Snell v. State of Washington

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT AT SEATTLE KIM SNELL, CASE NO. 3:20-cv-06028-JHC Plaintiff, ORDER v. THE STATE OF WASHINGTON; DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND HEALTH SERVICES, JUDITH A. FITZGERALD and UNA I. WILEY, Defendant.

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration. Dkt. # 50. The Court concludes that there is no manifest error in its prior ruling. See LCR 7(h). And even if Plaintiff were correct that she spoke on a matter of public concern, qualified immunity would preclude her § 1983 claims. As the Court explained in its prior Order (Dkt. # 48), the Ninth Circuit has held that the determination of whether a public employee’s speech is constitutionally protected “turns on a context-intensive, case-by-case balancing analysis,” and that “the law regarding such claims will rarely, if ever, be sufficiently ‘clearly established’ to preclude qualified immunity under Harlow and its progeny.” Moran v. State of Wash., 147 F.3d 839, 847 (9th Cir. 1998). Plaintiff has cited several cases holding that the right to exercise protected speech without suffering retaliation is l “clearly established.” Dkt. # 50 at 7 (citing Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 256 (2006); Aydelotte v. Town of Skykomish, C14-307MJP, 2020 WL 4347261, at *5 (W.D. Wash. July 29, 2020); Tucker v. State of Cal. Dept. of Educ., 97 F.3d 1204, 1210 (9th Cir. 1996). But Plaintiff does not cite any cases holding that speech like Ms. Snell’s at issue is, in fact, constitutionally protected. The question before the Court is whether Plaintiffs speech was so clearly protected by First Amendment that it would have been patently unreasonable for Defendants to conclude g || that their actions were lawful. See, e.g., Lytle v. Wondrash, 182 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 1999). g || Plaintiff has not persuaded the Court on this point. The Court therefore denies the motion. Dated this 8th day of May, 2023. 1] Chur John H. Chun United States District Judge