Snead v. Wright

• Court: District Court, D. Alaska
• Decided: August 17, 2020
• Docket: 3:19-cv-00092
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 DISTRICT OF ALASKA 6 7 8 MONIQUE R. SNEAD, Individually and) as Personal Representative of the ) 9 Estate of John H. Snead; JOHN G. ) SNEAD, Individually and as Trustee ) 10 of the Snead Irrevocable Trust; ) MONIQUE R. SNEAD and JOHN G. ) 11 SNEAD, both individually and as ) beneficiaries of the John H. Snead ) 12 Revocable Trust and the Snead ) Irrevocable Trust, ) 13 ) Plaintiffs, ) 3:19-CV-00092 JWS 14 ) vs. ) ORDER 15 ) GUADALUPE C. WRIGHT; and ) [Re: Motion at Doc. 70] 16 MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER ) & SMITH INCORPORATED, ) 17 ) Defendants. ) 18 ) 19 I. MOTION PRESENTED 20 At docket 70 Defendant Guadalupe C. Wright (Wright) moves for an award of 21 fees and costs for claims pursuant to Rule 41(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 22 Plaintiffs Monique R. Snead and John G. Snead, in their various capacities (collectively 23 Plaintiffs), oppose the request at docket 75. Wright replies at docket 76. 24 II. BACKGROUND 25 The court need not repeat the complex procedural posture for purposes of this 26 motion for fees. The factual and procedural background of this case is set forth in the 27 court’s order at docket 35, wherein the court granted a stay as to the claims against 28 -1- 1 Wright because of pending state court litigation of a similar nature. Suffice it to say, 2 Plaintiffs have subsequently amended their state court complaint to remove reference to 3 the Merrill Lynch trust accounts. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a motion asking the court 4 to lift the stay based on their amendment, arguing that it separates the state court 5 issues from the federal issues. Before the court ruled on the motion to lift the stay, 6 Wright filed this motion requesting an award of fees and costs under Rule 41(d), arguing 7 that “if this Court grants the motion and lifts the stay” she should be awarded fees and 8 costs associated with the dismissal of the Merrill Lynch trust claims in the state court 9 action. The court subsequently denied the motion to lift the stay. In her reply, Wright 10 argues that she is still entitled to fees and costs under Rule 41 despite the stay, arguing 11 that Plaintiffs’ amendment effectively dismissed the claims against her to the extent they 12 were based on the Merrill Lynch trust accounts. 13 III. DISCUSSION 14 Rule 41(d) does not apply to the procedural posture of the ongoing litigation 15 between Plaintiffs and Wright. Rule 41(d) states as follows: 16 If a plaintiff who previously dismissed an action in any court files an action based on or including the same claim against the same defendant, the 17 court: (1) may order the plaintiff to pay all or part of the costs of that previous action; and (2) may stay the proceedings until the plaintiff has 18 complied.1 19 What constitutes a dismissal of an action under Rule 41 is set forth within the rule itself. 20 For voluntary dismissals: “The plaintiff may dismiss an action without a court order by 21 filing (i) a notice of dismissal before the opposing party serves either an answer or a 22 motion for summary judgment; or (ii) a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who 23 have appeared.”2 Plaintiffs have not filed any notice of dismissal or stipulation of 24 dismissal in the state court. They only filed an amendment. Moreover, the amendment 25 did not release Wright from the litigation; rather, it simply sought to limit the factual basis 26 27 1Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(d). 28 2Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a). -2- 1 for the claims against her. This is not enough to trigger the application of Rule 41(d). 2 As the Ninth Circuit has stated, “Rule 41 is reserved for circumstances in which the 3 result of the alleged dismissal is that one or all of the defendants are released from the 4 action.”3 5 Moreover, costs under Rule 41(d) may only be awarded for “the preparation of 6 work product rendered useless by the dismissal.”4 The court agrees with Plaintiffs that it 7 does not appear that work completed in the state litigation has been rendered useless 8 by the amendment of the complaint. 9 Wright alternatively argues that fees and costs are warranted under Rule 15. 10 While the rule does not explicitly permit the imposition of costs or sanctions, “a district 11 court, in its discretion, may impose costs pursuant to Rule 15 as a condition of granting 12 leave to amend in order to compensate the opposing party for additional costs incurred 13 because the original pleading was faulty.”5 However, here, Wright is seeking fees 14 associated with the Plaintiffs’ amendment of their state court claims, not an amendment 15 of their claims in this federal action. There is no basis for such an award. 16 IV. CONCLUSION 17 Based on the preceding discussion, Wright’s motion for fees and costs at 18 docket 70 is DENIED. 19 DATED this 17th day of August 2020. 20 /s/ JOHN W. SEDWICK 21 SENIOR JUDGE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 22 23 24 3Gen. Signal Corp. v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 66 F.3d 1500, 1513 (9th Cir. 1995). 25 4Esquivel v. Arau, 913 F.Supp. 1382, 1388 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (quoting Koch v. Hankins, 8 26 F.3d 650, 652 (9th Cir. 1993)); Nielson v. Union Bank of Cal., N.A., 2003 WL 27374136, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 31. 2003 (“Federal court interpreting Rule 41(d) generally deny costs incurred 27 for work that will be useful in the later filed case.”). 28 5Gen Signal Corp., 66 F.3d at 1514. -3-