Smyth v. Commissioner of Social Security

CourtDistrict Court, D. Massachusetts
DecidedDecember 6, 2021
Docket1:20-cv-12275
StatusUnknown

This text of Smyth v. Commissioner of Social Security (Smyth v. Commissioner of Social Security) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Smyth v. Commissioner of Social Security, (D. Mass. 2021).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

ROBERT SMYTH, Plaintiff,

v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 20-12275-MPK1

KILOLO KIJAKAZI,2 Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S EAJA APPLICATION FOR FEES AND EXPENSES (#28).

KELLEY, U.S.M.J.

Presently before the court is plaintiff’s application for fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. (#28.) For the reasons set forth below, plaintiff’s application is GRANTED. I. Background. Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking judicial review of a decision by the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration on December 23, 2020. (#1.) He filed a motion for reversal of that decision on July 26, 2021. (#22.)

1 With the parties’ consent, this case was assigned to the undersigned for all purposes, including trial and the entry of judgment, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (##12, 14.)

2 On July 9, 2021, Kilolo Kijakazi was appointed as Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration. She is automatically substituted as the defendant in this case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). On August 20, 2021, defendant, the Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, filed an assented-to motion for entry of judgment pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. 405(g) with reversal and remand. (#23.) Upon further consideration of the case, the Acting Commissioner determined that remand was appropriate. (#24 at 2.) On August 23, 2020, the court

allowed the Acting Commissioner’s assented-to motion and issued an order entering judgment under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) with reversal and remand (“Judgment”) (#26), substantially as proposed by the Acting Commissioner (#24-1.) Plaintiff filed this application on November 22, 2021. (#28.) Plaintiff’s application is supported by an affidavit of Francis Jackson, Esq. (“Jackson Affidavit”). (#28-2.) It is also supported by an itemized statement. (#28-1.) The itemized statement shows 26.20 attorney hours at a rate of $216.13 per hour, yielding $5,662.61, and .60 paralegal hours at a rate of $95.00 per hour, yielding $57.00, for a total of $5,719.60 in fees. (#28-1.)3 In addition, plaintiff has submitted an assignment, stating that he consents to the payment of fees directly to his attorneys. (#28-4.) The Acting Commissioner has no objection to the request for $5,719.60 in fees. (#29.) The

Acting Commissioner also has no objection to the payment of fees directly to plaintiff’s attorneys if, at the time of this Memorandum and Order, he does not owe a debt to the government that is subject to offset. Id. II. Discussion. The EAJA provides that: Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses, in addition to any costs awarded pursuant to subsection (a), incurred by that party in any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort), including proceedings for judicial review of agency action, brought by or against the United States in any court having jurisdiction of that action, unless the court finds that the position of the United

3 The itemized statement does not show any expenses. States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). To be eligible for an award of fees under the EAJA, the following prerequisites must be met: (1) the claimant must be the “prevailing party;” (2) the government’s position must not be “substantially justified;” (3) no “special circumstances” make the award “unjust;” and, (4) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B), the application must be supported by an itemized statement and filed within 30 days of judgment. Comm’r. I.N.S. v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 158 (1990). See Blaney v. Saul, No. 18-cv-12009-ADB, 2020 WL 6162944, at *2 (D. Mass. Oct. 21, 2020). In this case, the prerequisites are met. Plaintiff is the prevailing party because the case was reversed and remanded pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (##25, 26.) Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 301-302 (1993). See, e.g., Guillermo G. v. Kijakazi, No. 20-cv-01167- JLB, 2021 WL 4356132, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2021) (involving joint motion for voluntary remand); Roland S. v. Saul, No. 20-cv-01068-AHG, 2021 WL 4081567, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2021) (same). The Acting Commissioner does not argue that the government’s position was substantially justified or that special circumstances make the award unjust. See Whitzell v. Barnhart, 429 F. Supp. 2d 361, 365 (D. Mass. 2006) (government’s burden to show that position was substantially justified); Rodrigues v. Colvin, No. 13-cv-30207-MGM, 2015 WL 6157909, at *2 (D. Mass. Oct.

20, 2015) (same, as to special circumstances). See, e.g., Blaney, 2020 WL 6162944, at *2 (noting Commissioner’s failure to contest plaintiff’s argument that government’s position was not substantially justified and to make showing of special circumstances). Plaintiff’s application is supported by an itemized statement. (#28-1.). Moreover, it is timely. An application must be filed within 30 days after the time for appeal has ended. Shalala, 509 U.S. at 301-302. Here, Judgment was issued on August 23, 2021. (#26.) The time for appeal ended on Friday, October 22, 2021, see Fed. R. App. P. 4(a); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), and plaintiff’s application was filed on Monday, November 22, 2021. (#28.) Plaintiff is eligible for an award of fees under the EAJA, and the number of attorney hours

(26.20) and paralegal hours (0.60) is reasonable. The total number (26.80) is within the range of hours generally regarded as reasonable for a typical Social Security case. See Cano v. Saul, 505 F. Supp. 3d 20, 24-25 (D. Mass. 2020) (“Case law from the First Circuit supports the Commissioner’s contention that the average number of hours for a case of this type is between 20 and 40 hours”) (and cases collected). See also Costa v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 690 F.3d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Many district courts have noted that twenty to forty hours is the range most often requested and granted in social security cases”). The court has reviewed the itemized statement. The entries are not excessive or duplicative. The Acting Commissioner does not argue that any particular entry is not compensable. Attorney fees must be based on the prevailing market rate, subject to a cap of $125 an hour

unless the court determines that an increase in cost of living justifies a rate in excess of the cap. 28 U.S.C.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Shalala v. Schaefer
509 U.S. 292 (Supreme Court, 1993)
Richlin Security Service Co. v. Chertoff
553 U.S. 571 (Supreme Court, 2008)
Astrue v. Ratliff
560 U.S. 586 (Supreme Court, 2010)
Castaneda Castillo v. Holder, Jr.
723 F.3d 48 (First Circuit, 2013)
Whitzell v. Barnhart
429 F. Supp. 2d 361 (D. Massachusetts, 2006)
Yong Tang v. Chertoff
689 F. Supp. 2d 206 (D. Massachusetts, 2010)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Smyth v. Commissioner of Social Security, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/smyth-v-commissioner-of-social-security-mad-2021.