Sneed v. United States

• Court: United States Court of Federal Claims
• Decided: June 16, 2014
• Docket: 1:14-cv-00194
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

oRr0rNAr IJr tbt @nite! $ltutts 6,ourt of feteru[ @lsims No. 14-194C

(Filed: June 13,2014)

(NOT TO BE PUBLISHED) FILED * :* r. * :N,* {. * :t t! :t ** {. * *'1. * * rt *'1. * rr :1.,* ****** *( {. JUN 13 2014

U.$@tJRTtr TIMOTHY SNEED, FEDERAICI.AIi'

Plaintiff,

UNITED STATES,

Defendant'

*'* * * * * * * * * *! * * * * {( * *,t<'t * * * :t * * *'r * * * * *'t

Timothy Sneed, pro se, Chipley, Florida'

LisaL.Donahue,TrialAttomey,CommercialLitigationBranch'CivilDivision'United States Department of Justice, Washingion, D C', for defendant With her on the briefs were E. Kirschman, Jr., Director, Stuart F. belery, Assistant Attomey deneral, Civil Division, Robert and neginald T.' Blades, Jr., Assisiant Director, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D C'

OPINION AND ORDER

LETTOW, Judge.

Plaintifl Timothy Sneed, is an inmate confined by the Florida Depanment of No. 5; see also sne.ed -v state, corrections. see Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss ("Def.'s Mot.") at 1, ECF sqso.ra514(Fla.Dist.Ct.App'2011).Hisclaimsinthiscourtariseoutofhiscriminal state violations of federal and conviction in Florida. Compl. at 4.r Mr. Sneed alleges numerous Lawinhiscomplaint,appearingtochallengehisconvictionandthelegalityofsalariespaidto rlo lggg,Mr. Sneed was convicted of second degree murder. sneed v. State,934 So.2d 475 (Fla.pist. it. App. 2004) (per curiam). His conviction for the murder rested heavily on after the shooting ld The f,orpiiui ,".-ar..lating to tis iieat nent for a gunshot wound soon and a new trial was ordered' nor'pitut ,..ora, were la-ter held to have been illegally obtained' inia ,. State, gi6 So. 2d 1235, i238 (Fta. Dist. Ct. App 2004) (per curiam)' Ultimately, 99 So' 3d at 514' Mr. Sneed was retried, reconvicted, and resentenced in2005' Sneed' Mr. Sneed remains incarcerated. individuals involved in his prosecution and conviction. See Compl. at 5-7. Pending before the court is the government's motion to dismiss, filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) ofthe Rules ofthe Court ofFederal Claims ("RCFC"), contending thal the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider Mr. Sneed's claims. See Def.'s Mot. at l.'

BACKGROUND

Following his incarceration in Florida, Mr. Sneed filed a series ofactions and appeals in both federal and state courts, generally seeking relief from his criminal conviction. Mr. Sneed was ultimately unsuccessful in his efforts. See, e.g.,Sneedv. Florida' 552U.S' 845(2007) (denying petition for writ of certiorari); sneed v. Rodriguez,5 17 Fed. Appx. 923 (1 lth Cir. 2013) no bias on part of iper iu.iaml (affirming district court's decision finding lack ofjurisdiction and tire magistrate judge at retrial); Sneed v. Florida Dep't. ofcorr.,496 Fed' Appx' 20, 22 (11$ C.o.2O1D (per curiam) (affirming denial of petition for habeas corpus); Sneed v. Pan Am. Hosp. 8d.,122 So. :d AOg (Fla. 2013) (table) (summarily dismissing case for lack ofjurisdiction); sneed v. crews, No. scl3- 1045, 2014 WL 1647 498 (Fla. 2014) (denying petition for writ of habeas corpus as procedurally baned); sneedv. McNeil,984 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. Dist. ct. App. 2008) (table) (per curiam) (denying petition for writ of certiorari on the merits)'

In his complaint in this court, Mr. Sneed alleges that Florida State Attomey Katherine Fernandez-Rundle, who prosecuted him, the Honorable Victoria Brennan, the then-Assistant judge al his state Attomey who also prosecuted him, the Honorable Rosa I. Rodriguez, the retrial, and Ms. Eladia Chat ez, ajuror at his retrial (collectively "the named individuals"), are all agents of the State of Florida andthus agents of the United States. Compl. at 4; see ciso, Def.'s Mot. at 1 . Mr. Sneed avers that because the named individuals ale agents of the United States, the United states must answer for their actions. compl. at I l. He argues that they have been compensated for offices that they did not lawfully hold, and that theV 1ys; repaV compensation fraudulently received from the United States government Compl at4-5'' According-to Mr. Sneed, at the time of his first trial, then-Assistant state Attomey Brennan did not have a ,'valid notarized loyalty oath of office or valid notarized oath of Secrecy filed and recorded in the Office of the Cierkof the Court in the county in which the appointing State Attomey resides" andthuswas..masquerading,'asapublicofficialwhensheprosecutedhim.Compl.at4 (intemal quotation marks omitted;. He makes a similar claim regarding Judge Rodriguez id.; ru olro Pl.'s Reply and Resp. to Def.'s Mot to Dismiss ("Pl"s Opp'n") at 3' ECJ No. O.n tr,lt. Sneed fuiher av".r ihut Judg"r Brennan and Rodriguez violated 3l C.F R.

2By proceed ln order entered June 5,2014, the court granted Mr. Sneed's application to forma pauperis. 3Mr. Sneed additionally seeks fifty million dollars in unspecified damages for "[f]raud 'compl. and [t]reason and [c]riminal [a]narchy." at 6 (intemal quotation marks omitted). This claimior damag", ii unropport"d by'allegations in the complaint or by averments in Mr. Sneed's response to the govemment's motion to dismiss.

aAlthough Mr. Sneed alleges in his complaint that he has been unjustly imprisoned response to the because his trialand retrial were invalid, Compl. at 7, he confirms in his committed fraud against the Treasury by endorsing checks issued by the $ 202.3(b)(1)(iD5 and federal govemment. Pl.'s Opp'n at 2-3.

Mr. Sneed also posits a Fifth Amendment takings claim, asserting that Florida has taken his property by "cash[ing] in [a bond] against [him] for committing a [flelony criminal offense." Pl.'s Opp'n at 4.

Finally, Mr. Sneed requests that if this oourt finds that it lacks jurisdiction, it transfer his case to any court where his claims under the Eighth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, or 43 U.S.C. $ 1983 may be brought. Pl.'s Opp'n at 7 (citing 28 U.S.C. $ 1631).

STANDARDS FOR DECISION

Mr.Sneed premises this court's jurisdiction over his claims on the Tucker Act, 28 IJ.S.C. to renderjudgment $ 1491. See Pl.'s Opp',n at 3. The Tucker Act grants this court 'Jurisdiction upon uny claim againit the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congresi or any regulation ofan executive department, or upon any express or implied contract witlithe United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort." 28 U.S.C. $ la91(a)(1). The Tuiker Act waives sovereign immunity and enables a plaintiff to sue the United States for monetary damages. United States v. Mitchell,463 U.S. 206,212 (1983). The Act itself, however, does noi create a substantive right to monetary relieffrom this corxt. United Srates v. Testdn, 424 lJ .5. 392,398 (19':. 6); see also Martinez v. United States,333 F.3d 1295, 1302-03 (Fed. Cir.2003)(enbanc). "A substantive right must be found in some other source of law.'j Mitchetl,463 U.S. at216. To meet the jurisdictional requirements of the Tucker Act, the plaintiff must point to an independent, substantive source of law that mandates payment from th; United States for the injury suffered. Testan, 424 U S at 400'

The..court must satisfy itselfthat it has jurisdiction to hear and decide a case before proceeding to the merits.,' Hardie v. united states,367 F.3d 1288, 1290 (Fed. cir. 2004) Inc. r. Platte Chem. Co.,304 F.3d 1235' iintemal quotation marks omitted) (quoting P1N1N1P, iz+r 6"0^.Cir.2002)). When considering a motionto dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the court will "normally conslder the facts alleged in the complaint T P:^Td 1988) (citing "orr"",.,'Reynotrlsv.Army&AirForceExch.serv.,846F.2d'146,747(Fed.cir. court's Scheuer r. ihod"r,4l6 U.S. 232,236 (1974)). The party seeking to establish the jurisdiction bears ihe burden of proving it by a preponderance ofthe evidence' McNutt v' General Motors Acceptance Co)p of lnct.,isg U.S' 178, 189 (1936); Reynolds,846F'2dat748'

Pl.'s govemment,s motion to dismiss that he is not making a claim for unjust imprisonment, liberty were 6pp,r, at 5 (,,Although Mr. Sneed's imprisonment is unjust, as his freedom and tut"n . . . this complaint is not founded upon that theory at this junctue ")' "nju.tfy permits depositaries upon authorization by the Secretary of '31 C.F.R. $ 202.3(b)(1Xii) ,'the maintenance of accounts in the name ofthe United States the Treasury to periorm Treasurv." In construing pleadings filed bypro se plaintiffs, the court generally holds them to "'less stringentstandardsthanformaipleadingsdraftedbylawyers."'Estellev.Gamble,429U.5.97, i06 (1976) (qu,oting Haines v. Kerner,4O4 U.S. 519,520 (1972) (rct curiam))' "This latitude, however, does not relieve apro se pluntiff from meeting jr'risdictional requirements." Bernard v. united states,59 Fed. cl. 497 , 499 (200$, aff'd,98 Fed. Appx. 860 (Fed. Cit.2004); see also Henkev. IlnitedStates,60F.3d795,799 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Thus, even asapro se plaintiff' Mr. Sneed "bears the burden ofestablishing the [c]ourt's jwisdiction by a preponderance ofthe evidence." Riles v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl. 163, 165 (2010) (citing Taylor v United States, 303 F.3d 13s'1, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).

ANALYSIS

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiclion

As a preliminary matter, Mr. Sneed cannot name Judge Rodriguez, Judge Brennan, Eladia Chavez or State Attomey Femandez-Rundle as defendants before this court, The"only proper defendant for any matter before this court is the United States, not its officers nor any other individual:' Stephenson v. United States,58 Fed. Cl. 186, 190 (2003) (emphasis in original) (citing tJnited States v. Sherwood,3l2 U.S' 584,589 (19a1)). This court has no jurisdiction to hear claims against state prosecutors, judges, orjurors. Mr. Sneed repeatedly itates that Judge Rodriguez, Judge Brennan, Ms. Chavez, and State Attomey Fernandez-Rundle are agents of the United States, see, e.g , Pl.'s Opp'n at 4-5, but this claim is facially without merit.o

In addition to naming defendants over whom this court has no jurisdiction, Mr. Sneed has alleged statutory violations ihat this court has no juridical power to address. He alleges that the nu*"d indiuiduuls have violated federal criminal laws related to fraud, treason, and perjury, among others. See Compl. at 2-3. This court does not have jurisdiction over criminal matters. see Jishua v. [Jnited states, 1"7 F .3d 3'18,379-80 (Fed. cir. 1994) ("The court of Federal claims does not have jurisdiction over claims alleging tortious or criminal conduct."); Campbell v. United States,229 Ct. Cl. 706 (l93 1) (per curiam) (dismissing claims oftreason and various other criminai charges for lack ofjurisdiction). Thus, this court also does not have jurisdiction over Mr. Sneed,s claim that the named Florida officials have committed "[t]reason and

6Mr. Sneed cites Jacobs v. (lnited States,290 U.S. 13 (1933), as support for his claim that the United States can be held accountable for the actions ofthese individuals, Compl. at 5, but Jacobs concems the right to just compensation following a govemmental taking of private properly, Jacobs, 290 U.S, at 15, and has no bearing on this case' Mr. Sneed also cites united states v. National Exchange Bank of Baltimore,27j U .5. 527 (1926), in support ofhis theory that the named parties can be considered proxies for the united states govem-ent. Pl.'s opp'n at2. National Exchange Bank concemed a check issued by the United States Veteran's Buriau that had been fraudulently altered before being eventually cieared through the Baltimore Branch of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. 270 U.S' at 5 33. Federal institutions were thus at the heart ofthe dispute considered by the Supreme court in National Exchange Bank. Id. at 533-34. Here, none ofthe named individuals were purporting to act on behalf of the United States. [c]riminal [a]narchy" in violation of Florida state law. Compl. at 3. Moreover, Mr. Sneed has not provided a plausible factual foundation for the crimes he asserts were committed. For example, Mr. Sneed states that the named parties committed commercial crimes in violation of 27 C.F.R. $ 72.11. Compl. at 2-3. The cited regulation applies only to officers and agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, se e 27 C.F .R. $ 72. I 1 , and is therefore inapplicable to this case.

Mr. Sneed also seeks to invoke jurisdiction in this court "under the Tucker Act for recovery of the money illegally required to be paid on behalfofthe govemment." Pl.'sOpp'nat 6 (citingFisher v. United States,402F.3d 1167 (Fed. Cir.2005)). Mr. Sneed's reliance on Fisher is misplaced. Fisher requires that the statute being examined create a fair inference that it is amenable to a right of recovery in damages. 402F.3dat.1172. Mr. Sneed cites no federal statute or regulation that would constitute a money-mandating source of law to be applied in his favor as a basis for relief. Forexample, Mr. Sneed cites 31C.F.R. 55202.32-.34,240.6, claiming that these regulations allow this court to seek, on behalfofthe Treasury, reclamation of funds paid to the named individuals. Pl.'s Opp'n at 2-3. The regulations apply only to financial institutions. not individuals.

Mr. Fifth Amendment's takings clause as a basis for jurisdiction, Sneed also identifies the but his claim fails plausibly to allege a taking by the United States. The takings clause is money- mandating, but it provides forjust compensation only in the event that private property is taken for public use. See U.S. Const. amend. V. Mr. Sneed appears to rely on the Fifth Amendment to assert that: (1) the State ofFlorida illegally took his money by assessing against him "charges to pay for the prosecution of his case and his bond," Pl.'s Opp'n at 6, and (2) the named individuals illegally retained money paid by the United States govemmenr, id. at 4-5. His claim that Florida illegally retained his money is not a claim against the United States, and therefore it is beyond the court's jurisdiction. Similarly, his second claim is not a claim against the United States, but rather appears to be a claim on behalf of ttre United States. Furthermore, as far as the court can surmise from the record, no property was taken for public use in this case, and Mr. Sneed's claim has no factual basis.

As the govemment correctly noted in its motion to dismiss, to the extent that Mr. Sneed alleges violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and 42 U.S.C. $ 1983, see Pl.'s Opp'n at 7, this court does not have jurisdiction over any ofthose claims. Def 's Mot at 5-6; see also Trafny v. [Jnited States,503 F.3d 1339, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that the Court of Federal Claims does not have jurisdiction over claims arising under the Eighth Amendment); Marlin v. (/nited States,63 Fed. Cl. 475,476 (2005) (concluding that jurisdiction over claims arising under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. $ 1983, resides exclusively with the federal district courls); LeBlanc v. (Jnited States,50 F.3d 1025, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (stating that the Fourteenth Amendment is not money-mandating and provides no basis for Tucker Act iurisdiction). In sum, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over any of Mr. Sneed's claims.

B. Motion to Transfer

Mr. Sneed requests that if this court lacks jurisdiction, it transfer his claims to another court in which the action could have been brought. Pl.'s Opp'n at 7. When this court lacks jurisdiction over a civil claim, it has the authority to transfer that claim to a court "in which the action . . . could have been brought at the time it was filed or noticed" if such transfer is "in the interest of justice." 28 U.S.C. $ 163 1; see Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 672 F '3d' 13 09, 13 14 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc). The court determines whether a transfer would serve the interests of justice after parsing plaintiff s claims. See Johnsonv. United Stafes, 105 Fed. Cl' 85,96 (2012); Taylor v. United States,92 Fed. Cl. 36,39 (2010). In this respect, courts emphasize that a plaintiff should have the opportunity to have his or her nonfrivolous claims heard on the merits if jurisdictionatly possible. Johnson,l05 Fed. Cl. at 96 (citing Galloway Farms, Inc. v United States,834 F.2d 998, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 1987)). Because Mr. Sneed has had a number ofprior opportunities to present his claims to federal and Florida courts, transfer is not appropriate in this instance. See id.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, the govemment's motion to dismiss is GRANTED, and Mr. Sneed,s complaint is dismissed pursuant to RCFC l2(b)(1) for lack of subject matter iurisdiction. The clerk shall enter judgment in accord with this disposition.

No costs.

It is so ORDERED.

Judge