Smith-Wynn Post No. 96 v. United States

197 F. Supp. 140, 8 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 6127, 1961 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5670
CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Alabama
DecidedAugust 16, 1961
DocketCiv. A. No. 1701-N
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 197 F. Supp. 140 (Smith-Wynn Post No. 96 v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Smith-Wynn Post No. 96 v. United States, 197 F. Supp. 140, 8 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 6127, 1961 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5670 (M.D. Ala. 1961).

Opinion

JOHNSON, District Judge.

This cause is now submitted upon the motion of the United States of America made pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S. C.A., wherein the United States seeks to have this Court dismiss the taxpayer’s complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

The taxpayer, Smith-Wynn Post No. 96 Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States, is a post of war veterans organized in the United States and in[141]*141corporated in the State of Alabama with its principal office and place of business being located in the City of Montgomery, Alabama. Taxpayer operates as a subordinate unit of its post a club where music and dancing privileges are afforded its patrons in connection with the service of selling food, refreshments, etc.

On or about February 21, 1961, taxpayer filed with the District Director of the Internal Revenue Service for the District of Alabama at Birmingham, Alabama, its excise tax return for the calendar quarter ending March 31, 1955, and paid the tax shown thereon to be due of $2,760.33, a penalty of $680.08 and interest of $961.84. A claim for refund of these amounts (totaling $4,-412.25) was duly filed by the taxpayer, and on March 9, 1961, this claim for refund was disallowed by the defendant.1 This action was thereafter duly and timely filed.

The only question before the Court at this time is whether the so-called “cabaret” tax imposed by § 4231(6), Internal Revenue Code of 1954 2 is a form of admissions tax and thereby included within the phrase “any admissions” appearing in § 4233(a) (1) (A), resulting in the exemptions provided in § 4233(a) (1) (A) (vi) being applicable to the tax imposed by paragraph (6) of § 4231. More concisely : Does the exemption from the tax levied on “any admissions” which is granted to veterans’ organizations by § 4233(a) (1) (A) (vi) exempt such an organization from the payment of cabaret taxes ?

The question presented in this case is one of first impression. The scope of the exemption in issue therefore must be determined on the basis of the language of the applicable statutes, the legislative history thereto, and the construction and interpretation of the matter by the agency charged with its administration.

The primary rule of statutory construction — in the absence of prior court decisions — is for the interpreting court to ascertain, if possible, the intent of the legislating body. United States v. N. E. Rosenblum Truck Lines, Inc., 315 U.S. 50, 62 S.Ct. 445, 86 L.Ed. 671. In ascertaining this intent, no one invariable rule is controlling, and when, as in this instance, the statutes under consideration leave some doubt as to the intent of the Congress, it is entirely proper to use the aids of “legislative history” and “administrative construction.” Burnet v. Chicago Portrait Co., 285 U.S. 1, 52 S. Ct. 275, 76 L.Ed. 587.

An analysis of the provision of § 4231 leaves some doubt in the mind of the Court on the question of whether the tax on admissions is separate from the tax placed upon “ * * * all amounts paid for admission, refreshment, service, or merchandise, at any roof garden, cabaret, or other similar place furnishing a public performance for profit * * As a matter of fact, the indications from this statute alone are confusing in that the section on “cabarets” appears under the general heading “Admissions” and the subheading “Imposition of tax.”3 On the other hand, in addition to the different base upon which the two taxes are levied, it is provided that the admission tax “shall be paid by the person paying for such admission” with the proprietor acting only as the collecting agent, whereas in the case of the cabaret tax, “The tax * * * shall be returned and paid by the person receiving such payments” (the proprietor). In addition, an intended difference between the admission tax and the cabaret tax is indicated by the last sentence of the “cabaret” paragraph of § 4231, reading: “No tax shall be applicable under paragraphs (1) [general admission tax] or (2) on account of an amount paid with respect to [142]*142which tax is imposed under this [cabaret tax] paragraph.”

In addition to the above, it is further indicated that the cabaret tax was not intended by Congress to be a tax on admissions ; otherwise, it would have been unnecessary for Congress to include in the “cabaret paragraph” of § 4231 the provision that a tax would be imposed on « * * * all amounts paid for admission * * *” when such an admission charge is specifically imposed under subsection (1) [general admission paragraph] of § 4231.

Furthermore, there is a strong indication in § 4232(a) that the term “any admissions” as used in the exemption section [4233(a) (1) (A)] was not intended to exempt war veteran organizations from being taxed for “refreshments” and “merchandise.” Section 4232(a) states that “ ‘admission’ as used in this chapter includes seats and tables, * * * and other similar accommodations, and the charges made therefor.”

As to the legislative history of §§ 4231 (6) and 4233(a) (1) (A), it appears there has been some confusion. These sections originated in the Revenue Act of 1917 as a part of § 700.4 That section levied a tax on charges for admission to cabarets when the charge was “wholly or in part included in the price paid for refreshment, service, or merchandise; the amount paid for such admission to be deemed to be 20 per centum of the amount paid for refreshment, service, and merchandise * * This tax was imposed on the patron and clearly authorized the imposition of an admission tax to be made upon the basis of'a percentage of the amount paid for refreshment, service and merchandise. The Revenue Act of 1918 seems to have codified the action of the Internal Revenue Commissioner in his ruling imposing such a tax.

Sections 541 and 542 of the Revenue Code of 1941 5 treated the tax on admissions (§ 541) separately from the tax on cabarets (§ 542). It is also significant to note that the nature of the cabaret tax was changed from that first set up by the 1917 Code, and the liability for the payment of the tax was shifted from the patron to the person receiving the payment. As to the exemptions previously granted from the imposition of an admissions tax — they were removed. In this connection, the Committee Report that concerned these changes stated that “Certain admission charges exempted from tax under existing law * * * are denied exemption under the bill.” House Rep. No. 1040, 77th Cong., 1st Session, page 31.

In 1951 Congress again made some changes in the Revenue Code that are pertinent to the question here under consideration. Section 402 in the 1951 Code, dealing with exemptions from admissions tax, indicates that the stated exemptions were limited in their applicability to the tax on admissions. The language of the 1951 Internal Revenue Section 402, § 404 (cabaret tax) and the history of these sections 6 refer not only to the cabaret tax and admission tax separately, but, in addition, make no mention of any exemption granted where the cabaret is owned by an organization such as a war veterans’ organization.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Hodgson v. Mauldin
344 F. Supp. 302 (N.D. Alabama, 1972)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
197 F. Supp. 140, 8 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 6127, 1961 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5670, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/smith-wynn-post-no-96-v-united-states-almd-1961.