Socorro Independent School District v. Angelic Y.

107 F. Supp. 2d 761, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18459, 2000 WL 1092520
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Texas
DecidedMay 23, 2000
Docket7:00-cv-00044
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 107 F. Supp. 2d 761 (Socorro Independent School District v. Angelic Y.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Socorro Independent School District v. Angelic Y., 107 F. Supp. 2d 761, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18459, 2000 WL 1092520 (W.D. Tex. 2000).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

HUDSPETH, District Judge.

This action is in the nature of an appeal from the decision of a Texas Education Agency (“TEA”) Special Hearing Officer (“Officer”), brought pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. Plaintiff Socorro Independent School District (“SISD”) seeks to overturn a decision ordering it to reimburse next friend Angela T. for the private schooling costs she incurred after unilaterally withdrawing her daughter, Defendant Angelic Y. (“Angelic”), from O’Shea-Keleher Elementary School (“O’Shea”). Angela T.’s withdrawal decision followed a meeting with SISD officials in April 1997 regarding her daughter’s academic progress. The SISD had planned to allow Angelic to advance from O’Shea to William D. Slider Middle School (“Slider”), but Angela T. felt Angelic was not ready. After the principals of two parochial schools determined they could not treat Angelic for her learning disability, Angelic’s mother enrolled her daughter at The Bridges School (“Bridges”), a private school for the learning disabled. On August 12, 1998, Defendant filed a petition for due process with the TEA Officer. A two-day administrative hearing was held on November 9 and 10, 1998. On August 5, 1999, the Officer issued a decision in which she impliedly found that the educational benefits provided to Angelic by the SISD were de minimis, and that Angelic’s placement at Bridges was proper. On February 22, 2000, the SISD timely filed the present complaint. 1 On May 3, 2000, the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment; ■ subsequently, the SISD filed a response. This case is now ripe for decision.

A district court has jurisdiction to review an appeal of a state administrative hearing concerning a claim under the IDEA without regard to amount in controversy. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(I)(2)(A). Although it should assign “due weight” to a hearing officer’s findings, a court reviewing an IDEA case must ultimately reach an independent decision based on a preponderance of the evidence; moreover, its review is virtually de novo. See Houston I.S.D. v. Bobby R, 200 F.3d 341, 347 (5th Cir.2000).

Under IDEA, public school districts in states receiving certain federal funds must provide each child with a “free and appropriate public education” (“FAPE”). See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(8). To determine whether a school district has provided a FAPE, a district court must make the following inquiries: “First, has the State complied with the procedures set forth in [IDEA, a]nd second, is the individualized educational program [TEP’] developed through the Act’s procedures reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits?” Board of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Central Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207-08, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 3051, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982). The IEP consists of requirements and procedures which are set forth in 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d). The IEP plays a critical role in the overall FAPE inquiry. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 203-04, 102 S.Ct. at 3049. In assessing an IEP, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit requires courts to ask whether:

(1) the program is individualized on the basis of the student’s assessment and performance;
*764 (2) the program is administered in the least restrictive environment;
(3) the services are provided in a coordinated and collaborative manner by the key “stakeholders”; and
(4) positive academic and non-academic benefits are demonstrated.

Bobby R., 200 F.3d at 347-48 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Cypress-Fairbanks I.S.D. v. Michael F., 118 F.3d 245, 253 (5th Cir. 1997)). An IEP need not be the best possible one, nor one that will maximize the child’s educational potential; it must only provide the child a basic floor of opportunity. See Cypress-Fairbanks, 118 F.3d at 247-48. The educational benefits cannot be de minimis; rather, they must represent “meaningful progress” for the child’s education. See id. Parents who remove their child from a public school without the school district’s consent do so at their own financial risk; “only if a federal court concludes both that the public placement violated IDEA and that the private school placement was proper under the Act” will the parents be entitled to reimbursement. Florence County S.D. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 15, 114 S.Ct. 361, 366, 126 L.Ed.2d 284 (1993). The burden of proof rests with the parent to show that the IEP is flawed. See Alamo Heights I.S.D. v. State Bd. of Educ., 790 F.2d 1153,1158 (5th Cir.1986).

The first Cypress-Fairbanks factor to address is whether, based on the SISD’s assessment of her disability, Angelic’s IEP was sufficiently individualized. There is no doubt that SISD recognized that Angelic suffers from a learning disability; the only question concerns the precise label to affix to her condition. Dr. Robert Woody described Angelic as having “static encephalopathy,” a term broadly connoting brain disfunction of unknown origin. (Woody 11:175 — 93. 2 ) The disease prevents a child’s brain from functioning normally within approximately two standard deviations of the child’s age. It manifests itself particularly in slow auditory and visual processing. The slow development in turn leads to behavioral problems, and can affect cognitive attention span. The disease will not progress; instead, academic progress can be achieved by continuing to develop learning skills at an individualized pace. 3 Dr. Woody’s diagnosis corresponds very closely to Angelic’s symptoms, as evinced by the first-hand observations of teachers and diagnosticians at O’Shea and Bridges. Her teachers described her as having a very mild dyslexia, difficulty processing sounds and words, and trouble with reproducing pictures and symbols. (Hendricks 1:228-30; Teegarden 11:25-29.) Both the testimony and Angelic’s results on various tests indicate that the child’s progress in different academic areas is uneven, reflecting in large part a need to proceed at a slower pace. (Collins 11:108-30; Hendricks 1:239-41; Appendix, infra, at 13.) The tests also indicate, first, that her development is within approximately two standard deviations of her age, as Dr.

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107 F. Supp. 2d 761, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18459, 2000 WL 1092520, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/socorro-independent-school-district-v-angelic-y-txwd-2000.