WalKer, J.,
after stating the case: If the defendant’s witnesses testified truthfully in this case, the defendant performed its duty and is not liable to the plaintiff for anything. It transmitted the message promptly from Lumberton to Fayetteville, caused search to be made for the sendee at that place, and, failing to find him, used the telephone unsuccessfully for' the purpose of communicating with him. It then wired back to the sender for payment or a guarantee of the charge of 75 cents for the extra service in delivering beyond the place to which the message was addressed. So far, it was within its rights, and there was full compliance with a correct performance of its duty, and the case turns, at this point, upon the question whether H. 0. Freeman did or did not refuse to pay the charges. His testimony as to the conversation with Hamilton was" not very consistent, and it became important to the defendant that every piece .of evidence fairly tending to impair his credit should be considered by the jury. The portion of his written statement, which he had before deliberately made, was excluded by the court, for what reason we are not advised. It clearly tended to contradict him in respect to this vital matter. Surely this admission, in the excluded part of the statement, had that tendency, viz., “We lay no blame on the part of the telegraph company at all, as they did as instructed by us,” and we also think that the whole letter should have gone to the jury. 1 Elliott on Evidence, sec. 241;
Spencer v. Fortescue,
112 N. C., 268. The part which was excluded was very material as tending directly to show.that the company had acted solely under Freeman’s directions in regard to handling the message, and was therefore not guilty of any negligence in failing to deliver it on the day it was sent, and, besides, it had an important bearing upon another phase of the case, in that it tended to show that the conversation between Free
man and Hamilton, near the postoffice, related
to
tbis particular message and not to tbe one sent to a Miss Smith in Georgia, as Freeman testified tbat be thought Hamilton was referring to tbe latter one. When recalled, be testified: “I do not really know undier what circumstances I authorized tbe telegraph company to mail the telegram. I had a death in my family at tbe time. I was at tbe postoffice, and, really, there were two telegrams sent. I did not know it at the time, and really did not think about it — whether it was going to Miss Smith in Georgia, and when Mr. Hamilton asked me tbe question, and I guess I got it right, and he asked me what he should do, and I told him to ‘mail it,’ thinking it was to the one in Georgia.” It was material for defendant to show tbat be did know which telegram Hamilton meant when be asked about tbe extra charge, and tbe excluded part of the statement further tended to show not only tbat he refused to pay the charge, but why he refused to pay it, because “he sent the message to Smith as a matter of respect and did not expect him to attend the funreal,” and, therefore, thought tbat mailing tbe telegram would answer as well as a quicker delivery. The evidence excluded really showed tbe contradiction in an intensive form.
It was tbe duty of tbe defendant, when it learned tbat tbe sendee lived “out of town,” to inform tbe sender of tbe fact and demand payment, or a satisfactory guarantee, of the charge for the extra service, as it elected. The
Chief Justice
said, in
Bryan v. Tel. Co.,
133 N. C., at pp. 605, 606 : “The defendant could have sent the message on to the plaintiff, collecting the charge for the special delivery from her, or, if not willing to risk it, it was negligence not to wire back to Mooresville and demand payment or a guarantee of the cost of delivery beyond the free-delivery limits.” And again: “If guarantee of payment of the special delivery (charge) had been asked and refused, there was no compulsion on the defendant to deliver beyond the free-delivery limits.” We fuJJge=¥ecog-nized, in the following cases, the right of the company, when it discovers that tbe sendee lives beyond its free-delivery limits, to collect in advance the charge for tbe extra service required in making a special delivery.
Bryan v. Tel. Co., supra; Hood v. Tel. Co.,
135 N. C., 622;
Bright v. Tel. Co.,
132 N. C., 317. In the
Gainey case,
136 N. C., 265, we quoted with approval what was said by the
Chief Justice
in
Bryan v. Tel. Co., supra:
“The officer at the receiving point could not have given the sender any information which he did not already have. It was his own negligence not to have paid the special delivery charges, if such a delivery was required,” citing
Tel. Co. v. Henderson,
89 Ala., 510;
Tel. Co. v. Matthews,
107 Ky., 663;
Tel. Co. v. Taylor,
3 Texas Civ. App., 310;
Tel. Co. v. Swearingen,
95 Texas, 420.
Tbe case of
Tel. Co. v. Taylor, supra,
wbicb bas been generally followed by tbe courts, and wbicb bas been approved by tbis Court, beld tbat where tbe rules of tbe company restrict its free-delivery limits to tbe radius of a given distance, in tbaj case one-balf mile of its office, it is not legally bound (tbe special delivery charge not having been paid or arranged) to deliver a message to tbe addressee at bis residence in tbe country, 3 miles from tbe ^áid office. Tbe rule as to delivery limits is a reasonable one, and we/have beld tbat it must be complied with, when brought to tbe attention of tbe sender, by tbe prepayment of or some agreement in regard to tbe special delivery charges.
Some courts have beld, in well considered opinions, notably
Tel. Co. v. Henderson,
89 Ala., 510, tbat tbe sender, if tbe blank on wbicb be writes bis message informs him tbat there are free-delivery limits, must take notice of tbe fact, and is presumed to have sent tbe message with tbe understanding tbat tbe sendee resides’ within them, unless be bas provided, in some way satisfactory to tbe company and in advance, for tbe payment of tbe extra toll for a special delivery, if tbe sendee lives beyond tbe free-delivery limits. But we have not gone so far, and deem our rule tbe more reasonable one, viz., tbat tbe company should notify tbe sender by a service message, if tbe message cannot be delivered within tbe limits prescribed for tbe place to wbicb it is addressed, so tbat be may furnish a better address, or, if tbe addressee lives beyond tbe said limits, provide for tbe payment of tbe charge for tbe extra service required.
Hendricks v. Tel. Co.,
126 N. C., 310. We so beld in
Gainey v. Tel. Co., supra,
where it was said: “We have beld tbat when a message is received at a terminal office to wbicb it bas been transmitted for delivery to tbe person addressed, it is tbe duty of tbe company to make diligent search to find him, and, if be cannot be found, to wire back to tbe office from wbicb tbe message came for a better address; and likewise it is tbe duty of tbe company, when it bas discovered tbat tbe person for whom tbe message is intended lives beyond its free-delivery limits, either tó deliver it by a special messenger or to wire-back and demand payment, or a satisfactory guarantee of payment, as it may choose to do, of tbe charge for tbe special delivery, and if it fails to deliver without demanding and being refused payment of the charge, it will be liable for its default.
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WalKer, J.,
after stating the case: If the defendant’s witnesses testified truthfully in this case, the defendant performed its duty and is not liable to the plaintiff for anything. It transmitted the message promptly from Lumberton to Fayetteville, caused search to be made for the sendee at that place, and, failing to find him, used the telephone unsuccessfully for' the purpose of communicating with him. It then wired back to the sender for payment or a guarantee of the charge of 75 cents for the extra service in delivering beyond the place to which the message was addressed. So far, it was within its rights, and there was full compliance with a correct performance of its duty, and the case turns, at this point, upon the question whether H. 0. Freeman did or did not refuse to pay the charges. His testimony as to the conversation with Hamilton was" not very consistent, and it became important to the defendant that every piece .of evidence fairly tending to impair his credit should be considered by the jury. The portion of his written statement, which he had before deliberately made, was excluded by the court, for what reason we are not advised. It clearly tended to contradict him in respect to this vital matter. Surely this admission, in the excluded part of the statement, had that tendency, viz., “We lay no blame on the part of the telegraph company at all, as they did as instructed by us,” and we also think that the whole letter should have gone to the jury. 1 Elliott on Evidence, sec. 241;
Spencer v. Fortescue,
112 N. C., 268. The part which was excluded was very material as tending directly to show.that the company had acted solely under Freeman’s directions in regard to handling the message, and was therefore not guilty of any negligence in failing to deliver it on the day it was sent, and, besides, it had an important bearing upon another phase of the case, in that it tended to show that the conversation between Free
man and Hamilton, near the postoffice, related
to
tbis particular message and not to tbe one sent to a Miss Smith in Georgia, as Freeman testified tbat be thought Hamilton was referring to tbe latter one. When recalled, be testified: “I do not really know undier what circumstances I authorized tbe telegraph company to mail the telegram. I had a death in my family at tbe time. I was at tbe postoffice, and, really, there were two telegrams sent. I did not know it at the time, and really did not think about it — whether it was going to Miss Smith in Georgia, and when Mr. Hamilton asked me tbe question, and I guess I got it right, and he asked me what he should do, and I told him to ‘mail it,’ thinking it was to the one in Georgia.” It was material for defendant to show tbat be did know which telegram Hamilton meant when be asked about tbe extra charge, and tbe excluded part of the statement further tended to show not only tbat he refused to pay the charge, but why he refused to pay it, because “he sent the message to Smith as a matter of respect and did not expect him to attend the funreal,” and, therefore, thought tbat mailing tbe telegram would answer as well as a quicker delivery. The evidence excluded really showed tbe contradiction in an intensive form.
It was tbe duty of tbe defendant, when it learned tbat tbe sendee lived “out of town,” to inform tbe sender of tbe fact and demand payment, or a satisfactory guarantee, of the charge for the extra service, as it elected. The
Chief Justice
said, in
Bryan v. Tel. Co.,
133 N. C., at pp. 605, 606 : “The defendant could have sent the message on to the plaintiff, collecting the charge for the special delivery from her, or, if not willing to risk it, it was negligence not to wire back to Mooresville and demand payment or a guarantee of the cost of delivery beyond the free-delivery limits.” And again: “If guarantee of payment of the special delivery (charge) had been asked and refused, there was no compulsion on the defendant to deliver beyond the free-delivery limits.” We fuJJge=¥ecog-nized, in the following cases, the right of the company, when it discovers that tbe sendee lives beyond its free-delivery limits, to collect in advance the charge for tbe extra service required in making a special delivery.
Bryan v. Tel. Co., supra; Hood v. Tel. Co.,
135 N. C., 622;
Bright v. Tel. Co.,
132 N. C., 317. In the
Gainey case,
136 N. C., 265, we quoted with approval what was said by the
Chief Justice
in
Bryan v. Tel. Co., supra:
“The officer at the receiving point could not have given the sender any information which he did not already have. It was his own negligence not to have paid the special delivery charges, if such a delivery was required,” citing
Tel. Co. v. Henderson,
89 Ala., 510;
Tel. Co. v. Matthews,
107 Ky., 663;
Tel. Co. v. Taylor,
3 Texas Civ. App., 310;
Tel. Co. v. Swearingen,
95 Texas, 420.
Tbe case of
Tel. Co. v. Taylor, supra,
wbicb bas been generally followed by tbe courts, and wbicb bas been approved by tbis Court, beld tbat where tbe rules of tbe company restrict its free-delivery limits to tbe radius of a given distance, in tbaj case one-balf mile of its office, it is not legally bound (tbe special delivery charge not having been paid or arranged) to deliver a message to tbe addressee at bis residence in tbe country, 3 miles from tbe ^áid office. Tbe rule as to delivery limits is a reasonable one, and we/have beld tbat it must be complied with, when brought to tbe attention of tbe sender, by tbe prepayment of or some agreement in regard to tbe special delivery charges.
Some courts have beld, in well considered opinions, notably
Tel. Co. v. Henderson,
89 Ala., 510, tbat tbe sender, if tbe blank on wbicb be writes bis message informs him tbat there are free-delivery limits, must take notice of tbe fact, and is presumed to have sent tbe message with tbe understanding tbat tbe sendee resides’ within them, unless be bas provided, in some way satisfactory to tbe company and in advance, for tbe payment of tbe extra toll for a special delivery, if tbe sendee lives beyond tbe free-delivery limits. But we have not gone so far, and deem our rule tbe more reasonable one, viz., tbat tbe company should notify tbe sender by a service message, if tbe message cannot be delivered within tbe limits prescribed for tbe place to wbicb it is addressed, so tbat be may furnish a better address, or, if tbe addressee lives beyond tbe said limits, provide for tbe payment of tbe charge for tbe extra service required.
Hendricks v. Tel. Co.,
126 N. C., 310. We so beld in
Gainey v. Tel. Co., supra,
where it was said: “We have beld tbat when a message is received at a terminal office to wbicb it bas been transmitted for delivery to tbe person addressed, it is tbe duty of tbe company to make diligent search to find him, and, if be cannot be found, to wire back to tbe office from wbicb tbe message came for a better address; and likewise it is tbe duty of tbe company, when it bas discovered tbat tbe person for whom tbe message is intended lives beyond its free-delivery limits, either tó deliver it by a special messenger or to wire-back and demand payment, or a satisfactory guarantee of payment, as it may choose to do, of tbe charge for tbe special delivery, and if it fails to deliver without demanding and being refused payment of the charge, it will be liable for its default. It is not liable, though, if tbe sender of tbe message, when proper demand is made, refuses to pay tbe extra charge for a special delivery beyond tbe limits established for free delivery by tbe company, provided those limits are reasonable,” citing
Hendricks v. Tel. Co., supra,
and 78 Am. St. Rep., 658;
Bryan v. Tel. Co., supra,
and
Tel. Co. v. Moore,
12 Ind. App., 136 (54 Am. St. Rep., 515). Tbis rule is fair to tbe sender, who may not take special notice of tbe free-delivery regulation at tbe time,
as a very few read wbat is printed on tbe back of tbe blanks, or wbo may not know where tbe addressee resides; and it is also fair 'to tbe company, as it is tbus enabled to perform its full duty witb proper compensation. It seems to us that it would be exceedingly inconvenient, if not unfair, to tbe public should we take any other view of tbe matter.
But this only shows bow important it was that all tbe facts regarding the guarantee of tbe charge for tbe extra service should have been laid before tbe jury, and it would appear, in this case, that tbe denial of tbe right to have this done greatly prejudiced tbe defendant, as tbe written statement squarely contradicted Freeman’s testimony in every material respect, so far as it concerned this question, which was tbe paramount one in tbe case.
Mental anguish affords a proper basis for tbe assessment of damages in telegraph cases, irrespective of physical injury, as this Court held as far back as
Young v. Tel. Co.,
107 N. C., 370, and
Thompson v. Tel. Co.,
107 N. C., 449 ; but that-means genuine and not unreal anguish, and juries should be careful, if not astute, to distinguish between tbe two. It is necessary, therefore, that they should have all tbe light possible in order that they may detect that which is spurious, and compensate only that which is real, as it is so easy to be simulated.
For the error indicated, another trial is ordered.
New trial.