UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ____________________________________ ) MICHAEL A. SNEDGEN, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 19-1707 (ABJ) ) HOWMEDICA OSTEONICS ) CORPORATION d/b/a ) STRYKER ORTHOPAEDICS, ) ) Defendant. ) ____________________________________)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Michael A. Snedgen brought this action against Howmedica Osteonics
Corporation d/b/a/ Stryker Orthopaedics alleging that the company is strictly liable for an alleged
manufacturing defect in a medical component that was implanted in plaintiff’s right knee, Compl.
[Dkt. # 1] ¶¶ 24–30, and that the defendant violated the District of Columbia’s Consumer
Protection Procedures Act, D.C. Code § 28-3901, et seq. Compl. ¶¶ 31–36. Plaintiff seeks
compensatory damages, punitive damages, and other forms of relief for an injury he attributes to
a defective part. Compl. at 5.
Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss [Dkt. # 8] (“Def.’s Mot.”); Def.’s Mem. in
Supp. of Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss [Dkt. # 8-1] (“Def.’s Mem.”) at 7. Plaintiff has withdrawn the
state consumer protection law claim in response to the motion, see Pl.’s Mem. in Opp. to Def.’s
Mot. [Dkt. # 9] (“Pl.’s Opp.”) at 6, and the Court finds that the allegations in Count I, the products
liability claim, are sufficient to move forward. Defendant’s motion will therefore be denied as to Count I, but this ruling should not be read to express any point of view on the question of whether
plaintiff will be able to prove his allegations at the end of the day.
BACKGROUND
On February 22, 2012, plaintiff underwent knee surgery at MedStar Washington Hospital
Center in the District of Columbia. Compl. ¶¶ 7–8. During the procedure, an “MRH tibial bearing
component,” manufactured by defendant (the “Component”), was implanted in plaintiff’s right
knee. Compl. ¶¶ 9–10. By November 2016, plaintiff began experiencing severe right knee / thigh
pain. Compl. ¶ 11.
On November 29, 2016, plaintiff had another operation during which the doctor “observed
an obvious fracture obliquely through the rotating platform of the Component.” Compl. ¶ 14. The
complaint alleges that the component had failed as a result of the fracture, and that this caused the
plaintiff to suffer the pain and injury requiring the second operation. Compl. ¶ 15.
On June 12, 2019, plaintiff sued the defendant manufacturer, alleging that it is strictly liable
for manufacturing an “unreasonably dangerous” item. Compl. ¶ 26. Defendant has moved to
dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, Def.’s Mot.; Def.’s Mem., and the matter is fully 1 briefed. Defendant asserts that plaintiff “has offered no factual allegations explaining why or
how his theory of defect could be correct,” and that the complaint is too skeletal and conclusory
to state a claim. Def.’s Mem. at 7.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“To survive a [Rule 12(b)(6)] motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
1 See Pl.’s Opp.; Def.’s Reply to Pl.’s Opp. [Dkt. # 10].
2 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). In Iqbal,
the Supreme Court reiterated the two principles underlying its decision in Twombly: “First, the
tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable
to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. And “[s]econd, only a complaint that states a
plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Id. at 679, citing Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 556.
A claim is facially plausible when the pleaded factual content “allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than
a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id., quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
A pleading must offer more than “labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action,” id., quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, and “[t]hreadbare recitals
of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.
In evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must “treat the complaint’s
factual allegations as true and must grant plaintiff ‘the benefit of all inferences that can be derived
from the facts alleged.’” Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(internal citation omitted), quoting Schuler v. United States, 617 F.2d 605, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1979);
see also Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011), quoting Thomas v.
Principi, 394 F.3d 970, 972 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Therefore, when considering a motion to dismiss, a
court must construe a complaint liberally in the plaintiff’s favor. Kowal v. MCI Commc’ns Corp.,
16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994), citing Schuler, 617 F.2d at 208. Nevertheless, a court need
not accept inferences drawn by the plaintiff if those inferences are unsupported by facts alleged in
the complaint, nor must a court accept plaintiff’s legal conclusions. Id.; see also Browning v.
3 Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002). In ruling upon a motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim, a court may ordinarily consider only “the facts alleged in the complaint, documents
attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference in the complaint, and matters about which the
Court may take judicial notice.” Gustave-Schmidt v. Chao, 226 F. Supp. 2d 191, 196 (D.D.C.
2002), citing EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624–25 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
ANALYSIS
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has instructed that “[t]o establish strict liability
in tort, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant sold the product in question in a defective and
unreasonably dangerous condition.” Warner Fruehauf Trailer Co., Inc. v. Boston, 654 A.2d 1272,
1276 (D.C. 1995). Taking the factual allegations contained in the complaint as true as the Court
is required to do, the Court finds that plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to support a reasonable
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ____________________________________ ) MICHAEL A. SNEDGEN, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 19-1707 (ABJ) ) HOWMEDICA OSTEONICS ) CORPORATION d/b/a ) STRYKER ORTHOPAEDICS, ) ) Defendant. ) ____________________________________)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Michael A. Snedgen brought this action against Howmedica Osteonics
Corporation d/b/a/ Stryker Orthopaedics alleging that the company is strictly liable for an alleged
manufacturing defect in a medical component that was implanted in plaintiff’s right knee, Compl.
[Dkt. # 1] ¶¶ 24–30, and that the defendant violated the District of Columbia’s Consumer
Protection Procedures Act, D.C. Code § 28-3901, et seq. Compl. ¶¶ 31–36. Plaintiff seeks
compensatory damages, punitive damages, and other forms of relief for an injury he attributes to
a defective part. Compl. at 5.
Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss [Dkt. # 8] (“Def.’s Mot.”); Def.’s Mem. in
Supp. of Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss [Dkt. # 8-1] (“Def.’s Mem.”) at 7. Plaintiff has withdrawn the
state consumer protection law claim in response to the motion, see Pl.’s Mem. in Opp. to Def.’s
Mot. [Dkt. # 9] (“Pl.’s Opp.”) at 6, and the Court finds that the allegations in Count I, the products
liability claim, are sufficient to move forward. Defendant’s motion will therefore be denied as to Count I, but this ruling should not be read to express any point of view on the question of whether
plaintiff will be able to prove his allegations at the end of the day.
BACKGROUND
On February 22, 2012, plaintiff underwent knee surgery at MedStar Washington Hospital
Center in the District of Columbia. Compl. ¶¶ 7–8. During the procedure, an “MRH tibial bearing
component,” manufactured by defendant (the “Component”), was implanted in plaintiff’s right
knee. Compl. ¶¶ 9–10. By November 2016, plaintiff began experiencing severe right knee / thigh
pain. Compl. ¶ 11.
On November 29, 2016, plaintiff had another operation during which the doctor “observed
an obvious fracture obliquely through the rotating platform of the Component.” Compl. ¶ 14. The
complaint alleges that the component had failed as a result of the fracture, and that this caused the
plaintiff to suffer the pain and injury requiring the second operation. Compl. ¶ 15.
On June 12, 2019, plaintiff sued the defendant manufacturer, alleging that it is strictly liable
for manufacturing an “unreasonably dangerous” item. Compl. ¶ 26. Defendant has moved to
dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, Def.’s Mot.; Def.’s Mem., and the matter is fully 1 briefed. Defendant asserts that plaintiff “has offered no factual allegations explaining why or
how his theory of defect could be correct,” and that the complaint is too skeletal and conclusory
to state a claim. Def.’s Mem. at 7.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“To survive a [Rule 12(b)(6)] motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
1 See Pl.’s Opp.; Def.’s Reply to Pl.’s Opp. [Dkt. # 10].
2 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). In Iqbal,
the Supreme Court reiterated the two principles underlying its decision in Twombly: “First, the
tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable
to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. And “[s]econd, only a complaint that states a
plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Id. at 679, citing Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 556.
A claim is facially plausible when the pleaded factual content “allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than
a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id., quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
A pleading must offer more than “labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action,” id., quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, and “[t]hreadbare recitals
of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.
In evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must “treat the complaint’s
factual allegations as true and must grant plaintiff ‘the benefit of all inferences that can be derived
from the facts alleged.’” Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(internal citation omitted), quoting Schuler v. United States, 617 F.2d 605, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1979);
see also Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011), quoting Thomas v.
Principi, 394 F.3d 970, 972 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Therefore, when considering a motion to dismiss, a
court must construe a complaint liberally in the plaintiff’s favor. Kowal v. MCI Commc’ns Corp.,
16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994), citing Schuler, 617 F.2d at 208. Nevertheless, a court need
not accept inferences drawn by the plaintiff if those inferences are unsupported by facts alleged in
the complaint, nor must a court accept plaintiff’s legal conclusions. Id.; see also Browning v.
3 Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002). In ruling upon a motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim, a court may ordinarily consider only “the facts alleged in the complaint, documents
attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference in the complaint, and matters about which the
Court may take judicial notice.” Gustave-Schmidt v. Chao, 226 F. Supp. 2d 191, 196 (D.D.C.
2002), citing EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624–25 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
ANALYSIS
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has instructed that “[t]o establish strict liability
in tort, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant sold the product in question in a defective and
unreasonably dangerous condition.” Warner Fruehauf Trailer Co., Inc. v. Boston, 654 A.2d 1272,
1276 (D.C. 1995). Taking the factual allegations contained in the complaint as true as the Court
is required to do, the Court finds that plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to support a reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable under this theory.
The complaint sets out the identifying numbers and letters found on the Component
implanted in plaintiff’s knee, and it alleges that defendant manufactured that part. Compl. ¶¶ 9-10.
Plaintiff describes the fracture observed by his doctor, and he specifies what allegedly caused the
Component to fail: defendant improperly cooled the material that was used to form the
Component. Compl. ¶¶ 14; 17. Plaintiff claims that due to the allegedly improper cooling, the
Component was “brittle and not fit for its designed purpose” because it was more susceptible to
breakage. Compl. ¶¶ 28–29. Based on these facts, plaintiff alleges that: 1)“[d]efendant
manufactured the Component with a defect that made it unreasonably dangerous;” and 2) [w]hen
it was sold, the Component had a defect that made it unreasonably dangerous. Compl. ¶¶ 26–27.
While more will be required to survive summary judgment, there is enough in the
complaint to state a plausible claim for relief. Plaintiff points to several products liability cases
4 that were dismissed, but those were considerably more deficient. For example, in Aston v. Johnson
& Johnson, the court granted a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) because “the amended complaint
[contained] nothing more than conclusory statements,” including “no facts ‘that would appear to
relate to manufacturing defects . . . .’” 248 F. Supp. 3d 43, 53 (D.D.C. 2017), quoting Rollins v.
Wackenhut Servs., 802 F. Supp. 2d 111, 122 (D.D.C. 2011). And in Wright v. Howmedica
Osteonics Corp., the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a lower court’s ruling that the plaintiff failed to
state a claim for a manufacturing defect because “none of the statements in the [Second Amended
Complaint] allege in what way the product was defective,” and the plaintiff’s allegation that she
experienced pain after a surgery during which the product was implanted “could perhaps speak to
causation, but d[id] not inform [the court] how the product was allegedly defective.” 741 Fed.
App’x 624, 626 (11th Cir. 2018).
But here, in addition to tracking the elements of a strict liability claim, the complaint
identifies a specific defect that caused plaintiff’s injury, and it places the cause of that alleged
defect at a specific point in the manufacturing process. Therefore, resolving all inferences in favor
of the plaintiff, the allegations are sufficient to state a claim.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion to dismiss is denied. A separate order will
issue.
AMY BERMAN JACKSON United States District Judge
DATE: March 26, 2020