Soffer v. General Motors, LLC

Opinion

Soffer v General Motors, LLC

2026 NY Slip Op 04807

July 30, 2026

Appellate Division, Third Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Victor K. Soffer, Appellant,

v

General Motors, LLC, Respondent.

Decided and Entered:July 30, 2026

CV-25-1793

Calendar Date: June 1, 2026

Before: Clark, J.P., Fisher, Powers, Mackey And Corcoran, JJ.

Victor K. Soffer, Stone Ridge, appellant pro se.

Ricci Tyrrell Johnson & Grey, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (Ilana Robinson of counsel), for respondent.

[*1]

Fisher, J.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Kevin Bryant, J.), entered May 7, 2025 in Ulster County, which, among other things, granted defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint.

In 2022, plaintiff purchased a new vehicle manufactured by defendant, and thereafter installed approximately $1,600 of accessories onto the vehicle. Following several unsuccessful repair attempts to address a vehicle defect, plaintiff requested arbitration under the New Car Lemon Law (see General Business Law § 198-a). In doing so, plaintiff sought a full refund of the purchase price and reimbursement for the cost of the accessories installed onto the vehicle. In June 2024, after plaintiff was advised that the cost of the accessories was not refundable under the Lemon Law, the arbitrator awarded plaintiff the full purchase price, with certain adjustments set by statute for fees, charges and allowances (see General Business Law § 198-a [c] [1]). Plaintiff, pro se, commenced this action against defendant, claiming that defendant was unjustly enriched by the accessories installed onto the vehicle when it was returned. Thereafter, plaintiff moved for a default judgment and defendant contemporaneously moved to dismiss the complaint; plaintiff opposed and further cross-moved for sanctions. Supreme Court denied plaintiff's motion for a default judgment, granted defendant's motion and dismissed the complaint, and denied plaintiff's cross-motion for sanctions. Plaintiff appeals.

We affirm. When moving for a default judgment under CPLR 3215 (f), a plaintiff must establish "(1) valid service of the summons and complaint, (2) the facts constituting the claim and (3) the default" (Gordon v Rockwood, 232 AD3d 976, 978 [3d Dept 2024] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). Where, as here, a plaintiff's moving papers are facially sufficient under CPLR 3215, "a defendant must show either that there was no default, or that it has a reasonable excuse for its delay and a potentially meritorious defense" (HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Thorne, 189 AD3d 1193, 1195 [3d Dept 2020] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). In opposition, defendant contended that it failed to timely appear in this action due to law office failure — specifically, recording the wrong date of service of process by plaintiff and two rejected filings with the court clerk's office. The record reveals that these errors amounted to a delay of less than two weeks, during which plaintiff was aware of defendant's intention to appear in the action. As to a potentially meritorious defense, defendant contended that, among other things, plaintiff failed to state a cause of action for unjust enrichment. Under these circumstances, including the policy preference in favor of resolving disputes on the merits, we conclude that Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion for a default judgment (see SNL Leaseholder LLC v Oakdale Rd. Holdings LLC, 210 AD3d 1355, 1356-1357 [3d Dept 2022]; Carrington [*2]v Moore, 125 AD3d 1069, 1070 [3d Dept 2015], appeal dismissed 26 NY3d 956 [2015]; see also Kegelman v Town of Otsego, 203 AD3d 82, 85 [3d Dept 2021], lv dismissed 38 NY3d 1124 [2022]).

Turning next to the portion of Supreme Court's order that granted defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint under CPLR 3211 (a) (7), "courts must accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true and accord the nonmoving party the benefit of every possible favorable inference and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" (De La Roca v Schacht, 244 AD3d 1570, 1572 [3d Dept 2025] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). Although "[a]ffidavits or other proof submitted by the [nonmoving party] may be used to remedy any defect in the complaint[, d]ismissal is nevertheless appropriate where a claim is premised upon bare legal conclusions, where the alleged facts do not support an element of the claim, or where the factual allegations and inferences to be drawn from them do not allow for an enforceable right of recovery" (He v Apple, Inc., 189 AD3d 1984, 1985 [3d Dept 2020] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). To state a cause of action for unjust enrichment, a plaintiff must "establish that (1) the other party was enriched, (2) at the plaintiff's expense, and (3) that it is against equity and good conscience to permit the other party to retain what is sought to be recovered" (Clark v Locey, 196 AD3d 794, 796 [3d Dept 2021] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted]). Furthermore, "[a]n allegation that the other party received benefits, standing alone, is insufficient to establish a cause of action to recover damages for unjust enrichment" (Schoch v Lake Champlain Ob-Gyn, P.C., 184 AD3d 338, 344 [3d Dept 2020] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], affd 38 NY3d 253 [2022]; see Clifford R. Gray, Inc. v LeChase Constr. Servs., LLC, 31 AD3d 983, 988 [3d Dept 2006]).

Here, the complaint alleged that plaintiff purchased approximately $1,600 of accessories which were specifically designed for and became part of the vehicle. It is further alleged that, pursuant to the arbitration award, defendant "accepted" these accessories with the return of the vehicle, and therefore had been unjustly enriched by approximately $1,600. In support of its motion to dismiss, defendant contended that these allegations failed to state that defendant received any benefit from the accessories — particularly given that defendant had no choice but to buy back the vehicle pursuant to the arbitration award. Although plaintiff's opposition focused on establishing his right to commence this action outside of the arbitration process (see General Business Law § 198-a [f]), he did not offer any facts to remedy defects in the complaint or support elements of his claim. Nor did he refute the contention that defendant was not benefited or enriched by the accessories with anything more than bare legal conclusions, which [*3]are insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss (see Godrey v Spano, 13 NY3d 358, 373 [2009]). Even according plaintiff the favorable inference that these accessories conferred some type of benefit to defendant, a mere benefit standing alone is insufficient to establish entitlement to a recovery under a cause of action for unjust enrichment (see Goel v Ramachandran, 111 AD3d 783, 791-792 [2d Dept 2013]; see also Schoch v Lake Champlain Ob-Gyn, P.C., 184 AD3d at 346; Clark v Daby, 300 AD2d 732, 733 [3d Dept 2002], lv denied 100 NY3d 503 [2003]). Moreover, there are no claims in the complaint alleging that plaintiff's return of the vehicle for a near-full refund pursuant to the arbitration award was made under such circumstances where it would be against equity and good conscience to permit defendant to retain the used accessories on a defective vehicle (see Ford Motor Credit Co. v State of New York, 219 AD2d 202, 204 [3d Dept 1996], lv denied 88 NY2d 813 [1996]; see also Grika v McGraw, 161 AD3d 450, 452 [1st Dept 2018]). Accordingly, Supreme Court properly granted defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint.

Lastly, Supreme Court properly denied plaintiff's cross-motion. Contrary to plaintiff's contention, and further in light of our determination, defendant's motion to dismiss was not completely without merit, undertaken to delay or prolong the litigation, or asserted false material facts (see 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 [c]; Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v LeTennier, ___ AD3d ___, ___, 250 NYS3d 260, 266 [3d Dept 2026]; Zwickel v Underhill Land LLC, 237 AD3d 1455, 1458-1459 [3d Dept 2025]). We have examined the parties' remaining contentions and have found them to be without merit or rendered academic.

Clark, J.P., Powers, Mackey and Corcoran, JJ., concur.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs.