Smith v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary

254 F. Supp. 805, 1966 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7668
CourtDistrict Court, D. Maryland
DecidedJune 6, 1966
DocketCiv. No. 16165
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 254 F. Supp. 805 (Smith v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Maryland primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Smith v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, 254 F. Supp. 805, 1966 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7668 (D. Md. 1966).

Opinion

THOMSEN, Chief Judge.

In May 1960, in the Criminal Court of Baltimore, Robert M. Smith (petitioner) was convicted by Judge Cullen, sitting without a jury, of the second degree murder of Edmund Lake, known as “the Shadow”, and was sentenced to a term of 18 years. At his trial petitioner was represented by an attorney whom he had known for 10 or 15 years and who had represented him in a number of civil cases.

No appeal was taken from the conviction, but in 1964 petitioner filed a petition under the Maryland Post Conviction Procedure Act. In that proceeding, as here, the only points pressed by petitioner were that the testimony of Adelaide Arthur and Norma Scott at his trial had been perjured and contradicted statements each of them had made to the police shortly after the killing, and that the State’s Attorney who prosecuted petitioner knew or should have known that the testimony was perjured. Petitioner was represented in the PCPA proceeding by a lawyer experienced in the handling of criminal cases; he was given a full hear[806]*806ing before Judge Carter, at which both he and the State’s Attorney who had prosecuted the case testified and various exhibits were offered. In a careful written opinion Judge Carter compared the testimony of each of the witnesses with her previous statement, and found in each instance that the testimony and statement were substantially alike. The Judge further found that their testimony was not perjured, that the record did not support the charge that the State’s Attorney had knowingly used perjured testimony, and that the State’s Attorney had not done anything improper. A copy of Judge Carter’s opinion is attached hereto as an exhibit. An application for leave to appeal was denied by the Maryland Court of Appeals for the reasons set forth in Judge Carter’s opinion. Smith v. Warden, 236 Md. 655, 205 A.2d 218 (1964).

At the hearing on his habeas corpus petition in this Court petitioner pressed the same points on which he had relied before Judge Carter. His court-appointed counsel has been very thorough and industrious in developing both the facts and the law, and the Court gave petitioner an opportunity to testify at length and to state any points on which he wished to rely. Copies of the statements given by Adelaide Arthur and Norma Scott to the police were admitted in evidence as exhibits, as well as the transcript of the testimony of Adelaide Arthur at the trial before Judge Cullen and a full transcript of the hearing in the PCPA proceeding.

A preliminary question is whether this Federal Court should accept the findings of fact made by Judge Carter after the hearing in the PCPA proceeding. That hearing met all the tests set out in Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, at 313, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963). See also Morris v. State of South Carolina, 4 Cir., 356 F.2d 432 (1966). This Court concludes that it should accept the findings of fact made by Judge Carter. If those findings were not accepted, this Court would make the same findings from the evidence presented at the hearing in this Court. There are no material discrepancies between the statement given by Adelaide Arthur to the police and her testimony at the trial, or between the statement and testimony of Norma Scott. Such discrepancies as can be discovered are minor and such as would be expected where a witness testifies nearly a year after the event. The delay in the trial was caused by the fact that petitioner was first arrested in a distant State some eight months after the killing.

Counsel for petitioner argues earnestly that to obtain relief in the present proceeding petitioner need not show that the prosecuting officer had actual knowledge that the testimony was perjured, but that it is sufficient if he should have known that the testimony of the witnesses was perjured. The more severe requirement is supported by Clark v. Warden, 4 Cir., 293 F.2d 479 (1961), and Napue v. People of State of Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959). Petitioner’s counsel relies on Wild v. State of Oklahoma, 10 Cir., 187 F.2d 409 (1951), and Jones v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 6 Cir., 97 F.2d 335 (1938). It is not necessary for the Court to pass on that legal point, because even if the less severe burden applies, petitioner has not proved any such perjury as would bring the rule into play. Petitioner’s contention that the testimony was perjured seems to be based on his feeling that the challenged testimony is not in line with the facts as he would have had the trial court, and this court, believe; and his real complaint seems to be that his claim of self-defense should have been given greater weight, either in completely excusing him of the killing (which he does not deny), or in mitigation of his sentence, which was more severe than he thought he deserved, and, allegedly, more severe than his lawyer led him to expect. In this connection it may be noted that petitioner had a record of three convictions for assault.

Petitioner also makes general statements of incompetency, both of his trial counsel and of his counsel in the PCPA proceeding, and contends that both [807]*807the trial and the hearing were unfair. He says that the trial consumed only fifteen minutes, whereas the transcript of the testimony of one witness ran 33 pages. Petitioner’s unhappiness is understandable, but it is no ground for relief in this habeas corpus proceeding.

The Court wishes to reiterate its gratitude to counsel for petitioner for his able representation of petitioner, particularly since there is no way in which the Court can compensate him for his services,

The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is hereby denied.

Respondent’s Exhibit A

ROBERT M. SMITH Petitioner -vs-WARDEN OF THE MARYLAND PENITENTIARY Respondent

IN THE CRIMINAL COURT OF BALTIMORE Ind. No. 940 of 1960 P.C.P.A. NO. 765

Robert Y. Lazzaro, Esq. - Attorney for Petitioner

William T. S. Bricker, Esq. - Attorney for Respondent

The petitioner, Robert M. Smith, heretofore filed a petition in the Criminal Court of Baltimore under the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act.

A hearing on the said petition was held on Monday, June 22, 1964, at which time the petitioner was present. Robert V. Lazzaro, Esq., appeared on behalf of the petitioner. The respondent was represented by William T. S. Bricker, Esq., Assistant State’s Attorney.

The record reveals that the petitioner was indicted on March 10, 1960 (Ind. No. 940/60) charged with the commission of the crime of murder. On May 4, 1960, he, represented by Leonard Goodman, Esq., entered a plea of not guilty at his arraignment and trial. Thereafter, he was found guilty and sentenced to serve a term of eighteen (18) years in the Maryland Penitentiary dating from February 28, 1960.

In his petition for relief, the petitioner asserts the following contentions :

1. That he was convicted on perjured and contradictory testimony of five state witnesses; namely, Herbert A. Scott, Thelma L. Smith, Louise E.

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Bluebook (online)
254 F. Supp. 805, 1966 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7668, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/smith-v-warden-maryland-penitentiary-mdd-1966.