Sobin v. Guarnaccia

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Sobin v. Guarnaccia

256 A.D.2d 457, 682 N.Y.S.2d 93, 1998 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13497

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedDecember 16, 1998

StatusPublished

This text of 256 A.D.2d 457 (Sobin v. Guarnaccia) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Sobin v. Guarnaccia, 256 A.D.2d 457, 682 N.Y.S.2d 93, 1998 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13497 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1998).

Pincite

Opinion

—In an action to recover damages for alleged malpractice by a psychologist, the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (De Maro, J.), dated December 3, 1997, which granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint as time-barred pursuant to CPLR 214-a.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the motion is denied, and the complaint is reinstated.

The Court of Appeals has held that “the services provided by psychologists, however scientifically based they may be, are not ‘medical’ services within the meaning of CPLR 214-a” (Karasek v LaJoie, 92 NY2d 171, 177). Accordingly, the instant action, which was commenced more than 2V2 years but less than 3 years after the plaintiffs discontinued their treatment with the defendant, a licensed psychologist, is timely (see, CPLR 214 [6]). Rosenblatt, J. P., Santucci, Friedmann and McGinity, JJ., concur.

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—In an action to recover damages for alleged malpractice by a psychologist, the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (De Maro, J.), dated December 3, 1997, which granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint as time-barred pursuant to CPLR 214-a.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the motion is denied, and the complaint is reinstated.

The Court of Appeals has held that “the services provided by psychologists, however scientifically based they may be, are not ‘medical’ services within the meaning of CPLR 214-a” (Karasek v LaJoie, 92 NY2d 171, 177). Accordingly, the instant action, which was commenced more than 2V2 years but less than 3 years after the plaintiffs discontinued their treatment with the defendant, a licensed psychologist, is timely (see, CPLR 214 [6]). Rosenblatt, J. P., Santucci, Friedmann and McGinity, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

256 A.D.2d 457, 682 N.Y.S.2d 93, 1998 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13497, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sobin-v-guarnaccia-nyappdiv-1998.

Opinion

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