IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA Richmond Division JEFFREY T. SNOW, IV, ) Plaintiff, v. Civil Action No. 3:20CV543-HEH TIMOTHY FISHER, Defendant. MEMORANDUM OPINION (Dismissing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Complaint) Jeffrey T. Snow, IV, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, submitted this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The matter is before the Court for evaluation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A. I. PRELIMINARY REVIEW Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) this Court must dismiss
any action filed by a prisoner if the Court determines the action (1) “is frivolous” or (2) “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The first standard includes claims based upon “an indisputably meritless legal theory,” or claims where the “factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Clay v. Yates, 809 F. Supp. 417, 427 (E.D. Va. 1992) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)). The second standard is the familiar standard for a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
“A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint; importantly, it does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.” Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992) (citing 5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1356 (1990)). In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations are taken as true and the complaint is viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993); see also Martin, 980 F.2d at 952. This principle applies only to factual allegations, however, and “a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “require[] only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . .. claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”” Bell Atl Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (second alteration in original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Plaintiffs cannot satisfy this standard with complaints containing only “labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action.” Jd. (citations omitted). Instead, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” stating a claim that is “plausible on its face,” rather than merely “conceivable.” Jd. at 555, 570 (citation omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Igbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 556). In order for a claim or complaint to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, the plaintiff must “allege facts sufficient to state all the elements of [his or] her claim.” Bass v. E.l. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d 193, 213 (4th Cir. 2002); Jodice v. United States, 289 F.3d 270, 281 (4th Cir. 2002)). Lastly, while the Court liberally construes pro se complaints, Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978), it will not act as the inmate’s advocate and develop, sua sponte, statutory and constitutional claims that the inmate failed to clearly raise on the face of his complaint. See Brock v. Carroll, 107 F.3d 241, 243 (4th Cir. 1997) (Luttig, J., concurring); Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). Il. SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges: On July 1% 2020, Judge Fisher showed prejudice against me stating I was locked up and that’s where I was gonna be pending the outcome of my case. He was very biased in violating my 5“ Amendment by depriving me of life, freedom, and liberty without due process of law, also violating my 8" Amendment by denying me bail without good cause, treating me as guilty without due process and as if he has a personal vendetta against me as well as no reason for denying my motions to the courts. (Compl. 4.)! Plaintiff demands a fair trial before an unbiased judge. (Jd. at 5.) Il. ANALYSIS It is both unnecessary and inappropriate to engage in an extended discussion of the lack of merit of Plaintiffs theories for relief. See Cochran v. Morris, 73 F.3d 1310, 1315
! The Court employs the pagination assigned by the CM/ECF docketing system. The Court corrects the capitalization and punctuation in the quotations from Plaintiffs Complaint.
(4th Cir. 1996) (emphasizing that “abbreviated treatment” is consistent with Congress’s vision for the disposition of frivolous or “insubstantial claims” (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989))). Snow’s claims will be dismissed for failing to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and as legally frivolous. Snow clearly seeks the invalidation or vacation of his criminal conviction and sentence. The notion that Snow may seek, through a civil suit, the vacation or alteration of his criminal convictions and sentence, “is legally frivolous under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), and related cases.” Payne v. Virginia, No. 3:07CV337, 2008 WL 1766665, at *2 (E.D. Va. Apr. 17, 2008). In Heck, the Supreme Court emphasized that “civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 486.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA Richmond Division JEFFREY T. SNOW, IV, ) Plaintiff, v. Civil Action No. 3:20CV543-HEH TIMOTHY FISHER, Defendant. MEMORANDUM OPINION (Dismissing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Complaint) Jeffrey T. Snow, IV, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, submitted this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The matter is before the Court for evaluation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A. I. PRELIMINARY REVIEW Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) this Court must dismiss
any action filed by a prisoner if the Court determines the action (1) “is frivolous” or (2) “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The first standard includes claims based upon “an indisputably meritless legal theory,” or claims where the “factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Clay v. Yates, 809 F. Supp. 417, 427 (E.D. Va. 1992) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)). The second standard is the familiar standard for a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
“A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint; importantly, it does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.” Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992) (citing 5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1356 (1990)). In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations are taken as true and the complaint is viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993); see also Martin, 980 F.2d at 952. This principle applies only to factual allegations, however, and “a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “require[] only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . .. claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”” Bell Atl Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (second alteration in original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Plaintiffs cannot satisfy this standard with complaints containing only “labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action.” Jd. (citations omitted). Instead, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” stating a claim that is “plausible on its face,” rather than merely “conceivable.” Jd. at 555, 570 (citation omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Igbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 556). In order for a claim or complaint to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, the plaintiff must “allege facts sufficient to state all the elements of [his or] her claim.” Bass v. E.l. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d 193, 213 (4th Cir. 2002); Jodice v. United States, 289 F.3d 270, 281 (4th Cir. 2002)). Lastly, while the Court liberally construes pro se complaints, Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978), it will not act as the inmate’s advocate and develop, sua sponte, statutory and constitutional claims that the inmate failed to clearly raise on the face of his complaint. See Brock v. Carroll, 107 F.3d 241, 243 (4th Cir. 1997) (Luttig, J., concurring); Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). Il. SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges: On July 1% 2020, Judge Fisher showed prejudice against me stating I was locked up and that’s where I was gonna be pending the outcome of my case. He was very biased in violating my 5“ Amendment by depriving me of life, freedom, and liberty without due process of law, also violating my 8" Amendment by denying me bail without good cause, treating me as guilty without due process and as if he has a personal vendetta against me as well as no reason for denying my motions to the courts. (Compl. 4.)! Plaintiff demands a fair trial before an unbiased judge. (Jd. at 5.) Il. ANALYSIS It is both unnecessary and inappropriate to engage in an extended discussion of the lack of merit of Plaintiffs theories for relief. See Cochran v. Morris, 73 F.3d 1310, 1315
! The Court employs the pagination assigned by the CM/ECF docketing system. The Court corrects the capitalization and punctuation in the quotations from Plaintiffs Complaint.
(4th Cir. 1996) (emphasizing that “abbreviated treatment” is consistent with Congress’s vision for the disposition of frivolous or “insubstantial claims” (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989))). Snow’s claims will be dismissed for failing to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and as legally frivolous. Snow clearly seeks the invalidation or vacation of his criminal conviction and sentence. The notion that Snow may seek, through a civil suit, the vacation or alteration of his criminal convictions and sentence, “is legally frivolous under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), and related cases.” Payne v. Virginia, No. 3:07CV337, 2008 WL 1766665, at *2 (E.D. Va. Apr. 17, 2008). In Heck, the Supreme Court emphasized that “civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 486. The Supreme Court then held that: [I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a [civil rights] plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Id. at 486-87 (internal footnote omitted). The Supreme Court then required that “when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” Jd. at 487.
In Edwards v. Balisok, the Supreme Court extended Heck to civil rights actions that do not directly challenge confinement, but instead contest procedures which necessarily imply unlawful confinement. See 520 U.S. 641, 646 (1997). The Supreme Court has explained that Heck and its progeny teach that: [A] state prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation}—no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings)—if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005). Snow requests that the Court grant him a new trial. Snow does not articulate, and the Court does not discern, how he could be entitled to such relief and not simultaneously invalidate the fact or duration of his confinement. See Edwards, 520 U.S. at 648; Heck, 512 U.S. at 481-90; see also Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973) (holding that when “the relief [a prisoner] seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from [custody], his sole federal remedy is the writ of habeas corpus”). Because success on his claims necessarily implies invalid confinement, under the second prong of the Heck analysis, Snow must demonstrate a successful challenge to his current conviction. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. Snow makes no allegation that the state court has invalidated his current convictions or sentence. Jd. at 486-87. Thus, Heck and its progeny, bars all of Snow’s claims.
IV. CONCLUSION Snow’s claims will be dismissed for failure to state a claim and as frivolous. The action will be dismissed without prejudice. The Clerk will be directed to note the disposition of the action for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). An appropriate Order will accompany this Memorandum Opinion. \\UK /s/ HENRY E. HUDSON Date:Der, 2,202.0 SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE Richmond, Virginia