J-S10039-25
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
WALTER SMITH : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : KEVIN RANSOM : No. 533 MDA 2024
Appeal from the Order Entered February 20, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Civil Division at No(s): 2023-08623
BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and SULLIVAN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED: SEPTEMBER 11, 2025
Walter Smith (“Smith”) appeals pro se from the order transferring his
self-titled petition for writ of habeas corpus from Luzerne County to
Philadelphia County. We affirm.
In 1987, Smith was convicted of first-degree murder, and the
Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas sentenced him to life imprisonment.1
Smith is serving his sentence in SCI-Dallas, located in Luzerne County. In
August 2023, Smith filed the instant petition in Luzerne County and asserted
seven claims, the essence of which are as follows: (1) he was not sentenced
to life without the possibility of parole; (2) there was no legal sentencing order
to hold him in prison; and (3) his continued detention without the possibility
of parole violated state and federal constitutional protections. See Pet.,
____________________________________________
1 Smith does not allege that he was a juvenile at the time of the murder. J-S10039-25
8/21/23, unnumbered at 2-4. Smith contended that all of these claims “test
the legality of his commitment and detention.” Id. at 4. The defendant, the
then-superintendent of SCI-Dallas, filed an answer as well as a motion for
transfer or dismissal of the petition. On February 20, 2024, the trial court
transferred the petition to Philadelphia County. Smith timely appealed. Smith
and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Prior to reviewing the merits of Smith’s appeal, we must first determine
whether we have jurisdiction over this case. See Smith v. O’Brien, 321 A.3d
1034, 1039 (Pa. Super. 2024). Appellee, the then-superintendent of SCI-
Dallas, argues that this Court should quash this appeal because: (1) the order
is not a final order; (2) the trial court transferred the petition for writ of habeas
corpus under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5103, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 108, cmt.; and (3) while
Pa.R.A.P. 311(c) permits an interlocutory appeal as of right from an order in
a civil proceeding changing venue or transferring a matter to a court of
coordinate jurisdiction, the comment to Pa.R.A.P. 311(c) states that a transfer
pursuant to section 5103 is not immediately appealable, see Pa.R.A.P. 311,
cmt. to 311(c). See Appellee’s Br. at 7.
Because a petition for writ of habeas corpus is civil in nature, Pa.R.A.P.
311(c) affords a basis to exercise appellate jurisdiction over an otherwise non-
final order transferring venue. See Pa.R.A.P. 311(c) (noting, in relevant part,
that “[a]n appeal may be taken as of right from an order in a civil action or
proceeding changing venue” or “transferring the matter to another court of
coordinate jurisdiction”); Com. ex rel. Paylor v. Claudy, 77 A.2d 350, 351
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(Pa. 1951) (noting that habeas corpus is “a civil remedy rather than a criminal
proceeding regardless of whether the prisoner is detained under civil or
criminal process”). As noted by Appellee, the relevant rule for transferring
venue of the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus are set forth in
Pa.R.Crim.P. 108, the comment to which states, “[a] petition misfiled in the
wrong judicial district under this rule may be transferred to the proper judicial
district pursuant to . . . 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 5103(a).” Pa.R.Crim.P. 108, cmt. In
turn, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5103 states, “If [a] matter is . . . brought in a court . . .
which does not have jurisdiction . . ., the court . . . shall not . . . dismiss the
matter, but shall transfer the record thereof to the proper tribunal of this
Commonwealth . . ..” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5103(a). The comment to Pa.R.A.P.
311(c) further states subdivision(c) “does not relate to a transfer under . . .
42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 5103, or any other similar provision of law, because such a
transfer is not to a ‘court of coordinate jurisdiction’ within the meaning of this
rule.” See Pa.R.A.P. 311, cmt. to 311(c). The comment continues, “[I]t is
intended that there shall be no right of appeal from a transfer order based on
improper subject matter jurisdiction.” See Pa.R.A.P. 311, cmt. to 311(c).
The present transfer of the petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant
to Pa.R.Crim.P. 108 and 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5103(a) constitutes a change of
venue. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6502(b) (stating that venue for petitions for writ
of habeas corpus under 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6501-6505 shall be prescribed by
general rule); Pa.R.Crim.P. 108, cmt. (stating that “[t]his rule implements
[s]ection 6502(b) . . . as it applies to the venue for petitions for writs of
-3- J-S10039-25
habeas corpus in criminal matters”) (emphasis and italics added). Moreover,
such a transfer does not implicate improper subject matter jurisdiction.
Rather, it involves a transfer between courts of coordinate jurisdiction. See
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6501(a) (authorizing any judge of a court of record to issue a
writ of habeas corpus); see also Commonwealth v. Bethea, 828 A.2d 1066,
1074 (Pa. 2003) (noting subject matter jurisdiction and venue are distinct).
Accordingly, this appeal falls within the explicit wording of Pa.R.A.P. 311(c),
and we reject Appellee’s claim that the comments to Pa.R.Crim.P. 108 and
Pa.R.A.P. 311(c) preclude this Court from exercising jurisdiction.2 See
Pa.R.A.P. 107; see also Pa.R.J.A. 108 (a)-(c). Having concluded that this
Court has jurisdiction over this appeal, we proceed to review the trial court’s
order transferring Smith’s petition.
This Court reviews a transfer of venue for an abuse of discretion. Cf.
Commonwealth v. Nicoletti, 328 A.3d 85, 90 (Pa. Super. 2024). As noted
above, Pa.R.Crim.P. 108 governs the transfer of venue in habeas actions in
criminal matters and states:
(A) A petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the legality of the petitioner’s detention or confinement in a criminal matter shall ____________________________________________
2 We note that a recent Commonwealth Court decision has agreed with Appellee’s argument to quash. See Barnett v. Ransom, 337 A.3d 986, 2025 WL 763690 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2025) (mem. op. at *2) (quashing an appeal from an order transferring a petition for writ of habeas corpus based on the comment to Pa.R.A.P. 311(c)). Although we may cite that decision for persuasive value, it is neither precedential nor binding on this Court. See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b); Peter Daniels Realty, Inc. v. N. Equity Inv’rs, Grp., Inc., 829 A.2d 721, 723 (Pa. Super. 2003). For the reasons stated above, we respectfully decline to follow the Barnett decision.
-4- J-S10039-25
be filed with the clerk of courts of the judicial district in which the order directing the petitioner’s detention or confinement was entered.
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J-S10039-25
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
WALTER SMITH : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : KEVIN RANSOM : No. 533 MDA 2024
Appeal from the Order Entered February 20, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Civil Division at No(s): 2023-08623
BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and SULLIVAN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED: SEPTEMBER 11, 2025
Walter Smith (“Smith”) appeals pro se from the order transferring his
self-titled petition for writ of habeas corpus from Luzerne County to
Philadelphia County. We affirm.
In 1987, Smith was convicted of first-degree murder, and the
Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas sentenced him to life imprisonment.1
Smith is serving his sentence in SCI-Dallas, located in Luzerne County. In
August 2023, Smith filed the instant petition in Luzerne County and asserted
seven claims, the essence of which are as follows: (1) he was not sentenced
to life without the possibility of parole; (2) there was no legal sentencing order
to hold him in prison; and (3) his continued detention without the possibility
of parole violated state and federal constitutional protections. See Pet.,
____________________________________________
1 Smith does not allege that he was a juvenile at the time of the murder. J-S10039-25
8/21/23, unnumbered at 2-4. Smith contended that all of these claims “test
the legality of his commitment and detention.” Id. at 4. The defendant, the
then-superintendent of SCI-Dallas, filed an answer as well as a motion for
transfer or dismissal of the petition. On February 20, 2024, the trial court
transferred the petition to Philadelphia County. Smith timely appealed. Smith
and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Prior to reviewing the merits of Smith’s appeal, we must first determine
whether we have jurisdiction over this case. See Smith v. O’Brien, 321 A.3d
1034, 1039 (Pa. Super. 2024). Appellee, the then-superintendent of SCI-
Dallas, argues that this Court should quash this appeal because: (1) the order
is not a final order; (2) the trial court transferred the petition for writ of habeas
corpus under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5103, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 108, cmt.; and (3) while
Pa.R.A.P. 311(c) permits an interlocutory appeal as of right from an order in
a civil proceeding changing venue or transferring a matter to a court of
coordinate jurisdiction, the comment to Pa.R.A.P. 311(c) states that a transfer
pursuant to section 5103 is not immediately appealable, see Pa.R.A.P. 311,
cmt. to 311(c). See Appellee’s Br. at 7.
Because a petition for writ of habeas corpus is civil in nature, Pa.R.A.P.
311(c) affords a basis to exercise appellate jurisdiction over an otherwise non-
final order transferring venue. See Pa.R.A.P. 311(c) (noting, in relevant part,
that “[a]n appeal may be taken as of right from an order in a civil action or
proceeding changing venue” or “transferring the matter to another court of
coordinate jurisdiction”); Com. ex rel. Paylor v. Claudy, 77 A.2d 350, 351
-2- J-S10039-25
(Pa. 1951) (noting that habeas corpus is “a civil remedy rather than a criminal
proceeding regardless of whether the prisoner is detained under civil or
criminal process”). As noted by Appellee, the relevant rule for transferring
venue of the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus are set forth in
Pa.R.Crim.P. 108, the comment to which states, “[a] petition misfiled in the
wrong judicial district under this rule may be transferred to the proper judicial
district pursuant to . . . 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 5103(a).” Pa.R.Crim.P. 108, cmt. In
turn, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5103 states, “If [a] matter is . . . brought in a court . . .
which does not have jurisdiction . . ., the court . . . shall not . . . dismiss the
matter, but shall transfer the record thereof to the proper tribunal of this
Commonwealth . . ..” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5103(a). The comment to Pa.R.A.P.
311(c) further states subdivision(c) “does not relate to a transfer under . . .
42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 5103, or any other similar provision of law, because such a
transfer is not to a ‘court of coordinate jurisdiction’ within the meaning of this
rule.” See Pa.R.A.P. 311, cmt. to 311(c). The comment continues, “[I]t is
intended that there shall be no right of appeal from a transfer order based on
improper subject matter jurisdiction.” See Pa.R.A.P. 311, cmt. to 311(c).
The present transfer of the petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant
to Pa.R.Crim.P. 108 and 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5103(a) constitutes a change of
venue. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6502(b) (stating that venue for petitions for writ
of habeas corpus under 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6501-6505 shall be prescribed by
general rule); Pa.R.Crim.P. 108, cmt. (stating that “[t]his rule implements
[s]ection 6502(b) . . . as it applies to the venue for petitions for writs of
-3- J-S10039-25
habeas corpus in criminal matters”) (emphasis and italics added). Moreover,
such a transfer does not implicate improper subject matter jurisdiction.
Rather, it involves a transfer between courts of coordinate jurisdiction. See
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6501(a) (authorizing any judge of a court of record to issue a
writ of habeas corpus); see also Commonwealth v. Bethea, 828 A.2d 1066,
1074 (Pa. 2003) (noting subject matter jurisdiction and venue are distinct).
Accordingly, this appeal falls within the explicit wording of Pa.R.A.P. 311(c),
and we reject Appellee’s claim that the comments to Pa.R.Crim.P. 108 and
Pa.R.A.P. 311(c) preclude this Court from exercising jurisdiction.2 See
Pa.R.A.P. 107; see also Pa.R.J.A. 108 (a)-(c). Having concluded that this
Court has jurisdiction over this appeal, we proceed to review the trial court’s
order transferring Smith’s petition.
This Court reviews a transfer of venue for an abuse of discretion. Cf.
Commonwealth v. Nicoletti, 328 A.3d 85, 90 (Pa. Super. 2024). As noted
above, Pa.R.Crim.P. 108 governs the transfer of venue in habeas actions in
criminal matters and states:
(A) A petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the legality of the petitioner’s detention or confinement in a criminal matter shall ____________________________________________
2 We note that a recent Commonwealth Court decision has agreed with Appellee’s argument to quash. See Barnett v. Ransom, 337 A.3d 986, 2025 WL 763690 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2025) (mem. op. at *2) (quashing an appeal from an order transferring a petition for writ of habeas corpus based on the comment to Pa.R.A.P. 311(c)). Although we may cite that decision for persuasive value, it is neither precedential nor binding on this Court. See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b); Peter Daniels Realty, Inc. v. N. Equity Inv’rs, Grp., Inc., 829 A.2d 721, 723 (Pa. Super. 2003). For the reasons stated above, we respectfully decline to follow the Barnett decision.
-4- J-S10039-25
be filed with the clerk of courts of the judicial district in which the order directing the petitioner’s detention or confinement was entered.
(B) A petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the conditions of the petitioner’s confinement in a criminal matter shall be filed with the clerk of courts of the judicial district in which the petitioner is confined.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 108. To the extent the issue on appeal involves the
interpretation and application of the statute and rules governing venue, our
standard of review is de novo, and the scope of our review is plenary. Cf.
Harvey v. Bohenski, --- A.3d ---, 2025 WL 1482923 (Pa. Super. May 23,
2025) (unpublished mem. decision at *1); see also Pa.R.A.P. 126(b).
On appeal, Smith discusses the merits of his claims that his confinement
is illegal or unconstitutional, but he does not address 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6502,
Pa.R.Crim.P. 108, or the trial court’s decision to transfer his petition. See
Smith’s Br. at 10-17. Regardless, having reviewed the record and Smith’s
arguments, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to
transfer the instant petition to Philadelphia. Smith’s petition asserted he was
challenging the legality of his confinement, see Pet. 8/21/23, unnumbered at
2-4, and his arguments on appeal confirm that he is challenging the legality
of his confinement and not any condition of his confinement. See Smith’s Br.
at 10-17. Pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 108(A), venue for Smith’s petition
challenging the legality of confinement is in Philadelphia, the judicial district
where the order directing the petitioner’s detention or confinement was
entered. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 108(A); cf. Harvey, 2025 WL 1482923
-5- J-S10039-25
(unpublished mem. decision at *2-3). Accordingly, no relief is due from the
order transferring the petition to Philadelphia.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 09/11/2025
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