Sohayegh Enterprises Corp. v. Gisondi

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Sohayegh Enterprises Corp. v. Gisondi

139 A.D.3d 457, 29 N.Y.S.3d 791

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMay 10, 2016

Docket1089 162112/14

StatusPublished

This text of 139 A.D.3d 457 (Sohayegh Enterprises Corp. v. Gisondi) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Sohayegh Enterprises Corp. v. Gisondi, 139 A.D.3d 457, 29 N.Y.S.3d 791 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2016).

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Opinion

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Carol R. Edmead, J.), entered on or about October 6, 2015, which granted plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment dismissing the fourteenth affirmative defense, and denied defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and for attorneys’ fees, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The term of the parties’ exclusive brokerage agreement was 180 days, to be extended for a number of days equal to the number of days the property was under contract. The agreement did not state that “the term of the contract shall be deemed renewed for a specified additional period unless [defendant] . . . gives notice to [plaintiff] ... of [his] intention to terminate the contract at the expiration of such term” (General Obligations Law § 5-903 [2]), and thus does not fall within the ambit of the statute. The term was tolled and thereby extended during the period the sale agreement with the third party was in effect. Further, because the duration of the agreement could be determined from the terms of the agreement, although it was not expressly or specifically stated, the agreement was not of “indefinite” duration and thus was not terminable at will (see Haines v City of New York, 41 NY2d 769, 772 [1977]).

Concur — Mazzarelli, J.P., Renwick, Saxe, Gische and Kahn, JJ.

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Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Carol R. Edmead, J.), entered on or about October 6, 2015, which granted plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment dismissing the fourteenth affirmative defense, and denied defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and for attorneys’ fees, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The term of the parties’ exclusive brokerage agreement was 180 days, to be extended for a number of days equal to the number of days the property was under contract. The agreement did not state that “the term of the contract shall be deemed renewed for a specified additional period unless [defendant] . . . gives notice to [plaintiff] ... of [his] intention to terminate the contract at the expiration of such term” (General Obligations Law § 5-903 [2]), and thus does not fall within the ambit of the statute. The term was tolled and thereby extended during the period the sale agreement with the third party was in effect. Further, because the duration of the agreement could be determined from the terms of the agreement, although it was not expressly or specifically stated, the agreement was not of “indefinite” duration and thus was not terminable at will (see Haines v City of New York, 41 NY2d 769, 772 [1977]).

Concur — Mazzarelli, J.P., Renwick, Saxe, Gische and Kahn, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

139 A.D.3d 457, 29 N.Y.S.3d 791, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sohayegh-enterprises-corp-v-gisondi-nyappdiv-2016.

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