Smith v. Webb

11 Minn. 500
CourtSupreme Court of Minnesota
DecidedJuly 15, 1866
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 11 Minn. 500 (Smith v. Webb) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Minnesota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Smith v. Webb, 11 Minn. 500 (Mich. 1866).

Opinion

By the Gov/rt

Berry, J.

That the State taxation of the shares of stock in national banks, is, under the legislation of Congress, per se lawful, has been determined by the Supreme Court of the Hnited States, in the recent case of VanAllen v. The Assessors, 3 Wal. 573. While we deem it not improperio remark that some portions of thereasoning found in the prevailing opinion pronounced in this case are unsatisfactory to our minds, and would, as we think, lead to startling consequences, we follow this adjudication by the tribunal of last resort and paramount authority, as in duty bound to do.

It was assumed by the court and counsel in VanAllen v. The Assessors, that Congress possessed authority to pass the national banking law, and to grant the new rights and privileges thereby conferred. The same assumption is made i n the case at bar, and neither party could have any interest in calling it in question. It would seem to follow that if it be a legitimate exercise of the constitutional powers of Congress to establish a national banking system, Congress must, in the absence of express inhibition, possess the right to surround that system with whatever safe-guard may be necessary and proper to protect the banks organized thereunder, and their stockholders, from injury by the States. And if in the exercise of legislative discretion to this end, Congress sees fit, as it has done, to regulate the taxing power of the States over [503]*503these institutions, that exercise is not to be questioned; because, by the the terms of the Federal Constitution “the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, * * * * shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.”

It is then not necessary nor important to inquire whether the 41st Sec. of the national banking act, by which it is provided, among other things, that nothing contained in the act shall be construed to prevent the shares of stock from being included, in the valuation made for the assessment of taxes imposed ly or wider State cmthority, is to be regarded as a permission to the States to tax that which, without such permission they could not tax, or as a regulation or restriction of a taxing power inherent in the State, and underived from the general government. In either case the taxes must be imposed “by or under State authority,” and to State constitutions and laws must State officers look for the rules by which they are to be guided in levying and collecting taxes. If this provision in Sec. 41 be in the nature of a permission, then State laws can operate only to the extent of such permission. If the provision be a regulation simply, then State law can operate only in obedience to it.

It becomes necessary, therefore, to examine our State constitution and laws, to ascertain whether authority is there given to tax the shares in question, consistently with the conditions imposed by Congress. Let us see first what these conditions are. Section 41 before cited enacts, “that nothing in this act shall be construed to prevent all the shares in any of said associations held by any person or body corporate, from being included in the valuation of the personal property of such person or corporation in the assessment of taxes imposed by or under State authority, at the place where such bank is located, and not elsewhere, but not at a greater rate [504]*504than is assessed upon other moneyed capital in the hands of individuals of such States. (2.) Provided further, that the tax so imposed under the laws of any State upon the shares of any of the associations authorized by this act, shall not exceed the rate imposed upon the shares in any of the banks organized under authority of the State where such association ■ is located.”

The construction which we place up'on these provisions is, that the taxes authorized must be imposed upon the shares eo nomine, and in no other way. Whether a tax in some other form, but equivalent in rate or amount would have answered all purposes to prevent unfair discrimination or not, Congress has pointed out the kind ofinterestuponwAzcA^hepersonwAcm, and the place where the taxes may be levied, and has thus excluded every other mode of taxation. As to the last proviso cited, that the tax imposed upon shares in national banks shall not exceed the rate imposed upon the shares of State banks, we hold that it is not necessary that State banks should exist in order to justify the taxation of the shares in national banks.

Manifestly, the object of the provision was to prevent unfair discrimination against the national banks, and in favor ot State banks. If there be no State banks, and none.authorized by law, no such discrimination is possible, and the provision can, therefore, have no operation. And we are confirmed in this view by the further consideration that it was expected and believed that the national banks with their enlarged privileges would drive the State banks out of existence. The result is fast justifying the expectation. That such was the intention, is asserted in the dissenting opinion pronounced by Chief Justice Chase (in VanAllen v. The Assessors,) under whose direction, as Secretary of the Treasury, the act was prepared. With this prospect in view, it is not to be presumed that Congress, as a compensation to the States for the withdrawal from taxation of the immense capital invested in State banks, would [505]*505proffer the empty delusion of a privilege to tax the stock of national banks, at the same time mailing that privilege dependent upon a state of things which would speedily cease to exist. But even if there be no State banks in actual operation, the fact that they may exist under a State law, would be as fatal to the exercise of the right to tax the shares in national banks as if such State banks were in actual existence, unless the State laws also provide for a taxation of State banks, equivalent at least, to a tax upon the shares of national banks. The lams of the State must, in this respect, be conformed to the law of Congress.

Ve now proceed to the examination of our Constitution and laws, for the purpose of ascertaining whether they permit the taxation of these shares, and whether they are in harmony with the act of Congress. Sec. 3, Art. 9, of our Constitution, provides that “ laws shall be passed taxing all moneys, credits, investments in bonds, stocks, joint stock companies or otherwise, and also all real and personal property according to its true value in money,” with certain exemptions not important in this case. This enumeration would, manifestly, include shares of stock in national banks. But it is urged that Sec. 4 of the same article makes an exclusive provision for legislation subjecting all banks and all bankers, and their property as such banks and bankers -to taxation. Sec. 4 reads as follows : Laws shall be passed for taxing the notes and bills discounted or purchased, money loaned, and all other property, effects, or dues of every .description, of all banks, and of all bankers, so that all property employed in banking, shall always be subject to a taxation equal to that imposed on the property of individuals.” It is contended by the counsel for the banks, that the language “all bcmJcs and all bankers” includes national as well State banks, and that if this be so, national as well as State banks must be taxed, and onkj

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Bluebook (online)
11 Minn. 500, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/smith-v-webb-minn-1866.