Snedden v. Strange

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Washington
DecidedJanuary 10, 2022
Docket2:21-cv-00286
StatusUnknown

This text of Snedden v. Strange (Snedden v. Strange) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Snedden v. Strange, (E.D. Wash. 2022).

Opinion

2 FILED IN THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 3 Jan 10, 2022

4 SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK

5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6

7 STEVEN SNEDDEN, NO: 2:21-CV-0286-RMP 8 Petitioner, ORDER DISMISSING HABEAS 9 v. CORPUS PETITION, DENYING MOTIONS AND DIRECTING THE 10 CHERYL STRANGE, OPENING OF A SEPARATE CIVIL RIGHTS CASE 11 Respondent.

12 13 On November 30, 2021, the Court directed Petitioner Steven Snedden to show 14 cause why his Habeas Corpus Petition should not be dismissed based on the 15 abstention principles of Younger v Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971). ECF No. 30 at 16 7–10. At that time, Petitioner was a prisoner at the Coyote Ridge Corrections 17 Center. He is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis. Respondent Cheryl Strange 18 has not been served. 19 RESPONSE TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 20 On January 5, 2022, the Court received a series of documents from Mr. 21 Snedden, indicating that he is now confined at Spokane County Detention Services. 1 The Court construes his letter dated December 29, 2021, as a Notice of Change of 2 Address. ECF No. 31. Because Mr. Snedden states that he deposited his documents 3 for mailing on December 29, 2021, id., the Court will consider his response titled, 4 “Reply to Court’s Order: Motion for Joinder of Claims and for Summary Judgment

5 on Declaratory Relief Claim,” ECF No. 32, to be timely. See Houston v. Lack, 487 6 U.S. 266 (1988). 7 After careful review of this response and the accompanying motions, ECF

8 Nos. 32–34, the Court finds that Mr. Snedden has failed to show cause why this 9 habeas corpus petition should not be dismissed as precluded by Younger. Contrary 10 to his assertions, Petitioner did not “cure the exhaustion deficiency” and he has 11 failed to present any facts warranting this Court’s intervention in pending criminal

12 proceedings. ECF No. 32 at 1. 13 The “Motion to Admit Amendment to Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus 14 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254,” ECF No. 33, is reiterates his prior assertions that his

15 initial term of community custody was unlawfully imposed, only brought against the 16 Superintendent of the Coyote Ridge Corrections Center, Melisa Andrewjeski. 17 Petitioner attached a copy of this Court’s November 30, 2021, Order. ECF No. 33-1.

18 In the future, Petitioner may refer the Court any documents in the record, instead of 19 refiling them. 20 In his Reply, Petitioner asks to “join” a civil rights complaint into these 21 habeas proceedings in an apparent attempt to avoid the exhaustion requirement. See 1 ECF No. 32 at 2. For reasons set forth later in this Order, the Court will not permit 2 Petitioner to incorporate a civil rights complaint into these proceedings. As for 3 exhaustion, the Court notes that since 1996, prisoners have been required to exhaust 4 available administrative remedies before bringing a civil rights action pursuant to 42

5 U.S.C. § 1983. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Vaden v. Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 6 1050 (9th Cir. 2006); Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 934–35 (9th Cir. 2005). 7 In his Reply, Plaintiff argues that the indecent exposure statute, under which

8 he was convicted, violates his civil rights. ECF No. 32 at 3. He claims the statute is 9 “overbroad where it invades an area of his protected freedoms.” Id. He claims that 10 he has “a First Amendment Right to dance in the nude, demonstrate politically in the 11 nude, and to be nude for scientific purposes.” Id. The court notes that this is a

12 departure from the claims asserted in the habeas petition. ECF No. 1. Petitioner 13 may challenge the constitutionality of a state criminal statute in appropriate state 14 appellate proceedings, and, once he has exhausted those remedies, he may apply for

15 federal habeas relief. At this time, however, these newly asserted claims also are 16 unexhausted. Petitioner’s request for “summary judgment on an action for 17 declaratory judgment,” ECF No. 32 at 4 of 6, must be denied.

18 As previously advised, federal courts generally will not intervene in a pending 19 state court criminal proceeding absent extraordinary circumstances where the danger 20 of irreparable harm is both great and immediate. ECF No. 30 at 7; see Younger, 401 21 U.S. at 41. “[O]nly in the most unusual circumstances is a defendant entitled to have 1 federal interposition by way of injunction or habeas corpus until after the jury comes 2 in, judgment has been appealed from and the case concluded in the state courts.” 3 Drury v. Cox, 457 F.2d 764, 764–65 (9th Cir. l972); see also Carden v. Montana, 4 626 F.2d 82, 83–84 (9th Cir. 1980). Plaintiff has failed to show that his criminal

5 cases have fully concluded in the state court. 6 In Younger, the Supreme Court held that principles of federalism, comity, and 7 equity require federal courts to abstain from enjoining ongoing state court criminal

8 proceedings, except in specific, very narrow circumstances. Younger, 401 U.S. at 45 9 (“[T]he normal thing to do when federal courts are asked to enjoin pending [state 10 criminal] proceedings . . . in state courts is not to issue such injunctions.”). Younger 11 abstention is appropriate when (1) there is “an ongoing state judicial proceeding”;

12 (2) the proceeding “implicate[s] important state interests”; (3) there is “an adequate 13 opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges”; and (4) the 14 requested relief “seek[s] to enjoin” or has “the practical effect of enjoining” the

15 ongoing state judicial proceeding. ReadyLink Healthcare, Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. 16 Fund, 754 F.3d 754, 758 (9th Cir. 2014). 17 As stated previously, Petitioner has the opportunity and means to challenge

18 the fairness of his final judgment and sentence, including any constitutional 19 challenge to the statute under which he was convicted, in the state appellate system, 20 and then, if necessary, through subsequent state and federal habeas corpus 21 proceedings. He has presented no factual allegations of proven harassment or 1 prosecutions undertaken by state officials in bad faith without hope of obtaining a 2 valid conviction or other extraordinary circumstances where irreparable injury can 3 be shown that would justify federal injunctive relief against pending state 4 prosecutions. See Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 85 (1971).

5 Having failed to assert facts sufficient to show that he is entitled to federal 6 intervention at this time, the Court finds that Petitioner is not entitled to the habeas 7 relief he seeks. See Rule 4, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases.

8 MOTION/CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT 9 Mr. Snedden asks the Court to allow him to proceed in forma pauperis in a 10 “joint civil rights claim.” ECF No. 34. The Court will not permit Mr. Snedden to do 11 so. Civil rights complaints and habeas corpus petitions are distinct civil proceedings

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Related

Gracie v. Palmer
21 U.S. 605 (Supreme Court, 1823)
Younger v. Harris
401 U.S. 37 (Supreme Court, 1971)
Perez v. Ledesma
401 U.S. 82 (Supreme Court, 1971)
Preiser v. Rodriguez
411 U.S. 475 (Supreme Court, 1973)
Heck v. Humphrey
512 U.S. 477 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Brown v. Valoff
422 F.3d 926 (Ninth Circuit, 2005)

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