Filed 6/9/26 S.N. v. Superior Court CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
S.N., E088172 Petitioner, (Super.Ct.No. DPSW2500406) v. OPINION THE SUPERIOR COURT OF RIVERSIDE COUNTY,
Respondent;
RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES,
Real Party in Interest.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for extraordinary writ. Sean P. Crandell,
Judge. Petition denied.
Lori Kennedy and Suzette Jacobsen for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
1 Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, Jamila T. Purnell, Chief Assistant County Counsel,
and Julie Jarvi, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.
I.
INTRODUCTION
S.N., the mother of 10-year-old A.M., petitions under California Rules of Court,
rule 8.542 to vacate the juvenile court’s order bypassing reunification services and setting
a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 366.26. The court found under
section 361.5, subdivision (b)(2), that Mother was incapable of caring for A.M. within the
statutory time limits due to her mental disability. Mother contends there was insufficient
evidence to deny her services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(2), because the court
relied on psychological evaluations where it was unclear as to the qualifications of either
mental health provider and neither mental health professionals testified or clarified the
reasons for their findings. Mother also argues that granting her reunification services was
in the best interest of the child. The order is supported by substantial evidence. We deny
the petition on its merits.
II.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On December 29, 2025, the Riverside County Department of Social Services
(DPSS) filed a petition on behalf of A.M. pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b)
(failure to protect) and (g) (no provision for support) based on Mother’s unresolved
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
2 mental health issues and not being under the care of a doctor. The petition also alleged
that Mother has had a prior child welfare history for similar concerns of general neglect
due to mental health issues in Riverside County and Los Angeles County and had failed
to benefit from services provided. The petition further alleged that Mother was unable
and/or unwilling to provide care and support to her child and had stated she could no
longer care for him. A first amended petition was filed on January 22, 2026, and a second
amended petition was filed on February 26, 2026.
Mother had prior child welfare history in Los Angeles County in 2014 that
involved her daughter, A.Z.2 Mother had been involuntarily hospitalized due to
attempting suicide. She had filled the home with carbon monoxide and overdosed on her
prescribed medication. Mother was found in a bathtub full of water with the gas on. A.Z.
was detained from Mother and released to her father. Mother received 12 months of
reunification services while A.Z. was on family maintenance with her father. In 2015,
jurisdiction was terminated with the father receiving full physical custody of A.Z. and the
parents having joint legal custody. Mother was provided with supervised visitation. In
total, Mother had nine prior child welfare allegations against her involving the children.
On November 20, 2025, DPSS received a referral alleging general neglect of A.M.
and A.Z. who was 17 years old at the time. It was alleged that A.M. and A.Z. were up at
3:00 a.m. mopping the floor because Mother did not want bugs crawling on her. Mother
2 A.Z. was not a party to this underlying dependency and is not a part of this writ proceeding. A.Z. and A.M. have different fathers. A.M.’s father is not a party to this writ petition.
3 stated that the home was deplorable and infested with several different insect species that
crawled in the family’s noses and mouths. A.Z. moved out of Mother’s home and was
living with a friend and the friend’s family.
The social worker met with Mother at her home. Mother allowed the social
worker to conduct a home evaluation. Mother stated that she was legally blind and
received government benefits. Mother had enough vision to cook and clean. She stated
that the apartment had some type of very small bug infestation, and the home needed to
be thoroughly cleaned on a regular basis to keep them away. She denied keeping the
children up late at night to clean. Mother showed the social worker a small amount of
water the size of a teaspoon on the bathroom floor and stated that there were pipe leaks
coming from under the floor causing this issue. The property manager, however, denied
that there were pipes under the units. Mother had pulled up the rug in the bedroom
because she believed there were bugs in it, and she was sleeping in the living room area
until new flooring could be installed. The property manager sent pest control to the unit,
but they said that there were no signs of bugs in the home. The social worker did not
observe any bugs or insects in the home during the visit. The social worker also noted
that there was no sign of a leak, or repair of a leak, or wall repair in the bedroom
anywhere, and no signs of water damage in the apartment.
On December 23, 2025, DPSS received a second referral after Mother called
dispatch stating that she was having issues with A.M. who kept running away from her.
Mother asked law enforcement to take A.M. on a “5150 hold” but he did not meet the
criteria. Mother believed that A.M. was going through a manic episode due to being
4 undiagnosed with schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. A.M. stated that he defied Mother
because she made him do chores which were boring and he wanted to play outside with
his friends instead. Because Mother was unable to safely care for A.M., he was taken
into law enforcement custody and transferred to the police station.
Mother denied abandoning A.M. and wanted him assessed and medicated so she
could care for him appropriately. Mother was told that A.M.’s behavior did not indicate
an assessment was needed, but Mother would repeat her belief that the child needed an
assessment and psychotropic medication. Mother accused “all persons, from neighbors,
to teachers, to the maternal aunt, as acting or colluding against her.” She also stated that
A.M. was trying to make her crazy because he threw fits, screamed and yelled. Mother
denied a mental health history for herself and denied being prescribed medications for
any diagnoses.
After the social worker obtained custody of A.M. from law enforcement, A.M.
informed the social worker that he did not want to return to his mother and indicated that
he would run away if returned to her. A.M. indicated that he was “okay” being placed in
foster care and repeatedly stated that he did not want to return to his mother. A.M. was
well-behaved and obedient, and he took direction with ease and without resentment. The
social worker spoke with a maternal aunt. The maternal aunt reported that the mother
had long-standing mental health issues. The maternal aunt was not surprised that A.M.
had behavioral issues after A.Z. left the home because the maternal aunt said that A.Z.
was A.M.’s primary caregiver due to Mother’s lack of mental health stability. A.M. was
placed in the maternal aunt’s care.
5 At the December 30, 2025, detention hearing, the juvenile court formally detained
A.M. from parental custody.
A.M.’s father was eventually located. The paternal aunt had power of attorney for
him for several years. According to the paternal aunt, Father had been diagnosed with
“ ‘acute schizophrenia’ ” since the age of 20. The paternal aunt took care of all of
Father’s needs including medical issues and appointments. He had never seen A.M., and
DNA testing showed that he was A.M.’s biological father.
On January 8, 2025, the social worker interviewed A.M. A.M. was polite and
articulate and did not appear guarded. He stated that he had never seen any bugs, and it
was Mother who told him there were bugs. He was not aware of any water leaks in the
home. He admitted that he had stated that he was going to kill himself while living with
Mother. He explained that he was in a bad place and out of control and that he no longer
wanted to harm himself. He wanted to stay at his maternal aunt and uncle’s home and did
not want to go home with Mother. The maternal aunt expressed that she had concerns
regarding phone calls between A.M. and Mother. A.M. continuously stated that he did
not want to speak with Mother and would refuse to speak with her and hang up on her
sometimes.
On January 16, 2026, A.M. underwent a psychological evaluation with
Dr. Kenneth Garett. Dr. Garett found that A.M. met the criteria for post-traumatic stress
disorder. A.M. disclosed that his mother physically and emotionally abused him and that
he wished to have no contact with Mother. Based on his evaluation, Dr. Garett
recommended the court order that there be no contact between A.M. and his mother at
6 that time. Dr. Garett also found that A.M. was behind in school, had learning difficulties,
and recommended A.M. be placed a special education program.
The juvenile court found that visitation between Mother and A.M. was detrimental
and denied Mother visitation. Over her counsel’s objections, the juvenile court
authorized two psychological evaluations for Mother. Mother’s counsel also informed
the court that they may be requesting a Guardian ad Litem for Mother.
On February 26, 2026, Mother’s counsel requested that a Guardian ad Litem be
appointed for Mother. The court granted the request.
Mother underwent two psychological evaluations. The first was conducted by
Dr. Garett, a licensed psychologist. Dr. Garett provided probable diagnoses of Delusional
Disorder, Bipolar 1 Disorder, and possible attention deficit disorder with hyperactivity
when Mother was younger. Dr. Garett opined that offering reunification services to
Mother at that time would not be appropriate as services may “further agitate her given
that she is not presently in a position to regain custody” and she had not fully
acknowledged the nature or severity of her mental health difficulties. Dr. Garett later
clarified that Mother would not benefit from reunification services due to the severity of
her mental illness.
The second psychological evaluation was conducted by Dr. Jamye Jesser, a
licensed psychologist. Dr. Jesser’s probable diagnoses for Mother were Delusional
Disorder; Bipolar 1 Disorder, manic, severe; Generalized Anxiety Disorder; Unspecified
Personality Disorder, Turbulent Disorder; Paranoid Personality Style; Compulsive
Personality Style, Dependent Personality Type, and Attention Deficit Disorder. Dr. Jesser
7 did not recommend reunification between Mother and A.M. and did not recommend court
services to Mother. Dr. Jesser explained that Mother did “not seem to have significant
enough insight into her bipolar or delusional disorder, or insight enough into her toxic
relationships.”
The jurisdictional/dispositional hearing was held on March 27, 2026. The juvenile
court found true the allegations in the second amended petition. The court found true that
Mother had unresolved mental health issues and was not under the care of a doctor or
seeking counseling or therapy, and that Mother had disclosed a family history of
Schizophrenia and Bipolar Disorder. The court also found true that Mother had prior
child welfare referral history of similar allegations of general neglect due to mental health
issues in Riverside and Los Angeles Counties and had failed to benefit from services
provided. The court further found true that Mother was unable or unwilling to provide
the child with care and support and expressed that she could no longer care for him.
The court thereafter proceeded with the contested dispositional hearing. DPSS
requested that Mother be denied services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(2). Mother
provided stipulated testimony. The stipulated testimony stated: “Mother would stipulate
that she loves her child very much. She is enrolled in therapy. Mother is willing to work
and improve on her mental health. And mother would like the opportunity to complete
services to reunify with her . . . child.” Mother’s counsel argued that DPSS did not meet
the burden to deny Mother services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(2). Counsel also
asserted that the two evaluators were not independent, as both shared the same office and
that it was not appropriate for either evaluator to state that Mother should be denied
8 reunification services as the purpose of a psychological assessment is to determine if a
parent would benefit from services. Counsel also pointed out that despite both
psychological reports stating Mother should be denied services, both psychologists
provide specific suggestions of what services should be provided to Mother to assist with
her mental health.
Following argument by the parties, the juvenile court declared A.M. a dependent
of the court, removed him from parental custody and denied reunification services to the
parents. The court found clear and convincing evidence to deny Mother services under
section 361.5, subdivision (b)(2). The court found no evidence that the psychologists
discussed or shared any information, and it was not uncommon for several people to
share office space. The court also noted that the psychological reports, while providing
recommendations for services for Mother, were not meant to be for reunification
purposes but were generally on how Mother should get help with her mental health. The
court further found providing Mother with visitation was detrimental to A.M.’s well-
being and denied Mother visitation.
On April 1, 2026, Mother filed a notice of intent to file writ petition.
III.
DISCUSSION
Mother contends that there was insufficient evidence to deny her reunification
services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(2). She also argues that granting her
reunification services was in the best interest of the child. We are not persuaded by these
arguments.
9 Dependency cases carry a presumption that parents will receive family
reunification services. (§ 361.5, subd. (a).) The presumption “implements the law’s
strong preference for maintaining the family relationship if at all possible.” (In re Baby
Boy H. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 470, 474; see § 202, subd. (a) [“reunification of the minor
with his or her family shall be a primary objective”].) Nevertheless, “in certain
situations, attempts to facilitate reunification do not serve and protect the child’s
interests.” (Baby Boy H., at p. 474.) Statutes authorizing the denial of reunification
services are often referred to as “bypass” provisions. (In re T.G. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th
976, 989.)
The bypass provision in section 361.5, subdivision (b)(2), is commonly referred to
as the mental disability exception, and its application draws upon not only the subdivision
itself but also section 361.5, subdivision (c)(1), and Family Code section 7827.
Reunification services need not be provided if the court finds by clear and convincing
evidence from any two experts “ ‘that a parent or parents suffer a mental incapacity or
disorder that renders the parent or parents unable to care for and control the child
adequately.’ ” (Sheila S. v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 872, 880, quoting
Fam. Code, § 7827, disapproved on other grounds in Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9
Cal.5th 989, 1010, fn. 7 (O.B.); see section 361.5, subd. (b) [requiring clear and
convincing evidence]; Fam. Cod § 7827, subd. (c) [requiring “the evidence of any two
experts” to support a mental disability finding].) Additionally, section 361.5,
subdivision (b)(2), requires a finding that the mental disability “renders the parent or
guardian incapable of utilizing those services” and “subdivision (c) of section 361.5
10 speaks to the proof required under subdivision (b)(2) and provides in relevant part:
‘When it is alleged . . . that the parent is incapable of utilizing services due to mental
disability, the court shall order reunification services unless competent evidence from
mental health professionals establishes that, even with the provision of services, the
parent is unlikely to be capable of adequately caring for the child.’ ” (In re Joy M. (2002)
99 Cal.App.4th 11, 17.)
Section 361.5, subdivision (b)(2), incorporates the requirement specified in Family
Code section 7827, subdivision (c), that a finding of mental disability be supported by
“ ‘the evidence of any two experts,’ ” each of whom must be a psychiatrist or
psychologist meeting educational and experience requirements. (In re C.C. (2003) 111
Cal.App.4th 76, 83-84.) But “there is no requirement that both experts must agree a
parent is unlikely to benefit from services before the court may deny the parent services.
Instead, the statute requires a showing only of evidence proffered by both experts
regarding a parent’s mental disability, evidence from which the court then can make
inferences and base its findings.” (Curtis F. v. Superior Court (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th
470, 474 (Curtis F.).)
We review the juvenile court’s denial of reunification services under section 361.5,
subdivision (b)(2) for substantial evidence. (Curtis F., supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at p. 474.)
We decide if the evidence is reasonable, credible, and of solid value, such that a
reasonable trier of fact could find the court’s order was proper based on clear and
convincing evidence. (Ibid.) In making this determination we do not reweigh the
evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses or indulge in inferences contrary to the
11 findings of the trial court. (In re Michael G. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 580, 589 (Michael
G.).) “The substantial evidence standard of review is generally considered the most
difficult standard of review to meet, as it should be, because it is not the function of the
reviewing court to determine the facts.” (Ibid.)
We must “account for the clear and convincing standard of proof when addressing
a claim that the evidence does not support a finding made under this standard,” as we do
here. (Conservatorship of O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1011.) Nevertheless, our review is
deferential to the juvenile court’s role as the trier of fact: “When reviewing a finding that
a fact has been proved by clear and convincing evidence, the question before the
appellate court is whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which
a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly probable that the fact was true. In
conducting its review, the court must view the record in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party below and give appropriate deference to how the trier of fact may have
evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and drawn
reasonable inferences from the evidence.” (O.B., at pp. 1011-1012.)
The evidence here was sufficient to support the juvenile court’s finding that a
mental disability rendered Mother unable to care for the child and unlikely to be capable
of doing so even if she were provided with reunification services. (§ 361.5, subds. (b)(2),
(c)(1).) The record shows that Mother suffered from a mental disability and that her
mental disability rendered her incapable of utilizing services. After administering several
psychological tests of Mother and reviewing Mother’s statements and social and mental
history, Dr. Garett provided probable diagnoses of Delusional Disorder, Bipolar 1
12 Disorder, possible attention deficit disorder with hyperactivity when the mother was
younger. Dr. Garett recommended that providing Mother with reunification services at
that time would not be appropriate and that offering reunification services may “further
agitate her given that she is not presently in a position to regain custody.” Dr. Garett later
clarified that Mother would not benefit from reunification services due to the severity of
her mental illness. Dr. Jesser also administered several psychological tests on Mother,
reviewed her history and statements provided by Mother and DPSS, and listed probable
diagnoses for Mother as Delusional Disorder; Bipolar 1 Disorder, manic, severe;
Generalized Anxiety Disorder; Unspecified Personality Disorder, Turbulent Disorder;
Paranoid Personality Style; Compulsive Personality Style, Dependent Personality Type,
and Attention Deficit Disorder. Dr. Jesser reported that Mother did “not seem to have
significant enough insight into her bipolar or delusional disorder, or insight enough into
her toxic relationships.” Dr. Jesser did not recommend reunification or court services to
Mother.
Substantial evidence also shows that competent evidence from mental health
professionals established that, even with the provision of services, Mother was unlikely to
be capable of adequately caring for A.M. within the statutory time limits. Dr. Garett
reported that Mother would not benefit from reunification services due to the severity of
her mental illness and that offering services may further agitate Mother given she was not
presently able to regain custody of A.M. Dr. Jesser opined that Mother should not receive
court-ordered services given that she did not seem to have significant enough insight into
her bipolar or delusional disorder or insight enough into her toxic relationships.
13 Mother argues the court’s ruling is unsupported by sufficient evidence because the
mental health providers’ qualifications were not provided, the mental health providers did
not testify and suggests their reports are suspect because the reports made similar
findings. Mother’s arguments essentially attack the credibility of the mental health
providers. However, as noted above, we do not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the
credibility of witnesses or indulge in inferences contrary to the findings of the trial court.
(Michael G., supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 589.) “It is the trial court’s role to assess the
credibility of the various witnesses, to weigh the evidence to resolve the conflicts in the
evidence.” (In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 52.)
In addition, there is nothing in the record to indicate Mother requested that the
mental health providers testify or objected to their qualifications or anything to indicate
their psychological reports were suspect because they made similar findings. If a parent
fails to object or raise an issue in the juvenile court, the parent is prevented from
presenting the issue on appeal. (In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1338-
1339 (Lorenzo C.).) “[A] party is precluded from urging on appeal any point not raised in
the trial court. [Citation.]” (In re Aaron B. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 843, 846.)
Mother asserts that she made reasonable efforts, pointing out her case from 2014
concerning A.Z., her successful competition of services in that case, and her reasonable
efforts prior to the detention hearing in this matter. However, Mother never raised this
issue in the court below and thus is precluded from raising it on appeal. (Lorenzo C.,
supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1338-1339.) In any event, whether or not Mother showed
“reasonable efforts” is not a part of the analysis for determining whether or not
14 section 361.5, subdivision (b)(2), applies. Mother appears to be using language from
section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(10) and (b)(11), because she cites two cases that analyze
those subdivisions. Section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(10) and (b)(11), are not relevant to
the instant matter.
Moreover, as part of the jurisdictional findings, the juvenile court found true that
Mother failed to benefit from services provided. According to the record, after Mother
received 12 months of reunification services while A.Z. was on family maintenance with
her father, the matter was terminated with a family law order granting her father full
physical custody and supervised visits for Mother. Given that Mother was awarded only
supervised visitation, she did not successfully reunify with A.Z.
Mother contends that even if the section 361.5, subdivision (b)(2) bypass
provision applies, the best interests of the child dictated that she should receive
reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (c). We reject this argument for
several reasons.
First, the argument is forfeited. At the dispositional hearing, Mother did not make
the argument she is now raising. “A party forfeits the right to claim error as grounds for
reversal on appeal when he or she fails to raise the objection in the trial court.
[Citations.] Forfeiture, also referred to as ‘waiver,’ applies in juvenile dependency
litigation and is intended to prevent a party from standing by silently until the conclusion
of the proceedings.” (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 221-222.)
Moreover, even if not forfeited, the argument is not persuasive. Her argument
rests on the premise that DPSS failed to prove that section 361.5, subdivision (b)(2),
15 applies. As discussed above, we reject that premise. As such, section 361.5,
subdivision (c)(2), is inapplicable. Specifically, section 361.5, subdivision (c)(2),
provides: “The court shall not order reunification for a parent or guardian described in
paragraph (3), (4), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), or (17) of
subdivision (b) unless the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that
reunification is in the best interest of the child.” Section 361.5, subdivision (b)(2), is
excluded from the purview of section 361.5, subdivision (c)(2). Where services are
bypassed pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(2), it is section 361.5, subdivision (f),
that applies. That subdivision requires only that the court determine if a hearing under
section 366.26 shall be set, and if so, to conduct the hearing within 120 days after the
dispositional hearing unless the other parent is receiving reunification services. (§ 361.5,
subd. (f).) It does not require or authorize an inquiry into whether reunification would be
in the best interests of the child, even though section 361.5, subdivision (b)(2), applies.
(See In re Austin P. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1124, 1129 [“ ‘[I]f the statutory language is
not ambiguous, then we presume the Legislature meant what it said, and the plain
meaning of the language governs.’ ”]; In re David (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 675, 682
[“ ‘Appellate courts may not rewrite unambiguous statutes’ ” or “rewrite the clear
language of [a] statute to broaden the statute's application”].) Mother has therefore failed
to show error.
Ample evidence supports the juvenile court’s decision to bypass reunification
services pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(2).
16 IV.
DISPOSITION
The petition for an extraordinary writ is denied on the merits.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
CODRINGTON J. We concur:
MILLER Acting P. J.
RAPHAEL J.