Snelson v. State

341 S.W.3d 582, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 3709, 2011 WL 1843600
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedMay 16, 2011
Docket07-10-0259-CV
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 341 S.W.3d 582 (Snelson v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Snelson v. State, 341 S.W.3d 582, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 3709, 2011 WL 1843600 (Tex. Ct. App. 2011).

Opinion

OPINION

PATRICK A. PIRTLE, Justice.

This is an appeal from an order partially granting and partially denying Appellant’s motion requesting the trial court to rescind a withdrawal notification issued pursuant to section 501.014(e)(4) and (5) of the Tex *583 as Government Code, pertaining to the withdrawal of funds from an inmate account for the purpose of payment of fines, court fees and costs. We affirm.

Procedural Background

Appellant was convicted on March 9, 2005, of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver in a drug-free zone, 1 twice enhanced, and sentenced to sixty years confinement. Almost five years later, on February 25, 2010, without a hearing, the trial court signed and entered a document entitled Order to Withdraw Inmate Funds (Pursuant to TX. Gov’t. Code, Sec. 501.011(e)). 2 By this withdrawal notification, the trial court directed the Texas Department of Criminal Justice Institutional Division to withhold $2,228.50 for court costs, fines and fees from Appellant’s inmate account. On March 9, 2010, a Bill of Costs was prepared reflecting Appellant owed $2,228.50, of which $1,950 was for court-appointed attorney’s fees. While the 2005 judgment provides that “the State of Texas do have and recover of the said defendant all costs in this proceeding incurred, for which let execution issue,” the summary portion of the judgment leaves the amount of costs blank and the issue of attorney’s fees is unaddressed.

On March 18, 2010, Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal and a request for recession of the withdrawal notification. On April 12, 2010, Appellant filed his second motion requesting recession of the withdrawal notification. On August 30, 2010, Appellant filed with this Court a pro se brief raising the following issues: (1) the withdrawal order is a violation of due process; (2) the withdrawal order is void because the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction lapsed; and (3) if the trial court’s order is valid pursuant to section 501.014(e) of the Texas Government Code, then that statute is unconstitutional. In its reply brief, the State raised the issue of whether a final, appealable order existed for review by this Court. Agreeing that no final, appealable order had been entered, on November 10, 2010, this Court found Appellant’s notice of appeal to be premature. See Snelson v. State, 326 S.W.3d 754, 756 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2010, no pet.). Accordingly, the appeal was abated for ninety days to allow Appellant the opportunity to challenge in the trial court the withdrawals from his inmate account and obtain an appealable order. Id. at 756-57. Thereafter, on January 21, 2011, Appellant filed his third request for recession of the withdrawal notification along with a request for setting.

By letter dated February 25, 2011, Appellant was notified that no order had been received by this Court during the abatement period and he was directed to show cause, no later than March 28, 2011, why the appeal should not be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. See Tex.R.App. P. 42.3(a). On March 16, 2011, Appellant filed a response which included a copy of a *584 letter to the trial court again requesting a ruling on his challenge to the withdrawal notification. On April 14, 2011, a supplemental clerk’s record was filed in this Court containing the trial court’s Amended Order to Withdraw Funds signed March 21, 2011.

We find that a final, appealable order was created by the trial court’s ruling on Appellant’s motion, as evidenced by the March 21, 2011 amended order. See Williams v. State, 332 S.W.3d 694, 698 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2011, pet. denied) (citing Ramirez v. State, 318 S.W.3d 906, 908 (Tex.App.-Waco 2010, no pet.)); Jewell v. State, No. 06-10-00114-CV, 2011 WL 1642769, at *1, 2011 Tex.App. LEXIS 3256, at *1 (Tex.App.-Texarkana April 28, 2011, no pet.).

Standard of Review

We review a trial court’s decision whether to grant or deny a challenge to a withdrawal notification under an abuse of discretion standard. Williams, 332 S.W.3d at 698. A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts “without reference to any guiding rules and principles.” Quixtar Inc. v. Signature Mgmt. Team, LLC, 315 S.W.3d 28, 31 (Tex.2010) (quoting Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex.1985)); Howell v. State, 175 S.W.3d 786, 792 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005); Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 380 (Tex.Crim.App.1990). Furthermore, a trial court abuses its discretion if “it reaches a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law.” Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W.2d 916, 917 (Tex.1985).

Analysis

In Harrell v. State, 286 S.W.3d 315 (Tex.2009), the Texas Supreme Court held that a withdrawal notification directing prison officials to withdraw money from an inmate account pursuant to section 501.014(e) does not violate due process and is, therefore, constitutional when the inmate has “received some measure of due process.” Id. at 320. In determining whether Harrell was accorded constitutional due process, the Court concluded that because Harrell had received notice of the withdrawal (a copy of the withdrawal notification) and an opportunity to contest the dollar amount and statutory basis of the withdrawal (a motion to rescind or modify the withdrawal notification), 3 he received all that due process required. Id. at 321. The Court added that neither notice nor an opportunity to be heard need occur before the issuance of a withdrawal notification. Id. This Court has interpreted Harrell as saying that due process requires that an inmate have an opportunity to contest the dollar amount and statutory basis of the withdrawal by way of a motion to modify, correct or rescind the withdrawal notification. See Snelson, 326 S.W.3d at 756; Bryant v. State, No. 07-10-00358-CV, 2010 WL 3893674, at *1-2, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 8059, at *4-5 (Tex.App.-Amarillo Oct. 5, 2010, no pet.); Williams v. State, 322 S.W.3d 301 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2010, no pet.).

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341 S.W.3d 582, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 3709, 2011 WL 1843600, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/snelson-v-state-texapp-2011.