Sneed v. Nevada Department of Corrections

Opinion

5 * * *

6 JAMAL SNEED, Case No. 3:24-cv-00569-MMD-CSD

7 Plaintiff, ORDER v. 8 NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF 9 CORRECTIONS, et al.,

10 Defendants.

11 12 Pro se Plaintiff Jamal Sneed filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to 13 redress constitutional violations that he alleges he suffered while incarcerated at Northern 14 Nevada Correctional Center in October 2024. (ECF No. 8.) The Court screened Sneed’s 15 second amended complaint, found that he stated certain colorable claims, and granted 16 him an opportunity to file a third amended complaint curing the deficiencies of another 17 claim. (ECF No. 10.) Sneed then submitted a “Notice of Dismissal” requesting to dismiss 18 this action without prejudice on the condition that he be permitted to file a motion to reopen 19 the case when he is discharged from suicide watch, where he is currently confined and 20 cannot have pen and paper. (ECF No. 11.) On May 8, 2025, the Magistrate Judge entered 21 an order finding that the conditional nature of Sneed’s request meant that he had not filed 22 a proper Rule 41(a)(1) notice of dismissal, reminding Sneed that a third amended 23 complaint was not necessary for this case to proceed and extending the time for Sneed 24 to file an optional third amended complaint. (ECF No. 12.) Sneed responded by filing a 25 “Notice of Appeal” clarifying his desire to dismiss this case at this time. (ECF No. 13.) The 26 Court now acknowledges that this case has been dismissed. 27 “When a Notice of Appeal is defective in that it refers to a non-appealable 28 interlocutory order, it does not transfer jurisdiction to the appellate court, and so the 1 || ordinary rule that the district court cannot act until the mandate has issued on the appeal 2 || does not apply.” Nascimento v. Dummer, 508 F.3d 905, 908 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Ruby 3 || v. Secretary of Navy, 365 F.2d 385, 388-89 (9th Cir. 1966)). The Magistrate Judge’s May 4 || 8, 2025 order found that Sneed had not filed a proper Rule 41(a)(1) notice of dismissal 5 || and granted him an extension of time to file a third amended complaint. That was not a 6 || final, appealable order, so the Court retains jurisdiction over this case. 7 “As long as a district court has jurisdiction over the case, then it possesses the 8 || inherent procedural power to reconsider, rescind, or modify an interlocutory order for Q || cause seen by it to be sufficient.” City of L.A., Harbor Div. v. Santa Monica Baykeeper, 10 || 254 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). This authority permits district courts 11 || to act before entry of a final order “rather than wait[] for the time-consuming, costly 12 || process of appeal.” United States v. Martin, 226 F.3d 1042, 1049 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations 13 || omitted). Here, given Sneed’s unconditional expression of his desire to dismiss this case 14 || in the “Notice of Appeal,” and because no responsive pleading has been filed, the Court 15 || exercises its inherent authority to recognize that Sneed has voluntarily dismissed this 16 || case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i) (“[T]he plaintiff may dismiss an action without a 17 || court order by filing a notice of dismissal before the opposing party either serves an 18 || answer or a motion for summary judgment[.]’). 19 It is therefore ordered that this action is dismissed in its entirety without prejudice. 20 || Adismissal without prejudice allows Sneed to refile this action with the Court in the future 21 || under a new case number. 22 It is further ordered that Sneed’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF 23 || Nos. 1, 4) is denied as moot. 24 The Clerk of Court is kindly directed to close the case. 25 DATED THIS Day of May 2025.

27 MIRANDA M. DU 28 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE