Snodgrass v. Morris

24 N.E. 151, 123 Ind. 425, 1890 Ind. LEXIS 217
CourtIndiana Supreme Court
DecidedApril 26, 1890
DocketNo. 14,099
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 24 N.E. 151 (Snodgrass v. Morris) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Indiana Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Snodgrass v. Morris, 24 N.E. 151, 123 Ind. 425, 1890 Ind. LEXIS 217 (Ind. 1890).

Opinion

Elliott, J.

The appellee is the auditor of Henry county, and the appellant is one of the mortgagors by whom a mortgage was executed to secure a loan obtained from the school fund. The object of the suit is to secure a cancellation of the mortgage, and the ground upon which a right to the relief sought is placed is that the property mortgaged belonged to the appellant, and was executed to obtain money for her husband.

A county auditor is a public officer, invested by the statute with certain rights and duties, and he possesses no other rights than those conferred by the statute. He is, in no sense, the owner of the school fund, nor has he any right to release or cancel mortgages given to secure loans made from that fund, except as the statute provides; and there is nothing in the statute empowering him to decide whether a mortgage is, or is not, void because executed by a married woman to obtain money for the benefit of her husband. It seems quite clear, therefore, that no action will lie against him to compel the cancellation of a mortgage executed to the State to secure a loan made from the school fund. As said of the auditor, in a similar case : He is not the party in interest. The mortgage is neither payable to nor owned by him; it is payable to the State. The State is the party in interest.” Crooks v. Kennett, 111 Ind. 347.

Whether the appellant can, in any event, or in any suit against any person whatsoever, secure a cancellation of the mortgage, is a question upon which we express no opinion; but we may say that it is, at least, very doubtful whether a married woman who makes the statement the statute requires in order to obtain a loan from the school fund, can defeat the mortgage she joins in executing. There are strong reasons why the rule which applies in ordinary cases should not apply to such a case.

Judgment affirmed.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Draper v. Zebec
37 N.E.2d 952 (Indiana Supreme Court, 1941)
Barringer v. Fidelity & Deposit Co.
159 S.E. 373 (Supreme Court of South Carolina, 1931)
Anderson Lumber Co. v. Miner Township School District
230 N.W. 23 (South Dakota Supreme Court, 1930)
Southern Surety Co. v. Kinney
127 N.E. 575 (Indiana Court of Appeals, 1920)
Moore & Richter Lumber Co. v. Scheid
121 N.E. 91 (Indiana Court of Appeals, 1918)
Smiley v. State
110 N.E. 222 (Indiana Court of Appeals, 1915)
Title Guaranty & Surety Co. v. State ex rel. Leavenworth State Bank
109 N.E. 237 (Indiana Court of Appeals, 1915)
Cress v. Ivens
163 Iowa 659 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1914)
Fry v. P. Bannon Sewer Pipe Co.
101 N.E. 10 (Indiana Supreme Court, 1913)
Merchants' Protective Ass'n v. Jacobsen
127 P. 315 (Idaho Supreme Court, 1912)
Smith v. Bowman
88 P. 687 (Utah Supreme Court, 1907)
State ex rel. Longfellow v. Wimer
77 N.E. 1078 (Indiana Supreme Court, 1906)
Graham v. Russell
52 N.E. 806 (Indiana Supreme Court, 1899)
Trimble v. State ex rel. Stephens
44 N.E. 260 (Indiana Supreme Court, 1896)
Welch v. Fisk
38 N.E. 403 (Indiana Supreme Court, 1894)
State ex rel. Morris v. Frazier
34 N.E. 636 (Indiana Supreme Court, 1893)
Davee v. State, ex rel. Board of Commissioners
34 N.E. 308 (Indiana Court of Appeals, 1893)
Lloyd v. State ex rel. Banta
34 N.E. 311 (Indiana Supreme Court, 1893)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
24 N.E. 151, 123 Ind. 425, 1890 Ind. LEXIS 217, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/snodgrass-v-morris-ind-1890.