Soehl v. Kijakazi

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. California
DecidedJanuary 28, 2022
Docket3:22-cv-00118
StatusUnknown

This text of Soehl v. Kijakazi (Soehl v. Kijakazi) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Soehl v. Kijakazi, (S.D. Cal. 2022).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 HUDSON S., Case No.: 3:22-cv-00118-AHG 12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA 13 v. PAUPERIS 14 KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Commissioner of Social Security, [ECF No. 2] 15 Defendant. 16 17 18 On January 28, 2022, Plaintiff Hudson S. (“Plaintiff”) brought this action against the 19 Commissioner of Social Security, Kilolo Kijakazi, seeking judicial review of the 20 Commissioner’s final administrative decision denying his application for Social Security 21 Disability Insurance Benefits for lack of disability. ECF No. 1. Along with his Complaint, 22 Plaintiff also filed a Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) under 28 23 U.S.C. § 1915. ECF No. 2. 24 I. LEGAL STANDARD 25 A motion to proceed IFP presents two issues for the Court’s consideration. First, the 26 Court must determine whether an applicant properly shows an inability to pay the $400 27 civil filing fee required by this Court. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1914(a), 1915(a). To that end, an 28 applicant must also provide the Court with a signed affidavit “that includes a statement of 1 all assets[,] which shows inability to pay initial fees or give security.” CivLR 3.2(a). 2 Second, § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) requires the Court to evaluate whether an applicant’s complaint 3 sufficiently states a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 4 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (“1915(e) not only permits but requires a district court to 5 dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim.”). 6 II. DISCUSSION 7 A. Motion to Proceed IFP 8 An applicant need not be completely destitute to proceed IFP, but he must adequately 9 prove his indigence. Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339–40 10 (1948). An adequate affidavit should “allege[] that the affiant cannot pay the court costs 11 and still afford the necessities of life.” Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th 12 Cir. 2015) (citing Adkins, 335 U.S. at 339). No exact formula is “set forth by statute, 13 regulation, or case law to determine when someone is poor enough to earn IFP status.” 14 Escobedo, 787 F.3d at 1235. Consequently, courts must evaluate IFP requests on a case- 15 by-case basis. See id. at 1235–36 (declining to implement a general benchmark of “twenty 16 percent of monthly household income”); see also Cal. Men’s Colony v. Rowland, 939 F.2d 17 854, 858 (9th Cir. 1991) (requiring that district courts evaluate indigency based upon 18 available facts and by exercise of their “sound discretion”), rev’d on other grounds, 506 19 U.S. 194 (1993); Venable v. Meyers, 500 F.2d 1215, 1216 (9th Cir. 1974). 20 An adequate affidavit should also state supporting facts “with some particularity, 21 definiteness and certainty.” United States v. McQuade, 647 F.2d 938, 940 (9th Cir. 1981) 22 (citing Jefferson v. United States, 277 F.2d 723, 725 (9th Cir. 1960)). The Court should not 23 grant IFP to an applicant who is “financially able, in whole or in material part, to pull his 24 own oar.” Temple v. Ellerthorpe, 586 F. Supp. 848, 850 (D.R.I. 1984); see also Alvarez v. 25 Berryhill, No. 18cv2133-W-BGS, 2018 WL 6265021, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2018) (noting 26 that courts often reject IFP applications when applicants “can pay the filing fee with 27 acceptable sacrifice to other expenses”). 28 Here, Plaintiff states in his affidavit that he has had no income for the last 12 months, 1 other than $8.34 in gifts, and does not anticipate having any income in the next month. 2 ECF No. 2 at 1–2. He has not been employed in the past two years and has only $10 in a 3 checking account, and he owns no assets. Id. at 2-3. Considering the information in the 4 affidavit, the Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently shown an inability to pay the $400 5 filing fee under § 1915(a). 6 B. Screening under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e) 7 As discussed above, every complaint filed pursuant to the IFP provisions of 28 8 U.S.C. § 1915 is subject to a mandatory screening by the Court under Section 9 1915(e)(2)(B). Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127. Under that subprovision, the Court must dismiss 10 complaints that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim on which relief may be 11 granted, or seek monetary relief from defendants who are immune from such relief. See 28 12 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Social Security appeals are not exempt from this screening 13 requirement. See Hoagland v. Astrue, No. 1:12-cv-00973-SMS, 2012 WL 2521753, at *1 14 (E.D. Cal. June 28, 2012) (“Screening is required even if the plaintiff pursues an appeal of 15 right, such as an appeal of the Commissioner's denial of social security disability benefits 16 [under 42 U.S.C. 405(g)].”); see also Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) 17 (affirming that “the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners”); 18 Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1129. 19 Rule 8 sets forth the federal pleading standard used to determine whether a complaint 20 states a claim upon which relief may be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8; see also Ashcroft v. 21 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009) (“[A] complaint must contain a “short and plain 22 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”); Bell Atlantic Corp. 23 v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (noting that “detailed factual allegations” are not 24 required, but a plaintiff must provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic 25 recitation of the elements of a cause of action” to justify relief). A proper pleading “does 26 not require detailed factual allegations, but it demands more than an unadorned, the- 27 defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. A pleading that offers labels and conclusions 28 . . . will not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further 1 factual enhancement.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal citations and quotations omitted) 2 (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8).

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Related

Adkins v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co.
335 U.S. 331 (Supreme Court, 1948)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
New Hampshire Hemp Council, Inc. v. Marshall
203 F.3d 1 (First Circuit, 2000)
Jesse J. Calhoun v. Donald N. Stahl James Brazelton
254 F.3d 845 (Ninth Circuit, 2001)
Temple v. Ellerthorpe
586 F. Supp. 848 (D. Rhode Island, 1984)
Maria Escobedo v. Apple American Group
787 F.3d 1226 (Ninth Circuit, 2015)
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