Snipes v. Pure Oil Company

186 F. Supp. 373, 1960 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3437
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Louisiana
DecidedAugust 15, 1960
DocketCiv. A. 7163
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 186 F. Supp. 373 (Snipes v. Pure Oil Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Snipes v. Pure Oil Company, 186 F. Supp. 373, 1960 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3437 (W.D. La. 1960).

Opinion

HUNTER, District Judge.

Alleging that his serious, permanent, and disabling injuries resulted from the proximate negligence of defendant, plaintiff brings this maritime tort action on the civil side.

The case was tried and resulted in a verdict by the jury in favor of plaintiff for $75,000.

At the close of plaintiff’s case, defendant filed a motion for a directed verdict. Defendant filed a similar motion at the close of all the evidence. These motions were denied and the ease submitted to the jury. Subsequent to the verdict, defendant filed a timely motion to set aside the jury’s verdict and to grant defendant a judgment notwithstanding same.

The substantive federal maritime law controls and the maritime rules with respect to comparative negligence, assumption of risk, proximate cause, burden of proof, etc., are applicable. 1

The facts considered in the light most favorable to plaintiff are substantially these: The accident occurred on a stationary oil drilling platform owned by Pure Oil Company, which was located in the Gulf of Mexico off the Louisiana coast. Plaintiff was employed by Loff-land Brothers Company as a member of a drilling crew in the capacity of a rough neck. The drilling job was governed by a contract between Pure and Lofiland. 2 At the time of the accident, Loffland’s drilling crew of which plaintiff was a member was preparing to “skid” the rig from a location where the drilling of a well had been completed to a new location. The platform was owned by Pure; the fuel tank was owned by Pure; the fresh water storage tank was owned by Pure; Pure furnished the fresh water. The tanks were located on the platform and were used in connection with drilling operations. The water tank was used to store fresh water which was needed to flood the hydraulic brake in the rig. The tank was connected with the rig by two pipelines, one of which ran along the floor of the platform from the bottom of the tank to the rig, and was called a “suction line”, and the other was suspended above the platform of the rig to *375 the top of the water tank. During the course of operations the water circulated from the tank through the suction line into the rig, through the hydraulic brake, and by gravity was carried back through the line of pipe suspended above the platform floor from the rig to the water tank. The effect was a circulating system by which the water passed from the tank through the hydraulic brake in the rig and back to the tank through the return line suspended above the platform. This return line (or flow line), as plaintiff calls it, was composed of two joints of iron pipe which were connected together in the middle by a standard collar connection. The pipe was supported in the middle by a pole with a pedestal on the platform floor, at the top of which was a saddle in which the pipe rested. To move the rig from one location to a new location on the platform it was necessary to take down or discharge this overhead return line, sometimes called a discharge line, sometimes called a flow line. The plaintiff climbed the water tank by means of a ladder fastened to the side of the tank and went on top thereof for the purpose of lifting the nozzle which fitted into a hole in the middle of the top of the tank so that the end of the pipe could be slidden by his co-employees at its other end away from the derrick. As plaintiff lifted his end out of the hole on the top of the tank, the pipe broke at the middle of the two joints of pipe which had been connected by the collar. Then the long end of the pipe went down and the short one came up and gave plaintiff a little push off the top of the platform (Tr. 192). It was just enough push to unbalance him (Tr. 192), and he fell towards the platform floor and through a hole which had been left in the platform floor by Pure employees; his body struck portions of the substructure located below the platform floor, and he fell into the Gulf. Plaintiff was rescued by a boat belonging to Pure and was taken ashore. The Pure water tank from which plaintiff fell had no rails or guards of any kind upon it. It was oval shaped and was about ten or twelve feet in diameter. The top of it was of smooth surface, slightly oval shaped; it was not a flat top, but was rounded on the top (Tr. 187). Defendant’s own witness, Mr. Teacle, testified that it would not have been expensive to provide safety rails (Tr. 313).

Judgment n. o. v.

The law applicable is well established and multiplying authorities would be superfluous. It may be summarized as follows: The fact-finding power belongs to the jury. This power includes the determination of all questions of fact, and the drawing or rejection of inferences from facts. Both negligence and proximate cause are for the jury to find or reject, and the findings of the jury are not to be disturbed wherever they rest upon some evidence, or upon a reasonable inference or conclusion based upon some evidence. Neither conflicting evidence nor conflicting inferences are to be re-weighed or considered by the trial judge in testing the verdict. The sole question in testing the verdict is whether there is any evidence in the record, or any reasonable inference from any evidence in the record, which, if believed, would authorize a verdict against defendants.

Defendant energetically and earnestly contends that there is no evidence of negligence on its part which proximately caused plaintiff’s injuries. 3 We disagree.

Testing the evidence as we must, with all inferences most favorable to the jury verdict, we find that there was ample evidence which the jury could, and presumably did, credit to this effect :

(1) A proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of Pure in not equipping the oval shaped smooth surfaced water tank with railings or some sort of safety surface on top.
*376 (2) Had the water tank been so equipped, plaintiff would not have fallen.
(3) The failure on the part of defendant to provide a safe place from which plaintiff could do the work required of him (dismantling the pipe) was a proximate cause of the accident (see the description of the tank as contained in the transcript, page 59.)

Because of our conclusions heretofore immediately set out, it is not necessary to decide whether a jury question was presented on the issue of the ownership of the pipe that broke. The only positive testimony relative the ownership of the pipe was that defendant’s witness, Teacle, who stated categorically that the pipe belonged to Loffland (Tr. 301). This testimony could be accepted in whole or in part by the jury, or disbelieved in whole or in part. There was, in my opinion, ample evidence upon which the jury could have concluded that the connection that broke was in fact a flow line connection (Tr. 66, 68, 69, 78, 94, 347). Because this is true, plaintiff insists that it was equally within the province of the jury to find that the connection that broke belonged to Pure, because under the contract it was Pure’s obligation to furnish flow line connections. And in addition, the plaintiff insists that all of the equipment at the particular time of this accident was under the contract controlled by Pure.

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Bluebook (online)
186 F. Supp. 373, 1960 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3437, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/snipes-v-pure-oil-company-lawd-1960.