Soley v. Ampudia

183 F.2d 277, 19 A.L.R. 2d 689, 1950 U.S. App. LEXIS 3595
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedJune 30, 1950
Docket13101_1
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 183 F.2d 277 (Soley v. Ampudia) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Soley v. Ampudia, 183 F.2d 277, 19 A.L.R. 2d 689, 1950 U.S. App. LEXIS 3595 (5th Cir. 1950).

Opinion

RUSSELL, Circuit Judge.

The trial Court, ruling upon demurrers, dismissed the complaint of Benjamin Poly-carp Soley which sought from Pasqual Ampudia, Christopher E. Harewood and Local 713, United Public Workers of America, C. I. O., damages because of alleged slanderous remarks made by the two individuals, Ampudia being the president of Local No. 713, and Harewood the secretary and treasurer of Red Tank Chapter of Local 713.

In its orders sustaining the demurrers, the trial Court expressly based its ruling on specified cases. 1 Consideration of these rulings makes it clear that the Court was of the opinion that the utterances of the defendants alleged to be slanderous were qualifiedly privileged and, apparently further thought that malice had not been sufficiently alleged. However, the cases relied upon by the trial Court, while recognizing the protection of a qualified privilege in good faith utterances by a union official, acting under a moral duty, and by means reasonably adapted to protect the union’s interest, each likewise recognize that the defense of qualified privilege may be overcome by the proof of actual or express malice. We think the allegations of the complaint in the present case are sufficient to allege the existence of actual malice inducing the utterances of the alleged slander, and also disclose that the means employed *279 were not reasonably adapted to protection of the claimed privileged interest. The Court therefore erred in sustaining the demurrers of the individual defendants.

The complaint charges that the utterances were made with knowledge of their falsity, and maliciously, because the complainant had been active in attempting to remove all communistic influences from the union by seeking to force the resignation of the defendants and others whose statements and conduct had aroused suspicion. If upon the trial the complainant established this •claim, the asserted defense of privileged •communication would be unavailing. Blake v. Trainer, supra. Furthermore, the complaint alleges that the utterances were made, not in a closed union meeting, but in an open meeting to which members of the public generally were present. In these circumstances, the statement that the speaker would wait until another time actually intensified the slander, since with the remarks already made in public, the members •of the audience could well believe that more serious charges could and would be made against the complainant. Under the provisions of the Canal Zone Code, 2 as a matter of pleading, the charge of malice, rendered legally inefféctive the defense of privileged communication.

There can be no question of the sufficiency of the allegations of damage. It is alleged that as the result of the slander the complainant and his family “have been •ostracized by their fellows, he has been and is insulted wherever he goes among his fellows, his wife is ‘cut’ by former friends, and his sons have been cruelly beaten by boys who have embraced the errors of their elders.” The slander is charged also to have destroyed all complainant’s prospects of a profitable laundry business which Soley had already begun.

The remaining question in the case is whether the statements charged to have been made were defamatory, and if so, whether the association of Local No. 713 may be held liable therefor. As recited in the complaint, the nature of the utterances, and the circumstances under which made, were that at a monthly meeting of the Red Tank Chapter, at which a play was staged to depict the benefits of union membership, to which the public had been invited and members of which were present, and after the play, “The Chairman of the Chapter introduced Harewood as a speaker. Hare-wood made no. speech, but only turned to Soley and pointing at him said: ‘You, Brother Soley are a stooge, an informer and a stool-pigeon for the American Legionnaires and'the American Federation of Labor.’ Harewood then left the speaker’s platform and sat in his secretary’s chair. The Chairman then introduced Ampudia, as President of Local 713, and guest speaker of the evening. Ampudia walked to the rostrum, saluted the audience, and then said: ‘You, Brother Soley, take this down and write it down.’ Soley took out pencil and paper, and then Ampudia continued: T, Pasqual Ampudia, President of U. P. W. 713, CIO, seventeen thousand strong, tell you this: You are the informer, news carrier, stooge and stool-pigeon for the American Federation of Labor and the American Legionnaires, you are a traitor to the Union, you should be ashamed, go back and tell them that I Pasqual Ampudia, President of Local 713 tells you so.’ Ampudia made no speech but sat down in his chair.” It is alleged that at a subsequent meeting of the Chapter, in addressing an audience of members, and visitors who were not members, Ampudia said: “I have important 'information to give but Brother Soley, the Union traitor, informer, stooge and stool-pigeon for the American Legionnaires and A. F. of L. is here. I’ll give it another day.”

The complaint alleges the innuendo of the expressions of Ampudia and similarly of *280 the expressions of Harewood. 3 The falsity of the charges, and that the defendants knew they were false, is averred.

The Civil Code of the Canal Zone expressly establishes, among other personal rights, the right of protection from personal insult, from defamation, and from injury to personal relations. It is declared that defamation is effected by libel or slander, and slander is defined as “a false and unprivileged publication other than libel, which * * * 3. Tends directly to injure [the person] in respect to his office,profession, trade, or business, either by imputing to him general disqualification in those respects which the office or other occupation peculiarly requires, or by imputing something with reference to his office, profession, trade, or business that has a natural tendency to lessen its profits * * * (or) 5. Which, by natural consequence, causes actual damage.” 4

We think it clear that the allegations of the complaint, when considered upon demurrer, are slanderous within the terms of the statute. Indeed, if the facts as alleged be found true by a jury, the result of their utterances would not be other than as stated by the complainant. There are present in the case issues of fact which should be determined by a trial and not foreclosed by a ruling upon demurrer. The complaint stated a cause of action against the defendants Ampudia and Harewood.

There were several efforts to effect service of summons upon the defendant Local 713, and the dismissal of the complaint as to this defendant was apparently predicated by the Court upon the failure to find and serve a proper officer, and without consideration of the merits. However this may be, we find nothing which takes, the claim attempted to be asserted against the association defendant out of the general rule that a corporation or association can not be held liable for slanderous utterances of its officers or members unless it has either authorized or ratified such utterances. Here there is no claim of authorization or ratification.

The judgment dismissing the complaint as to the defendant Local 713, is affirmed.

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Bluebook (online)
183 F.2d 277, 19 A.L.R. 2d 689, 1950 U.S. App. LEXIS 3595, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/soley-v-ampudia-ca5-1950.