Snader, P., Sr. v. Huber, J.

CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedApril 30, 2018
Docket1229 MDA 2017
StatusUnpublished

This text of Snader, P., Sr. v. Huber, J. (Snader, P., Sr. v. Huber, J.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Snader, P., Sr. v. Huber, J., (Pa. Ct. App. 2018).

Opinion

J-A07035-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

PAUL A. SNADER SR. AND JEANNE : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF M. SNADER : PENNSYLVANIA : : v. : : : JACOB A. HUBER AND JOHN HUBER : : No. 1229 MDA 2017 Appellant :

Appeal from the Order Entered July 10, 2017 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Civil Division at No(s): 15-04801

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., OLSON, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED APRIL 30, 2018

Appellant Jacob A. Huber appeals from the July 10, 2017, order entered

in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County, which granted Appellees

Paul A. Snader, Sr., and Jeanne M. Snader’s (collectively, “the Snaders”) post-

trial motion for a new trial.1 After a careful review, we affirm.

The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows:

On June 4, 2013, Paul [A.] Snader, Sr., (“Mr. Snader”) was operating his car southbound on Broad Street in Lititz, Pennsylvania, when he was rear-ended by a vehicle owned by John Huber but being operated by his son, Jacob [A.] Huber [ ]. At the time of the collision, [Mr.] Snader had stopped his car near the intersection [of] West Main Street due to stopped traffic ahead of him. [Jacob A.] Huber, who was traveling behind [Mr.] Snader’s ____________________________________________

1 We note that an appeal may be taken as of right from an order entered in a civil action awarding a new trial. Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(6). We further note that, as indicated infra, prior to the jury trial, all claims brought against John Huber were dismissed with prejudice. ____________________________________ * Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. J-A07035-18

vehicle, failed to bring his vehicle to a stop prior to striking [Mr.] Snader’s vehicle. The force of the collision pushed [Mr.] Snader’s stopped vehicle forward causing it to strike the vehicle in front of him that was also stopped.

Trial Court Opinion, filed 9/12/17, at 1-2.

On June 1, 2015, the Snaders commenced this action via a writ of

summons. On August 17, 2015, they filed a complaint asserting Mr. Snader

suffered “serious injury” because of the accident, and they presented claims

of negligence, carelessness, and recklessness against Jacob A. and John

Huber. They sought damages for Mr. Snader’s past and future lost wages,

past and future medical expenses, and pain and suffering. Relevantly, at the

time of the accident, Mr. Snader had limited tort motor vehicle insurance

coverage as defined by the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law

(“MVFRL”), 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1705.2 However, Mr. Snader claimed he was

entitled to noneconomic damages since he suffered “serious injury” (serious

____________________________________________

2 Section 1705 of the MVFRL provides, in relevant part, the following: (d) Limited tort alternative.--Each person who elects the limited tort alternative remains eligible to seek compensation for economic loss sustained in a motor vehicle accident as the consequence of the fault of another person pursuant to applicable tort law. Unless the injury sustained is a serious injury, each person who is bound by the limited tort election shall be precluded from maintaining an action for any noneconomic loss. . . . 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1705(d) (emphasis added). There are certain exceptions set forth in Subsection 1705(d); however, none of them are applicable in the case sub judice.

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impairment of body function) under Section 1702 of the MVFRL.3 Mrs. Snader

asserted a claim for loss of consortium.

Jacob A. and John Huber filed preliminary objections, as a result of which

the trial court struck all counts with prejudice against John Huber. Thus, the

Snaders’ case proceeded solely against Jacob A. Huber, the driver of the

vehicle. Jacob A. Huber argued in his answer with new matter that Mr.

Snader’s injuries were pre-existing and, in any event, he did not suffer a

serious injury as defined by the MVFRL. Thus, he argued the Snaders’ claim

for noneconomic damages was barred by the MVFRL since Mr. Snader had

3 Section 1702 of the MVFRL defines “serious injury” as “[a] personal injury resulting in death, serious impairment of body function or permanent serious disfigurement.” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1702. With respect to this definition, this Court has relevantly noted: The “serious impairment of body function” threshold contains two inquiries: a) What body function, if any, was impaired because of the injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident? b) Was the impairment of the body function serious? The focus of these inquiries is not on the injuries themselves, but on how the injuries affected a particular body function. . . .In determining whether the impairment was serious, several factors should be considered: the extent of the impairment, the length of time the impairment lasted, the treatment required to correct the impairment, and any other relevant factors. An impairment need not be permanent to be serious. Brown v. Trinidad, 111 A.3d 765, 770-71 (Pa.Super. 2015) (quotation and citation omitted).

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selected the limited tort option when applying for his automobile insurance

that was in effect at the time of the accident.

The matter proceeded to a jury trial on June 5, 2017. At the beginning

of trial, defense counsel conceded that there was an accident, which resulted

entirely due to Jacob A. Huber’s negligence. N.T., 6/5/17, at 55. He also

conceded that Jacob A. Huber’s negligence caused Mr. Snader some bodily

injury of a limited duration. Id. at 61. Thus, as recognized by defense

counsel, the issue presented to the jury was whether Mr. Snader’s injury was

a “serious injury” such that he could recover noneconomic damages under the

MVFRL, as well as whether Mr. Snader had proven any economic damages

resulting from the accident. Id. at 56 (defense counsel indicating to jury: “We

don’t agree that he has proven a serious injury. We don’t agree he has proven

a wage loss because of this accident.”).

Mr. Snader, who was fifty-five years old, testified that, from 2011 until

the time of the accident, he worked as a forklift operator at Johnson & Johnson

Sales & Logistics Company, LLC, and he worked 40 hours per week plus

overtime. Id. at 67. He earned $26.28 per hour regular time. Id. at 69. Mr.

Snader testified that, on June 4, 2013, the day of the accident, he was stopped

in a line of traffic when Jacob A. Huber’s Suburban hit his Ford Escape from

behind “hard enough to push [Mr. Snader’s Ford Escape] into the car ahead

of [him].” Id. at 70. Mr. Snader noted that, after the accident, his Ford

-4- J-A07035-18

Escape was drivable; however, Jacob A. Huber’s Suburban was not drivable

and had to be towed from the scene. Id. at 70-71.

Mr. Snader testified that, as the evening progressed, he began to suffer

pain in his back and, by the next morning, he “was in a lot of pain.” Id. at

71. Accordingly, he went to his family doctor, Paul Vassil, M.D., who

prescribed pain medication to Mr. Snader. Id. at 72. Mr. Snader remained

out of work for the rest of the week (approximately three days); however, he

went back to work the next week. Id. He indicated that he attempted to

work for the next two weeks; however, the pain was “unbearable,” even with

the use of the prescribed pain medication. Id. at 73. Over the next eleven

weeks, he sometimes used vacation time and sometimes attended work;

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Snader, P., Sr. v. Huber, J., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/snader-p-sr-v-huber-j-pasuperct-2018.