 S.W.3d
727, 737 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (“Rule 403 does not require exclusion of
evidence simply because it creates prejudice; the prejudice must be ‘unfair.’”).
We overrule Appellant’s fifth point of error.
VII. Constitutional Challenges to Article 37.071
In his sixth, seventh, and eighth points of error, Appellant raises various
challenges to the constitutionality of Texas’s death penalty statutory scheme.
Specifically, Appellant argues that (1) his death sentence “is unconstitutional
16 The record shows that Appellant made a “prejudice” objection during Turner’s
testimony when the State sought to admit certain photos of Ascencio’s body. However, this objection was to the admission of the photographs rather than Turner’s testimony. SOLIS — 36
because it was assigned based on [Texas’s] arbitrary system of administering
the death penalty” (point of error six); (2) his death sentence should be vacated
because Texas’s “statute governing capital trials expressly limits the evidence
that a jury may consider mitigating, in violation of” the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments (point of error seven); and (3) Texas’s “10-12” rule, see TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. art. 37.071, § 2(a)(1), violates the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments because it prohibits a trial court from instructing the jury on the
consequences of any failure to agree on the punishment phase special issues
(point of error eight).
Appellant does not direct the Court to any motions he filed before or
during trial in which he challenged the constitutionality of Texas’s death
penalty statute on these or any other bases, nor are we aware of any.
Accordingly, Appellant has not preserved these three points of error for
purposes of appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); Reynolds v. State, 423 S.W.3d
377, 383 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (“‘As applied’ constitutional claims are subject
to the preservation requirement and therefore must be objected to at the trial
court in order to preserve error.”); Karenev v. State, 281 S.W.3d 428, 434 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2009). (“[A] defendant may not raise for the first time on appeal a
facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute.”). SOLIS — 37
Further, Appellant fails to acknowledge that we have repeatedly rejected
such claims. See, e.g., Coble, 330 S.W.3d at 296–98. We are not persuaded by
Appellant’s arguments to revisit these issues. We overrule Appellant’s sixth
through eighth points of error.
VIII. Conclusion
Finding no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment and
sentence of death.
Delivered: October 30, 2025 Publish