Smith v. Virginia Commonwealth University

84 F.3d 672, 1996 WL 241781
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
DecidedMay 10, 1996
DocketNo. 94-2187
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 84 F.3d 672 (Smith v. Virginia Commonwealth University) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Smith v. Virginia Commonwealth University, 84 F.3d 672, 1996 WL 241781 (4th Cir. 1996).

Opinions

Reversed by published opinion. Senior Judge CHAPMAN wrote the opinion of the court, in which Chief Judge WILKINSON and Judges RUSSELL, WIDENER, HAMILTON and NIEMEYER joined. Chief Judge WILKINSON wrote a concurring opinion, in which Judges RUSSELL and WIDENER joined. Judge WILKINS wrote a concurring opinion, in which Judge WILLIAMS joined. Judge LUTTIG wrote a concurring opinion. Judge MICHAEL wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Judges ERVIN, HALL, MURNAGHAN, and MOTZ joined.

OPINION

CHAPMAN, Senior Circuit Judge:

Plaintiffs-appellants are five male professors at Virginia Commonwealth University (“VCU”) who brought this action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in the Eastern District of Virginia. The appellants objected to pay raises that VCU gave to its female faculty in response to a salary equity study conducted at the university. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court, finding a statistically demonstrated disparity between female and male faculty salaries, denied the appellants’ motion and granted VCU’s motion. Because we find that there remains a genuine issue as to material fact, we reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment.

I.

VCU is a state institution of higher learning located in Richmond, Virginia. In the spring of 1988, several groups called on VCU to evaluate its pay structure to determine whether female professors were victims of sex based discrimination in pay. VCU appointed a Salary Equity Study Committee to investigate, and a Salary Equity Advisory Committee to review the findings of the Study Committee.

The Study Committee chose to employ a multiple regression analysis, which compares many characteristics within a particular set of data and enables the determination of how one set of factors is related to another, single factor. The VCU study controlled for such differences as doctoral degree, academic rank, tenure status, number of years of VCU experience, and number of years of prior academic experience. Any difference in salary after controlling for these factors was attributed to sex. The study included only tenured or tenure-eligible instructional faculty at the rank of assistant professor or higher. The first regression study in the summer of 1989 showed a $1,354 difference in salaries not attributable to permissible factors. A second analysis run in the summer of 1991 showed a difference of $1,982.

Until the study, the compensation system at VCU had been based on merit alone. A professor was awarded a pay increase after a detailed annual review, if funds were available. Merit factors considered in the annual [675]*675review were teaching load, teaching quality, quantity and quality of publications, quantity and quality of research, and service to the community (the “performance factors”). The department chair recommended pay raises to the dean, and the dean awarded raises, subject to approval from VCU’s Board of Visitors. Salaries vary widely from department to department.

The multiple regression analysis did not include the performance factors because VCU contended that these would be too difficult to quantify. VCU maintained that indirect performance variables were already included in the study in the form of academic rank, status, and experience. The study also did not take into account a faculty member’s prior service as an administrator. Administrators are paid higher wages, and faculty members retain this increase in salary when they return to teaching, thus inflating faculty salaries. Most of the faculty that had previously served as administrators were men. Furthermore, the study did not include career interruptions when measuring academic experience. Finally, the Study Committee worked under the assumption that there was no reason to suspect that female faculty members were less productive on the average than male faculty members.

After the study was completed, VCU approved more than $440,000 to increase female faculty salaries. These funds were outside of the normal salary process. The pay increases were implemented by the Salary Equity Implementation Committee made up of three women. Female faculty members had to apply for a pay increase by submitting a curriculum vitae or a narrative statement and a vitae. Of the 201 women eligible for salary review, 172 requested it. All women who requested a review received an increase in salary.

After the district court’s denial of the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and the grant of VCU’s motion, the plaintiffs filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment. In this motion, the plaintiffs offered the affidavit of expert witness Dr. Fred McChesney. McChesney contended that the performance factors VCU claimed it could not quantify had in fact been included in several studies of various faculty systems, and that the inclusion of the performance factors and other variables was necessary to ensure accurate statistical data. McChesney also contended that there was data to dispute VCU’s assumption that women were as equally productive as men. In response, VCU’s expert witness, Dr. Rebecca Klemm, stated that she ran several various statistical studies with VCU’s raw data and found a salary gap to be consistent with that found in the study. McChesney never conducted a pay study himself. The district court denied the motion to alter or amend the judgment.

II.

This case comes to us on the district court’s grant of a motion for summary judgment. A motion for summary judgment should be granted only where there is no dispute as to material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 67, 130 L.Ed.2d 24 (1994). We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Tuck v. Henkel Corp., 973 F.2d 371, 374 (4th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 918, 113 S.Ct. 1276, 122 L.Ed.2d 671 (1993). The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Ross v. Communications Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 364 (4th Cir.1985).

Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, employers are prohibited from discriminating on the basis of sex with respect to compensation. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1992). On its face, an affirmative action plan that provides for pay raises to only female faculty members violates this provision. However, courts may remedy a violation of § 2000e-2(a)(l) by instituting an appropriate affirmative action plan. 42 U.S.C § 2000e-5(g)(l). Also, the Supreme Court has determined that in certain circumstances, an employer may voluntarily establish an affirmative action plan without violating Title VII. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 197, 99 S.Ct. 2721, 2724, 61 L.Ed.2d 480 (1979).

[676]*676According to Weber,

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84 F.3d 672, 1996 WL 241781, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/smith-v-virginia-commonwealth-university-ca4-1996.