Society for Good Will for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Cuomo

718 F. Supp. 139, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9044, 1989 WL 87126
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. New York
DecidedAugust 3, 1989
Docket78-CV-1847
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 718 F. Supp. 139 (Society for Good Will for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Cuomo) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Society for Good Will for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Cuomo, 718 F. Supp. 139, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9044, 1989 WL 87126 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

FINAL JUDGMENT

WEINSTEIN, District Judge.

This litigation seeking relief for alleged unconstitutional conditions and violations of state and federal statutes at the Long Island Developmental Center for profoundly mentally and otherwise disabled persons has been before the court for more than ten years. See Society for Good Will for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Cuomo, 572 F.Supp. 1300 (E.D.N.Y.1983); 737 F.2d 1239 (2d Cir.1984); 103 F.R.D. 168 (E.D.N.Y.1984); 832 F.2d 245 (2d Cir.1987). The court has continued to visit the institution and some of its small residential satellites, review reports of certifying agencies and of the institution, hold evidentiary hearings and discuss ongoing problems with counsel and administrative staff.

Enormous improvements in conditions at the Center have resulted from the dedicated efforts of staff; support by the state; and pressure of governmental agencies, including the courts, and counsel for both plaintiffs and defendants. Nevertheless, severe institutional problems revealed in earlier opinions continue. As reflected in the most recent hearings and reports of certifying agencies, the constitutional rights of clients to adequate physical and medical support are being violated. According to expert testimony credited by the court, there is loss of capacity in residents as a result of inadequate facilities, treatment and habilitation. The institution fails to provide reasonably safe conditions of confinement, freedom from unreasonable bodily restraints and minimally adequate training that credible expert testimony and the court find to be reasonably required. These failures constitute a violation of the rights of clients. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 327, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 2464, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982) (Blackmun J., concurring) (constitution requires training “reasonably necessary to prevent a person’s preexisting self-care skills from deteriorating because of his commitment (emphasis in original)); Clark v. Cohen, 794 F.2d 79, 95-96 (3d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 962, 107 S.Ct. 459, 93 L.Ed.2d 404 (1986); Society for Goodwill to Retarded Children, Inc. v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239, 1250 (2d Cir.1984).

The court credits findings of various state and federal certifying agencies deter *141 mining that the institution is not complying with applicable federal regulations designed to protect clients physically and medically. These expert reports are trustworthy. See Rule 803(8)(B), (C) of the Federal Rules of Evidence; Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, — U.S. —, 109 S.Ct. 439, 102 L.Ed.2d 445 (1988). These findings confirm the evidence received in court and the court’s own observations that constitutional rights to minimum housing, food, medical treatment and habilitation necessary to prevent client deterioration have not been met. In view of these findings of constitutional violations and supporting oral findings made on the record, it is not necessary to determine whether specific federal statutes are being violated.

It has been suggested by the Court of Appeals that prior consent by the state to a decree in this case may have constituted a waiver of its eleventh amendment immunity under Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984) (eleventh amendment prohibits federal courts from imposing injunctive relief against state officials for violations of state law). See Society for Goodwill for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Cuomo, 832 F.2d 245, 246 (2d Cir.1987). See also Kozlowski v. Coughlin, 871 F.2d 241, 244 (2d Cir.1989). This court respectfully declines to follow that suggestion. As a matter of fact, no intentional waiver occurred. Implied waivers are not desirable in circumstances such as are reflected in the present litigation because they would make cooperative stipulations by the state less likely, reduce the number of consent decrees and induce litigation to the death by the defendant in an increased number of cases.

The plaintiffs have sought a master to supervise the institution. Such an appointment is not desirable under the circumstances of this case. The director and staff of the institution are fully committed to improvement and need no supervision. The state has been relatively forthcoming in its budgetary allocations, considering all the other fiscal demands it must meet.

The administrative limitations on the institution make it apparent that the constitutional rights of clients cannot be protected without further reduction of the client population. All agree that this reduction should, for generally accepted professional reasons, be accomplished by transferring as many clients as is practicable to small home-like cottages, houses and apartments; if possible these small residences should be off-campus, in the community. Community placement to the extent reasonable under the circumstances is a necessary remedial measure to vindicate the clients’ constitutional entitlements. The court has the power and obligation to require remedial steps designed to overcome the effect of years of severe constitutional deprivations experienced by clients of the Center. Cf. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 107 S.Ct. 1053, 1073, 94 L.Ed.2d 203 (1987) (“ 'Once a right and a violation have been shown, the scope of a district court’s equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies.’ ”) {quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 1275, 28 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971); United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 837 F.2d 1181, 1235-36 (2d Cir.1987), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 108 S.Ct. 2821, 100 L.Ed.2d 922 (1988).

The following is ordered after detailed consultation on terms among counsel, administrative staff of the institution and the court:

1. The policies and actions of the defendants in the operation of the Long Island Developmental Center are declared to be in continuing violation of the plaintiff class members’ rights under the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.

2. Defendants shall implement the following plan at LIDC (including the Sagti-kos and Sagamore units):

*142 GOAL I: To Assure Proper Programming, Particularly for those Over the Age of 21 Not Educated in the Public School System

OBJECTIVE

ACTIONS

1.

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718 F. Supp. 139, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9044, 1989 WL 87126, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/society-for-good-will-for-retarded-children-inc-v-cuomo-nyed-1989.