Socolov v. Bondi

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedDecember 23, 2025
Docket21-75
StatusUnpublished

This text of Socolov v. Bondi (Socolov v. Bondi) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Socolov v. Bondi, (9th Cir. 2025).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 23 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

OLEG SOCOLOV, Nos. 21-75 21-1179 Petitioner, Agency No. A206-497-115 v.

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General, MEMORANDUM*

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted December 17, 2025**

Before: PAEZ, CHRISTEN, and KOH, Circuit Judges.

In these consolidated petitions, Oleg Socolov, a native and citizen of

Moldova, petitions pro se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’

(“BIA”) orders denying various motions. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reconsider,

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). reopen, or terminate proceedings. See Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 791

(9th Cir. 2005); Dominguez v. Barr, 975 F.3d 725, 734 (9th Cir. 2020). We review

de novo constitutional claims. Mohammed, 400 F.3d at 791-92. We deny the

petitions for review.

In 21-75, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to

reconsider where Socolov failed to identify any error in the BIA’s decision

upholding the IJ’s order denying adjustment of status and cancellation of removal

under the Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA”). See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1);

Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 558 (9th Cir. 2004) (“A petitioner’s motion to

reconsider must identify a legal or factual error in the BIA’s prior decision.”).

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen where

Socolov did not identify new and material evidence. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1229a(c)(7)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); Fonseca-Fonseca v. Garland, 76 F.4th

1176, 1180 (9th Cir. 2023) (“The BIA can deny a motion to reopen . . . [for] failure

to introduce previously unavailable, material evidence.” (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted)).

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to terminate

where Socolov’s contentions relating to his criminal convictions were outside the

BIA’s purview, he did not comply with the procedural requirements for ineffective

assistance of counsel claims, and his due process contentions were unsupported by

2 21-75, 21-1179 the record. See Tamang v. Holder, 598 F.3d 1083, 1090-91 (9th Cir. 2010) (failure

to satisfy Lozada was fatal to ineffective assistance of counsel claim where

ineffectiveness was not plain on face of record); Padilla-Martinez v. Holder, 770

F.3d 825, 830 (9th Cir. 2014) (“To prevail on a due-process claim, a petitioner

must demonstrate both a violation of rights and prejudice.”).

In 21-1179, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to

reconsider where Socolov failed to identify any error in the BIA’s decision

denying his earlier motions to reconsider, reopen, and terminate. See 8 C.F.R.

§ 1003.2(b)(1); Ma, 361 F.3d at 558. Moreover, the BIA did not abuse its

discretion in denying the motion as untimely as to the underlying merits decision

where the motion was filed more than six months after the order. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1229a(c)(6)(B); Lona v. Barr, 958 F.3d 1225, 1230 (9th Cir. 2020) (motion to

reconsider generally must be filed within thirty days of the final removal order).

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen where

Socolov did not identify new and material evidence. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1229a(c)(7)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); Fonseca-Fonseca, 76 F.4th at 1180.

We reject Socolov’s unsupported contention that VAWA cancellation of

removal should not have a hardship requirement. Socolov’s contention that the

3 21-75, 21-1179 agency applied the wrong legal standard to battered spouses is unsupported by the

record.

PETITIONS FOR REVIEW DENIED.

4 21-75, 21-1179

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Related

Tamang v. Holder
598 F.3d 1083 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Kui Rong Ma v. John Ashcroft, Attorney General
361 F.3d 553 (Ninth Circuit, 2004)
Jesus Padilla-Martinez v. Eric Holder, Jr.
770 F.3d 825 (Ninth Circuit, 2014)
Elizabeth Lona v. William Barr
958 F.3d 1225 (Ninth Circuit, 2020)
Gonzalo Dominguez v. William Barr
975 F.3d 725 (Ninth Circuit, 2020)
Mario Fonseca-Fonseca v. Merrick Garland
76 F.4th 1176 (Ninth Circuit, 2023)

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