10/04/2022
DA 22-0070 Case Number: DA 22-0070
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2022 MT 193N
DAVID SNYDERS,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
PROFESSIONAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT,
Defendant and Appellee,
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, In and For the County of Missoula, Cause No. DV-21-1272 Honorable Robert L. Deschamps, III, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
David Snyders, Self-Represented, Missoula, Montana
For Appellee:
Thomas C. Orr, Orr McDonnell Law, PLLC, Missoula, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: August 31, 2022
Decided: October 4, 2022
Filed:
__________________________________________ Clerk Chief Justice Mike McGrath delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not
serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this
Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana
Reports.
¶2 David Snyders (Snyders) appeals from a February 1, 2022 Fourth Judicial District
Court Order denying his appeal from an August 25, 2021 bench trial in Justice Court. The
lower court denied his claim for relief after Professional Property Management (PPM)
withheld most of his $1,200 security deposit after he moved out of his rental. We affirm.
¶3 On February 9, 2017, Snyders entered into a Residential Lease-Rental Agreement
with Clark Fork Realty for a twelve-month rental of a property located at 2010 South 8th
Street West, in Missoula. The lease agreement provided for a $1200 security deposit.
Shortly thereafter, Snyders signed a document entitled Manager-Tenant Statement of
Condition of the Rental Property (Statement of Condition), that listed a number of items in
the residence as in “fair” or “poor” condition. On November 7, 2018, PPM sent a letter to
residents of the property, stating that PPM was taking over management of the property
from Clark Fork Realty and would be conducting walk throughs of the residences.
Accompanying the letter, for Snyders’ signature, was a Residential Lease Agreement
between PPM and Snyders providing for a month-to-month tenancy starting on December
2 15, 2018 and purporting to incorporate “Move-in Property Condition Report” and “Present
Condition of Premises” documents.
¶4 After Snyders moved out in 2021, PPM conducted an inspection, provided Snyders
with an inspection report listing numerous issues found, and, ultimately, withheld all but
$84.99 of Snyders’ security deposit, noting $735.96 in cleaning costs, including 14 hours
of labor, and $384.99 in damages, including removing and disposing of leftover tenant
items, painting and repairing a wall, and replacing carpet.
¶5 At an August 25, 2021 bench trial in Justice Court, Snyders argued that his security
deposit should not have been withheld because (1) PPM had not complied with
§ 70-25-206, MCA, and (2) the residence was already in disrepair when he moved in. Early
on in the trial, Snyders attempted to reference the Statement of Condition document, which
he had apparently attempted to file with the clerk’s office beforehand on the assumption
that the court would receive and consider it. The Justice Court advised that anything
Snyder wished to have considered by the court would need to be admitted into evidence at
the current trial. However, counsel for PPM then stipulated to the admission of the
Statement of Condition and it was admitted into the court file as evidence.
¶6 PPM presented testimony and a written report thoroughly documenting the
condition of the residence after Snyders moved out—describing it as “filth[y]” with vomit
on the floor and heating vent—and regarding the cost of the subsequent cleaning and
repairs. A PPM witness also testified that Snyders was not charged for anything that he
had listed as already in “fair” or “poor” condition on his original 2017 Statement of
Condition document. Moreover, witness testimony established that PPM did conduct a
3 walk-through of the premises upon taking over management of the property in 2018 and
Snyders had not raised any issues with regard to the condition of the premises at that time.
¶7 The Justice Court ruled in favor of PPM, determining that Snyders had failed to
provide sufficient evidence to support his claim. The ruling was upheld on appeal by the
District Court.
¶8 In an appeal from a justice court established as a court of record, the district court
functions as an appellate court and review is confined to the record. State v. Seaman, 2005
MT 307, ¶ 10, 329 Mont. 429, 124 P.3d 1137. This Court reviews a justice court’s factual
findings for clear error, its discretionary rulings for abuse of discretion, and its legal
conclusions for correctness, as if the appeal had been originally filed in this Court. Seaman,
¶ 10; Hines v. Topher Realty, LLC, 2018 MT 44, ¶ 11, 390 Mont. 352, 413 P.3d 813. Our
ultimate determination is whether the district court, in its review of the trial court’s
decision, reached the correct conclusions under the appropriate standards of review. Hines,
¶ 12.
¶9 Section 70-25-206(1), MCA, provides in relevant part that a “person engaged in the
rental of property for residential purposes who requires a security deposit shall furnish to
each tenant, in conjunction with execution of a lease or creation of a tenancy, a separate
written statement as to the present condition of the premises intended to be let.” It further
provides that a landlord who fails to do so “is barred from recovering any sum for damage
to or cleaning of the leasehold premises unless the person can establish by clear and
convincing evidence that the damage occurred during the tenancy in question and was
caused by the tenant” or the tenant’s guests. Section 70-25-206(3), MCA. Snyders argues
4 here, as he did before the Justice Court, that PPM was required to furnish him with a new
statement as to the present condition of the premises when it executed the 2018 lease
pursuant to taking over management of the property. However, we need not reach this
issue here1 because the record, as summarized above, supports the conclusion that PPM,
regardless, met its burden under § 70-25-206(3), MCA, to show by clear and convincing
evidence that the damage occurred during Snyders’ tenancy and was caused by Snyders or
his guests. Moreover, there was sufficient record evidence to support a factual finding that
Snyders was not charged for cleaning or repair of items that he had listed as being in either
fair or poor condition upon moving in.
¶10 On appeal, Snyders states that he was misadvised by a clerk of court that he could
“upload[]” exhibits ahead of time that could then be considered by the Justice Court during
trial. Snyders fails to show how reliance on this alleged bad advice entitles him to relief
on appeal. Similarly, Snyders provides no legal support for his argument that the Justice
Court should have, sua sponte, ordered a continuance or recess to better allow Snyders to
understand the rules of evidence and prepare accordingly, and fails to demonstrate that the
District Court was required to order a new trial on that basis.2
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10/04/2022
DA 22-0070 Case Number: DA 22-0070
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2022 MT 193N
DAVID SNYDERS,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
PROFESSIONAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT,
Defendant and Appellee,
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, In and For the County of Missoula, Cause No. DV-21-1272 Honorable Robert L. Deschamps, III, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
David Snyders, Self-Represented, Missoula, Montana
For Appellee:
Thomas C. Orr, Orr McDonnell Law, PLLC, Missoula, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: August 31, 2022
Decided: October 4, 2022
Filed:
__________________________________________ Clerk Chief Justice Mike McGrath delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not
serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this
Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana
Reports.
¶2 David Snyders (Snyders) appeals from a February 1, 2022 Fourth Judicial District
Court Order denying his appeal from an August 25, 2021 bench trial in Justice Court. The
lower court denied his claim for relief after Professional Property Management (PPM)
withheld most of his $1,200 security deposit after he moved out of his rental. We affirm.
¶3 On February 9, 2017, Snyders entered into a Residential Lease-Rental Agreement
with Clark Fork Realty for a twelve-month rental of a property located at 2010 South 8th
Street West, in Missoula. The lease agreement provided for a $1200 security deposit.
Shortly thereafter, Snyders signed a document entitled Manager-Tenant Statement of
Condition of the Rental Property (Statement of Condition), that listed a number of items in
the residence as in “fair” or “poor” condition. On November 7, 2018, PPM sent a letter to
residents of the property, stating that PPM was taking over management of the property
from Clark Fork Realty and would be conducting walk throughs of the residences.
Accompanying the letter, for Snyders’ signature, was a Residential Lease Agreement
between PPM and Snyders providing for a month-to-month tenancy starting on December
2 15, 2018 and purporting to incorporate “Move-in Property Condition Report” and “Present
Condition of Premises” documents.
¶4 After Snyders moved out in 2021, PPM conducted an inspection, provided Snyders
with an inspection report listing numerous issues found, and, ultimately, withheld all but
$84.99 of Snyders’ security deposit, noting $735.96 in cleaning costs, including 14 hours
of labor, and $384.99 in damages, including removing and disposing of leftover tenant
items, painting and repairing a wall, and replacing carpet.
¶5 At an August 25, 2021 bench trial in Justice Court, Snyders argued that his security
deposit should not have been withheld because (1) PPM had not complied with
§ 70-25-206, MCA, and (2) the residence was already in disrepair when he moved in. Early
on in the trial, Snyders attempted to reference the Statement of Condition document, which
he had apparently attempted to file with the clerk’s office beforehand on the assumption
that the court would receive and consider it. The Justice Court advised that anything
Snyder wished to have considered by the court would need to be admitted into evidence at
the current trial. However, counsel for PPM then stipulated to the admission of the
Statement of Condition and it was admitted into the court file as evidence.
¶6 PPM presented testimony and a written report thoroughly documenting the
condition of the residence after Snyders moved out—describing it as “filth[y]” with vomit
on the floor and heating vent—and regarding the cost of the subsequent cleaning and
repairs. A PPM witness also testified that Snyders was not charged for anything that he
had listed as already in “fair” or “poor” condition on his original 2017 Statement of
Condition document. Moreover, witness testimony established that PPM did conduct a
3 walk-through of the premises upon taking over management of the property in 2018 and
Snyders had not raised any issues with regard to the condition of the premises at that time.
¶7 The Justice Court ruled in favor of PPM, determining that Snyders had failed to
provide sufficient evidence to support his claim. The ruling was upheld on appeal by the
District Court.
¶8 In an appeal from a justice court established as a court of record, the district court
functions as an appellate court and review is confined to the record. State v. Seaman, 2005
MT 307, ¶ 10, 329 Mont. 429, 124 P.3d 1137. This Court reviews a justice court’s factual
findings for clear error, its discretionary rulings for abuse of discretion, and its legal
conclusions for correctness, as if the appeal had been originally filed in this Court. Seaman,
¶ 10; Hines v. Topher Realty, LLC, 2018 MT 44, ¶ 11, 390 Mont. 352, 413 P.3d 813. Our
ultimate determination is whether the district court, in its review of the trial court’s
decision, reached the correct conclusions under the appropriate standards of review. Hines,
¶ 12.
¶9 Section 70-25-206(1), MCA, provides in relevant part that a “person engaged in the
rental of property for residential purposes who requires a security deposit shall furnish to
each tenant, in conjunction with execution of a lease or creation of a tenancy, a separate
written statement as to the present condition of the premises intended to be let.” It further
provides that a landlord who fails to do so “is barred from recovering any sum for damage
to or cleaning of the leasehold premises unless the person can establish by clear and
convincing evidence that the damage occurred during the tenancy in question and was
caused by the tenant” or the tenant’s guests. Section 70-25-206(3), MCA. Snyders argues
4 here, as he did before the Justice Court, that PPM was required to furnish him with a new
statement as to the present condition of the premises when it executed the 2018 lease
pursuant to taking over management of the property. However, we need not reach this
issue here1 because the record, as summarized above, supports the conclusion that PPM,
regardless, met its burden under § 70-25-206(3), MCA, to show by clear and convincing
evidence that the damage occurred during Snyders’ tenancy and was caused by Snyders or
his guests. Moreover, there was sufficient record evidence to support a factual finding that
Snyders was not charged for cleaning or repair of items that he had listed as being in either
fair or poor condition upon moving in.
¶10 On appeal, Snyders states that he was misadvised by a clerk of court that he could
“upload[]” exhibits ahead of time that could then be considered by the Justice Court during
trial. Snyders fails to show how reliance on this alleged bad advice entitles him to relief
on appeal. Similarly, Snyders provides no legal support for his argument that the Justice
Court should have, sua sponte, ordered a continuance or recess to better allow Snyders to
understand the rules of evidence and prepare accordingly, and fails to demonstrate that the
District Court was required to order a new trial on that basis.2
1 Not raised by the parties here, the new lease appears to incorporate the preexisting Statement of Condition. 2 Notably, the record indicates that, once Snyders learned that he would have to enter into evidence any materials he wished the court to consider, the court promptly admitted, as stipulated to by opposing counsel, the Statement of Condition document Snyders sought to rely upon. Snyders did not take the opportunity to seek to admit any other evidentiary materials, beyond a print-out of § 70-25-206, MCA. Thus, the record demonstrates that Snyders was able to present the materials relevant to his two arguments made below. 5 ¶11 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our
Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the
Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear application of
applicable standards of review.
¶12 Affirmed.
/S/ MIKE McGRATH
We Concur:
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON /S/ BETH BAKER /S/ DIRK M. SANDEFUR /S/ JIM RICE