PD-1615-14 COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS Transmitted 12/29/2014 5:40:36 PM Accepted 12/30/2014 10:55:45 AM ABEL ACOSTA NO. PD-1615-14 CLERK
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
STATE OF TEXAS, Petitioner
vs.
WILLIAM SMITH, Respondent
State’s Petition for Discretionary Review from William Smith v. State, No. 13-11-00694-CR in the Thirteenth Court of Appeals, trial cause No. 11-CR-0403- C in the 94th Judicial District Court, Nueces County, the Hon. Bobby Galvan presiding
REPLY TO STATE’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
Respectfully submitted by:
Donald B. Edwards State Bar No. 06469050 Law Office of Donald B. Edwards P.O. Box 3302 December 30, 2014 Corpus Christi, TX 78463-3302 (361) 887-7007 (361) 887-7009 (fax) Table of Contents
Index of Authorities.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
I. The State’s petition for review lacks grounds to warrant this Honorable Court’s attention.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
II. This Honorable Court has correctly determined the Transportation Code does not create an exception to the warrant requirement to permit warrantless blood draws.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
III. The trial court was made sufficiently aware of the complaint in a timely fashion for purposes of preserving error under the Rules of Appellate Procedure, and the issue does not otherwise merit review.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Prayer. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Certificate of Compliance and Service. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2 Index of Authorities
Cases
Anderson v. State, 633 S.W.2d 851 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Garza v. State, 126 S.W.3d 79 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. 1552 (2013). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
State v. Villarreal, PD-0306-14 (Tex. Crim. App. November 26, 2014). . . . . . . 4, 5
Court Rules
TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3 I. The State’s petition for review lacks grounds to warrant this Honorable Court’s attention.
The State has offered only two grounds for review. The first, whether the
implied consent statute and mandatory blood draw provisions of the Transportation
Code provide an exception to the warrant requirement, has already been answered by
this Honorable Court in the negative in State v. Villarreal, PD-0306-14 (Tex. Crim.
App. November 26, 2014). While that case is still pending on rehearing, Respondent
would contend this Honorable Court correctly determined that the Transportation
Code does not create a permissible exception to the warrant requirement, as has also
been held by most of the Courts of Appeals in this State. The second ground for
review, whether the defendant failed to preserve error by objecting in a timely
fashion, does not present an issue of significance to the jurisprudence of the State that
it warrants being addressed by this Honorable Court. None of the In fact, even if the
State is correct about the error not being preserved at trial, by granting PDR on an
issue concerning the timeliness of an objection recognized by defense counsel, this
Honorable Court would do little more than require the issue concerning the
unconstitutional taking of a blood sample without warrant or consent to be re-urged
via a habeas petition, necessitating needless expense and a waste of judicial
resources.
4 II. This Honorable Court has correctly determined the Transportation Code does not create an exception to the warrant requirement to permit warrantless blood draws.
In State v. Villarreal, PD-0306-14, this Honorable Court held the
Transportation Code does not create an exception to the warrant requirement to
permit a warrantless taking of blood. The State has offered no argument in its
petition in this case to distinguish it from Villarreal. Respondent would contend this
Honorable Court directly decided Villarreal in light of the controlling precedent of
Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. 1552 (2013). Respondent reserves the right to
discuss the issue of the unconstitutionality of a warrantless blood draw in the event
this Honorable Court decides to grant this petition and requests briefing on the merits.
III. The trial court was made sufficiently aware of the complaint in a timely fashion for purposes of preserving error under the Rules of Appellate Procedure, and the issue does not otherwise merit review.
The State complains Respondent’s counsel did not timely object to the
admission of the blood test results and thus waived the issue on appeal. Respondent
contends the objection was sufficient and timely to prevent the trial court from
considering inadmissible evidence as the trier of fact. Furthermore, if the objection
is held to be untimely, the inevitable result will be a habeas petition urging ineffective
assistance of counsel for failing to object in a timely fashion to evidence he showed
5 himself to understand was inadmissible at the time of trial, such ineffective assistance
being more than sufficient to undermine the outcome of the trial.
The purpose of a timely objection is to give the trial judge the opportunity to
cure error. See generally Anderson v. State, 633 S.W.2d 851 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
This was a trial to the bench, not to a jury. Judges sitting as triers of fact may be
required to hear about the nature of seized evidence before having to rule on motions
to disregard or suppress the same, yet still be tasked to judge the case after learning
of the evidence that it has to disregard. Garza v. State, 126 S.W.3d 79, 83 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2004). The trial judge is presumed to be able to disregard on request
improperly admitted evidence, so “the time at which a motion is re-urged or a ruling
is obtained is not as crucial, because the judge, as fact-finder, is aware of the
substance of the motion regardless of when the defendant finally argues it.
Conversely, in a jury trial, the timing of an objection and ruling is much more
important because, if the objection is not made early enough and a ruling is not
obtained, the jury is able to hear evidence which it might never have
heard at all.” Id.
In this case, it is true that the blood test results were revealed to the trial court
before Respondent leveled his many objections to the taking and testing of the
sample; however, immediately upon the proffer of that evidence, Respondent objected
6 on many grounds, and the case essentially stopped for a long discussion about the
taking of the blood without a warrant and whether such taking was unconstitutional.
After a long discussion about the nature of Respondent’s objection to the evidence,
the trial court stated from the bench that it understood Respondent to be making an
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
PD-1615-14 COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS Transmitted 12/29/2014 5:40:36 PM Accepted 12/30/2014 10:55:45 AM ABEL ACOSTA NO. PD-1615-14 CLERK
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
STATE OF TEXAS, Petitioner
vs.
WILLIAM SMITH, Respondent
State’s Petition for Discretionary Review from William Smith v. State, No. 13-11-00694-CR in the Thirteenth Court of Appeals, trial cause No. 11-CR-0403- C in the 94th Judicial District Court, Nueces County, the Hon. Bobby Galvan presiding
REPLY TO STATE’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
Respectfully submitted by:
Donald B. Edwards State Bar No. 06469050 Law Office of Donald B. Edwards P.O. Box 3302 December 30, 2014 Corpus Christi, TX 78463-3302 (361) 887-7007 (361) 887-7009 (fax) Table of Contents
Index of Authorities.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
I. The State’s petition for review lacks grounds to warrant this Honorable Court’s attention.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
II. This Honorable Court has correctly determined the Transportation Code does not create an exception to the warrant requirement to permit warrantless blood draws.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
III. The trial court was made sufficiently aware of the complaint in a timely fashion for purposes of preserving error under the Rules of Appellate Procedure, and the issue does not otherwise merit review.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Prayer. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Certificate of Compliance and Service. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2 Index of Authorities
Cases
Anderson v. State, 633 S.W.2d 851 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Garza v. State, 126 S.W.3d 79 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. 1552 (2013). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
State v. Villarreal, PD-0306-14 (Tex. Crim. App. November 26, 2014). . . . . . . 4, 5
Court Rules
TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3 I. The State’s petition for review lacks grounds to warrant this Honorable Court’s attention.
The State has offered only two grounds for review. The first, whether the
implied consent statute and mandatory blood draw provisions of the Transportation
Code provide an exception to the warrant requirement, has already been answered by
this Honorable Court in the negative in State v. Villarreal, PD-0306-14 (Tex. Crim.
App. November 26, 2014). While that case is still pending on rehearing, Respondent
would contend this Honorable Court correctly determined that the Transportation
Code does not create a permissible exception to the warrant requirement, as has also
been held by most of the Courts of Appeals in this State. The second ground for
review, whether the defendant failed to preserve error by objecting in a timely
fashion, does not present an issue of significance to the jurisprudence of the State that
it warrants being addressed by this Honorable Court. None of the In fact, even if the
State is correct about the error not being preserved at trial, by granting PDR on an
issue concerning the timeliness of an objection recognized by defense counsel, this
Honorable Court would do little more than require the issue concerning the
unconstitutional taking of a blood sample without warrant or consent to be re-urged
via a habeas petition, necessitating needless expense and a waste of judicial
resources.
4 II. This Honorable Court has correctly determined the Transportation Code does not create an exception to the warrant requirement to permit warrantless blood draws.
In State v. Villarreal, PD-0306-14, this Honorable Court held the
Transportation Code does not create an exception to the warrant requirement to
permit a warrantless taking of blood. The State has offered no argument in its
petition in this case to distinguish it from Villarreal. Respondent would contend this
Honorable Court directly decided Villarreal in light of the controlling precedent of
Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. 1552 (2013). Respondent reserves the right to
discuss the issue of the unconstitutionality of a warrantless blood draw in the event
this Honorable Court decides to grant this petition and requests briefing on the merits.
III. The trial court was made sufficiently aware of the complaint in a timely fashion for purposes of preserving error under the Rules of Appellate Procedure, and the issue does not otherwise merit review.
The State complains Respondent’s counsel did not timely object to the
admission of the blood test results and thus waived the issue on appeal. Respondent
contends the objection was sufficient and timely to prevent the trial court from
considering inadmissible evidence as the trier of fact. Furthermore, if the objection
is held to be untimely, the inevitable result will be a habeas petition urging ineffective
assistance of counsel for failing to object in a timely fashion to evidence he showed
5 himself to understand was inadmissible at the time of trial, such ineffective assistance
being more than sufficient to undermine the outcome of the trial.
The purpose of a timely objection is to give the trial judge the opportunity to
cure error. See generally Anderson v. State, 633 S.W.2d 851 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
This was a trial to the bench, not to a jury. Judges sitting as triers of fact may be
required to hear about the nature of seized evidence before having to rule on motions
to disregard or suppress the same, yet still be tasked to judge the case after learning
of the evidence that it has to disregard. Garza v. State, 126 S.W.3d 79, 83 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2004). The trial judge is presumed to be able to disregard on request
improperly admitted evidence, so “the time at which a motion is re-urged or a ruling
is obtained is not as crucial, because the judge, as fact-finder, is aware of the
substance of the motion regardless of when the defendant finally argues it.
Conversely, in a jury trial, the timing of an objection and ruling is much more
important because, if the objection is not made early enough and a ruling is not
obtained, the jury is able to hear evidence which it might never have
heard at all.” Id.
In this case, it is true that the blood test results were revealed to the trial court
before Respondent leveled his many objections to the taking and testing of the
sample; however, immediately upon the proffer of that evidence, Respondent objected
6 on many grounds, and the case essentially stopped for a long discussion about the
taking of the blood without a warrant and whether such taking was unconstitutional.
After a long discussion about the nature of Respondent’s objection to the evidence,
the trial court stated from the bench that it understood Respondent to be making an
objection on Fourth Amendment search and seizure grounds. RR Vol. 1, p. 84, ll. 10-
25. When the State reoffered the exhibit of the blood test results, defense counsel
reurged his objections. RR Vol. 1, p. 93, ll. 18-25. The trial court stated it would
reserve ruling on the constitutional issue. RR Vol. 1, p. 95, ll. 17-19. At the close of
evidence, defense moved for an “instructed verdict,” complaining again that the blood
was taken in violation of the Fourth Amendment. RR Vol. 2, p. 21, ll. 8-11.
This was more than adequate to “make the trial court aware of the complaint.”
TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A). It actually made the trial court aware of the complaint
that Respondent’s blood was illegally seized without a warrant or express consent and
the test results should be held inadmissible. The trial court could have disregarded
the evidence but chose not to do so, instead relying on the test results to find
Respondent guilty. RR Vol. 2, p. 26, l. 21 through p. 27, l. 11.
The Thirteenth Court of Appeals’ determination that the issue was preserved
was neither against the plain language of the rule, in conflict with decisions of other
courts of appeals, in conflict with rulings by this Honorable Court, or so far departed
7 from the ordinary course of judicial procedure to require this Honorable Court to
address the decision of the lower court.
Even if this Honorable Court were to hold the objection was not timely, there
can be no viable trial strategy in waiting behind the log to permit the introduction of
inculpatory evidence before objecting to the same. Trial counsel’s objections showed
he was aware of the need to make the Fourth Amendment complaint, but he might
have been tardy in doing so. Valuable judicial resources would be wasted in the
exercise of reversing the decision of the Court of Appeals and requiring Respondent
and the State (and the courts) to entertain an 11.07 petition to get to the same result
already reached by the Thirteenth Court of Appeals in this case.
Prayer
Respondent respectfully requests this Honorable Court to deny the State’s
Petition for Discretionary Review.
Respectfully submitted,
Donald B. Edwards Attorney for Respondent State Bar No. 06469050 Law Office of Donald B. Edwards P.O. Box 3302 Corpus Christi, TX 78463-3302 (361) 887-7007 (361) 887-7009 (fax)
8 Certificate of Compliance and Service
I, Donald B. Edwards, certify that I hand delivered a copy of this reply to the Nueces County District Attorney’s Office, attention Mr. Doug Norman, and to the Office of the State Prosecuting Attorney on December 29, 2014, via the State’s electronic filing and service system, and that the reply contains 1129 words in those matters not exempted by Rule 9.
________________________ Donald B. Edwards