Sokorelis v . NHSP Warden 07-CV-335-SM 04/03/09 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Jonathan Sokorelis, Petitioner
v. Civil N o . 07-cv-335-SM Opinion N o . 2009 DNH 049 Bruce W . Cattell, Warden, New Hampshire State Prison, Respondent
O R D E R
Jonathan Sokorelis, a state prisoner, seeks habeas corpus
relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent, asserting that
Sokorelis is not entitled to relief, moves for summary judgment.
Sokorelis objects. For the reasons given, respondent’s motion
for summary judgment is granted.
Background
In November of 1994, Sokorelis was tried on one count of
first-degree murder and two counts of attempted murder in the New
Hampshire Superior Court. On the third day of jury
deliberations, petitioner decided to plead guilty to one count of
second-degree murder and two counts of attempted murder, thereby
eliminating the possibility of a guilty verdict on the first-
degree murder charge, and its concomitant mandatory sentence to
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. There was
no plea agreement, beyond the state’s willingness to accept the pleas in exchange for dropping the first-degree murder charge
then under deliberation. After Sokorelis pled guilty to the
three separate charges (involving separate victims), the
following exchange with the court occurred:
The Court: Do you have any questions at all, sir?
The Defendant: No.
The Court: Counsel, do you have something?
M s . Rundles: Yes, your Honor. Um, although this was (Prosecutor) a naked plea, there was one understanding between counsel. The defendant would agree to waive his right to petition for sentence suspension for a ten-year period, which — a right under [RSA] 651-20.
Mr. Jeffco: That is-that is correct, your Honor. As (Defense Counsel) pointed out, it is part of negotiations to get us to that point, sir. And it was and is a waiver of his right t o , u h , petition the superior court for sentence reduction pursuant to RSA 651:20 for a ten-year period.
The Court: Mr. Sokorelis, I’ll ask you individually: RSA 61:20, one of the statutes — 651:20, one of the statutes of the state of New Hampshire, allows an individual sentenced to state prison to petition the court once every four years, but not sooner, u h , for a review of the sentence. Usually, the sentencing judge or some other judge, if that sentencing judge is not available — u h , and that is a statutory right which you have. My understanding is as a part of the — that the only agreement, apparently, between you and the state is you’re waiving, u h , your rights under that statute for a period of ten years?
2 The Defendant: Yes, sir, I am.
The Court: All right.
M s . Rundles: And, your Honor, just for the record, I want to make clear that the waiver was in exchange for the nol pros of the first-degree indictment. There was no other rec — agree [sic] to recommend anything.
The Court: I understand.
Approximately one month after he entered his guilty pleas,
Sokorelis was sentenced to forty years to life on the second-
degree murder charge and ten to twenty years on each of the two
attempted murder charges, consecutive to each other and to the
murder sentence. Sokorelis is currently incarcerated in the New
Hampshire State Prison. His sentencing document states, among
other things: “Defendant has waived his rights under RSA 651:20
for a period of 10 years.” RSA 651:20 provides:
“Notwithstanding any other provision of law . . . the sentence to imprisonment of any person may be suspended by the sentencing court at the time of imposition of the sentence or at any time thereafter in response to a petition to suspend sentence which is timely brought. . . .”
Thus, the only right Sokorelis waived was his state statutory
right to petition the sentencing court for a suspension of his
sentence within ten years. In other words, he plainly did not
waive his right to collaterally attack his conviction on
3 constitutional grounds in either the state or federal courts, or
to seek any other post-sentencing relief.
After trial, Sokorelis actually did seek sentence relief,
from the state’s sentence review division. The record does not
include Sokorelis’ petition to the review division, so the
arguments he raised are unknown. But, on September 1 , 1995,
after considering the matter, the review division affirmed
petitioner’s sentence for second-degree murder, and increased the
two consecutive attempted-murder sentences to fifteen to thirty
years each.
On July 3 0 , 2004, a few months before the ten-year waiver
period expired, Sokorelis filed a pro se motion in state court
for leave to withdraw his guilty pleas. He subsequently retained
counsel, who refiled the motion in late October. Petitioner
argued that his guilty pleas were improvidently entered, in that
they had not been knowing, intelligent or voluntary. That motion
was denied on May 2 4 , 2005, after hearing. Petitioner appealed
to the New Hampshire Supreme Court, which affirmed the trial
court’s decision.
On October 1 5 , 2007, Sokorelis filed the pending federal
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He again contends that his
4 guilty pleas were not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary,
primarily because he was unaware of the consequences of those
pleas with regard to sentencing. Specifically, Sokorelis argues
he was not aware that his guilty pleas exposed him to the
imposition of consecutive sentences, and that the only reason he
agreed to plead guilty was that he understood he would receive
only one sentence rather than three.
The magistrate judge initially recommended that the petition
be dismissed as untimely, but reconsidered, leaving the issue of
timeliness for future resolution. Respondent now moves for
summary judgment, arguing that Sokorelis’ petition is time-
barred. Alternatively, if the petition is deemed timely,
respondent says petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on
the merits, because his pleas were provident when entered, and
were fully consistent with federal constitutional requirements.
Discussion
It is undisputed that Sokorelis filed his petition well
beyond the time limit established by the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). Sokorelis asserts,
however, that the AEDPA limitations period should be equitably
tolled due to exceptional circumstances. He argues that he
diligently pursued the relief he now seeks by moving in state
5 court to withdraw his guilty pleas, albeit ten years after
judgment was entered. He contends that he could not so earlier
due to an exceptional circumstance, i.e., his own belief that the
waiver of rights under RSA 651:20 to which he agreed included a
bar to challenging the constitutionality of his guilty pleas
during the same ten-year period. Petitioner’s argument is not
persuasive.
Under AEDPA, a one-year period of limitation applies to
applications for writs of habeas corpus, and it runs from the
date of final judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The court
of appeals for this circuit has held that “defendants like
[petitioner], convicted prior to AEDPA, can file their petitions
within one year of AEDPA’s effective date.” David v . Hall, 318
F.3d 343, 344 (1st Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). AEDPA was
effective as of April 2 4 , 1996. Consequently, petitioner had
until April 2 4 , 1997, to file a federal habeas corpus petition.
See Cordle v . Guarino, 428 F.3d 4 6 , 48 (1st Cir. 2005). That
deadline was missed by more than ten years. Thus, petitioner can
avoid dismissal of his petition only if the limitations period is
equitably tolled.
The United States Supreme Court has “never squarely
addressed the question [of] whether equitable tolling is
6 applicable to AEDPA’s statute of limitations.” Pace v .
DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 409, 418 (2005) (citing Pliler v . Ford, 542
U.S. 225 (2004)). The court of appeals for this circuit has,
however, “allowed for equitable tolling of the § 2244(d)(1)
limitations period in rare and extraordinary cases.” Trapp v .
Spencer, 479 F.3d 5 3 , 59 (1st Cir. 2007); see also Neverson v .
Farquharson, 366 F.3d 3 2 , 41 (1st Cir. 2004) (“the one-year
limitations period in § 2244(d)(1) is not jurisdictional and,
accordingly, can be subject to equitable tolling in appropriate
cases”). Such extraordinary relief is available, however, only
in the most compelling of circumstances. As the David court
observed:
If equitable tolling is available to extend section 2244(d)’s limitations period, it can only do so for the most exceptional reasons. One of AEDPA’s main purposes was to compel habeas petitions to be filed promptly after conviction and direct review, to limit their number, and to permit delayed or second petitions only in fairly narrow and explicitly defined circumstances. . . . To bypass these restrictions for reasons other than those given in the statute could be defended, if at all, only for the most exigent reasons.
David, 318 F.3d at 346 (citations omitted); see also Donovan v .
Maine, 276 F.3d 8 7 , 93 (1st Cir. 2002) (“We have made it pellucid
that equitable tolling, if available at all, is the exception
rather than the rule; and that resort to its prophylaxis is
deemed justified only in extraordinary circumstances”) (citations
and internal punctuation omitted); Delaney v . Matesanz, 264 F.3d
7 7 , 15 (1st Cir. 2001) (“In short, equitable tolling is strong
medicine, not profligately to be dispensed.”).
A petitioner who seeks equitable tolling must establish “(1)
that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that
some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace, 544
U.S. at 418 (citation omitted). The court of appeals expanded on
that standard by delineating six factors “that may influence a
court’s decision whether or not to grant equitable tolling in a
habeas case.” Trapp, 479 F.3d at 6 1 . Those factors include:
1. The petitioner’s own diligence in pursuing habeas relief;
2 . Whether some extraordinary circumstance prevented the petitioner from making a timely filing;
3 . The petitioner’s diligence in the pursuit of other post-conviction remedies and the process already afforded in the state system;
4 . Any prejudice to the prosecution that would result from tolling and possible retrial;
5 . The fact that equitable tolling is not available in cases of dubious merit;
6. Whether or not the case is a capital case and whether or not the petitioner has been sentenced to death.
Id. (citations omitted).
8 1. Diligence in pursuing habeas relief
Petitioner argues that the record demonstrates his diligence
because: (1) he believed (albeit mistakenly) that he had waived
his right to challenge the validity of his guilty pleas for ten
years from the day he entered them; and (2) just as soon as the
ten-year waiver period was over, he filed his motion to withdraw
his pleas, exhausted available state remedies, and then filed his
federal petition. Actually, petitioner’s motion to withdraw his
pleas was not filed “[e]xactly ten years after entry of his pleas
of guilty,” as he argues, but, rather, some nine years and eight
months later. It is a minor point of little consequence, but had
petitioner truly been waiting for the waiver period to expire,
one would expect him to file his motion to withdraw his pleas
promptly after the ten-year period expired, not before. In any
event, petitioner has failed to show that he was diligent in
pursuing habeas relief. A ten-year delay is facially
inconsistent with diligence, though it might be explained by
extraordinary circumstances.
2. Extraordinary circumstances
Petitioner argues that extraordinary circumstance did indeed
preclude his filing a timely federal habeas petition. That
circumstance was his mistaken belief that he had waived, for ten
years, his right to challenge the constitutionality of his pleas.
9 As a general matter, it is well established in this legal
context that “extraordinary circumstances” are “circumstances
beyond the litigant’s control [that] have precluded [him] from
promptly filing.” Cordle, 428 F.3d at 481 (quoting Lattimore v .
Dubois, 311 F.3d 4 6 , 55 (1st Cir. 2002))(emphasis added). The
court of appeals for this circuit has ruled that a petitioner’s
ignorance or carelessness does not excuse an untimely habeas
petition. See Cordle, 428 F.3d at 49 (ruling that petitioner’s
lack of knowledge of the law and filing deadlines in addition to
her attorney’s error did not constitute an extraordinary
circumstance). In Lattimore, the fact that the petitioner was
pro se and had a “limited knowledge of the law” was held not to
be a special circumstance that warranted equitable tolling.
Lattimore, 311 F.3d at 5 5 . In Voravongsa v . Wall, the
petitioner’s pro se status was not grounds for equitable tolling.
Voravongsa, 349 F.3d 1 , 8 (1st Cir. 2003); see also Donovan, 276
F.3d at 93 (ruling that “while pro se pleadings are to be
liberally construed, the policy of liberal construction cannot
plausibly justify a party’s failure to file a habeas petition on
time”) (internal citations omitted); Delaney, 264 F.3d at 15
(ruling that “in the context of habeas claims, courts have been
loath to excuse late filings simply because a pro se prisoner
misreads the law”). In Neverson the petitioner filed a timely
habeas petition, but it was dismissed because it included
10 unexhausted claims. Petitioner’s later argument, that the
court’s decision to dismiss rather than stay his case, as well as
the court’s failure to advise him of his options and the law,
constituted extraordinary circumstances excusing the untimely
filing of a second petition, was rejected. Neverson, 366 F.3d at
43. 1
In addition to rejecting the application of equitable
tolling, in the cases cited above, the court of appeals has also
identified, in opinions from other circuits, circumstances it
would likely consider sufficiently extraordinary to warrant
application of the doctrine. See Trapp, 479 F.3d at 6 0 . For
example, the Second Circuit found equitable tolling appropriate
when an attorney, specifically hired to file a habeas petition,
failed to file i t . See Baldayaque v . United States, 338 F.3d
145, 152-53 (2d Cir. 2003). The Ninth Circuit found equitable
tolling appropriate when, after the petitioner discharged his
attorney, the attorney refused to return the petitioner’s file,
causing him to miss the filing deadline. See Spitsyn v . Moore,
345 F.3d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 2003). Equitable tolling was also
1 In addition, “garden-variety attorney negligence” does not excuse a petitioner’s untimely habeas filing. Trapp, 479 F.3d at 60 (internal quotations omitted). For example, an attorney’s miscalculation of AEDPA’s limitations period is nothing more than “routine error” and “does not constitute extraordinary circumstances warranting equitable tolling.” Id. (citing David, 318 F.3d at 3 4 6 ) .
11 found appropriate when an attorney told a petitioner that a
habeas petition had been filed, but in fact it had not. See
United States v . Martin, 408 F.3d 1089, 1093-05 (8th Cir. 2005);
see also United States v . Wynn, 292 F.3d 226, 230 (5th Cir.
2002). The facts presented here do not establish like
circumstances, and do not warrant application of equitable
tolling principles.
The “extraordinary circumstance” petitioner says caused him
to miss the AEDPA filing deadline amounts to little more than a
“garden variety claim of excusable neglect” (and not a
particularly plausible o n e ) . David, 318 F.3d at 346.
Petitioner’s waiver of his state statutory right to seek a
suspended sentence under RSA 651:20 for ten years simply cannot
be reasonably understood as waiving all collateral challenges to
his conviction and sentence for ten years, including federal
habeas corpus relief. Such a belief, if petitioner actually
thought that was the case, would be unreasonable, and at best
negligent. Petitioner has failed, by a wide margin, to identify
any circumstances warranting application of equitable tolling in
this case. See Delaney, 264 F.3d at 15 (citing with approval the
trial court’s finding that extraordinary circumstances did not
exist when “no one lulled the petitioner into a false belief that
12 he had more than the allotted time to file, or otherwise misled
him”).
3. Diligence in pursuing other post-conviction remedies
Petitioner did obtain sentence review in 1995. However,
based on the record, he appears not to have pursued any other
post-conviction remedies until his state motion to withdraw his
pleas was filed in 2004. Consequently, petitioner has shown, at
best, only modest diligence in pursuit of other post-conviction
remedies.
4. Prejudice to the prosecution
The events that led to petitioner’s conviction occurred on
January 1 4 , 1994. His petition for habeas relief was filed some
thirteen years later. That passage of time would likely impose
significant burdens on the State should it have to retry
Sokorelis. See Trapp, 479 F.3d at 62 (finding events occurring
twenty-four years prior to filing a habeas petition prejudicial
to the state); see also David, (discussing the strong interest in
prompt assertion of habeas petitions due to the difficulty in
retrying petitioner “as memories fade, evidence disperses and
witnesses disappear”). Accordingly, this factor also militates
against equitable tolling.
13 5. Strength of petitioner’s claim
Equitable tolling is also not appropriate because
petitioner’s claim is of dubious merit. See Lattimore, 311 F.3d
at 55 (determining equitable tolling to be unavailable for a
claim of dubious merit); see also Brackett v . United States, 270
F.3d 6 0 , 71 (1st Cir. 2001).
Petitioner says his guilty pleas were not entered in a
manner consistent with minimum federal constitutional standards —
they were not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entered.
See Boykin v . Alabama, 395 U.S. 2 3 8 , 242 (1969); Desrosier v .
Bissonnette, 502 F.3d 3 8 , 41 (1st Cir. 2007). Courts consider
the totality of the circumstances when determining whether a
guilty plea was knowing, intelligent and voluntary. United
States v . Ward, 518 F.3d 7 5 , 84 (1st Cir. 2008). To meet federal
constitutional standards, the record must affirmatively disclose
that a defendant who pleaded guilty entered his plea
understandingly and voluntarily. Id. No particular form or
script need be followed, but the record must show that the
defendant’s plea was intelligent and voluntary, and, in that
respect, the plea colloquy “might be supplemented by the
completion of a printed waiver form that also addressed the
constitutional elements of a plea.” Ward, 518 F.3d at 8 3 .
14 Petitioner seeks to undermine his pleas on grounds that he
did not understand that he could be sentenced to three
consecutive terms of imprisonment, and that his attorney never
informed him of that possibility. Further, he argues that at the
age of nineteen, he did not understand the meaning of
“consecutive sentences,” so did not appreciate the consequences
of his pleas. He also says he was prejudiced because he never
would have agreed to plead guilty had he known that consecutive
sentences would mean, as a practical matter, imprisonment for
life. Petitioner also argues that he was rushed through the plea
discussions.
During the plea colloquy, the state judge advised petitioner
of the specific rights he would waive by pleading guilty. The
court also asked whether petitioner understood that he was
offering a “naked plea” (explained as one that involved no
promises by the state concerning sentencing recommendations).2
2 The transcript of the plea colloquy includes the following relevant exchange:
The Court: You understand, u h , do you — as I d o , apparently — u h , based on the — your attorney’s representations to m e , that you are entering what we call a naked plea, and that i s , a plea that is not based on any recommendations with the state and n o , u h , promises, u h , concerning recommendations have been made; do you understand that?
The Defendant: Yes, sir.
15 The court also asked whether anyone had promised petitioner
anything to induce him to plead guilty that day. He denied any
inducement to plead guilty.
Petitioner confirmed that he thoroughly reviewed the matter
with his attorney and had no further questions for the court or
his attorney. Petitioner also signed a Waiver of Indictment form
and an Acknowledgment and Waiver of Rights form on which he
acknowledged that he understood the nature of the charges to
which he was pleading guilty, had discussed the matter with
counsel, and pertinently, that he could be sentenced to “any term
up to life.” It also appears that petitioner’s defense counsel
testified, during the state hearing on his motion to withdraw the
pleas, that he told petitioner that consecutive sentences were
possible, and that petitioner understood the possible sentencing
consequences of his pleas in that respect.
Finally, the “rush,” as noted by the state court, was real
but unavoidable, given that it was petitioner who decided to
enter guilty pleas during trial. He had an interest in avoiding
what might have been an imminent verdict of guilty on the first
degree murder charge, and the life sentence with no possibility
of parole that would necessarily follow. The deal he struck,
such as it was, held out only a remote possibility of release
16 some day in the future, but a chance, however unlikely, was a
better option than no chance. Petitioner cannot now be heard to
claim that he was “rushed” to the point of not understanding what
he was doing.
Given the facts, as presented by petitioner and as appear in
the record, his claim that his guilty pleas were not knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily entered, or that the record does
not affirmatively show that his guilty pleas were entered in a
manner consistent with federal constitutional standards, is
highly dubious. This factor also weighs heavily against
application of the equitable tolling doctrine.
6. Possibility of a death sentence
This is not a case involving capital punishment, so
obviously, this factor does not support petitioner’s argument for
application of equitable tolling.
Evaluation of the petition and record in light of the six
Trapp factors leads the court to conclude that the statute of
limitations governing petitioner’s federal habeas petition should
not be equitably tolled.
17 Conclusion
Because petitioner did not bring his petition within the
limitations period imposed by AEDPA, did not pursue habeas relief
diligently, has not identified extraordinary circumstances that
prevented him from filing his petition in a timely fashion, seeks
to raise claims of dubious merit, the petition is untimely, and
petitioner is not entitled to have the filing period equitably
tolled. See Delaney, 264 F.3d at 16 (ending court’s analysis
after a finding that the petitioner’s untimely habeas action
would not be saved by equitably tolling). Accordingly,
respondent’s motion for summary judgment (document no. 10) is
granted. The clerk of the court shall enter judgment in
accordance with this order and close the case.
SO ORDERED.
Steven J. McAuliffe /Chief Judge April 3, 2009
cc: Stephen D. Fuller, Esq. Susan P. McGinnis, Esq. Jay Rancourt, Esq. John Vinson, NHDOC