Smith v. Virgin

33 Me. 148
CourtSupreme Judicial Court of Maine
DecidedJuly 1, 1851
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 33 Me. 148 (Smith v. Virgin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Judicial Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Smith v. Virgin, 33 Me. 148 (Me. 1851).

Opinion

Tenney, J.

— The plaintiff and six of the defendants, move the acceptance of this report. Several are silent upon that question. Others make objections for the following reasons. The first is in reference to the jurisdiction of the referees, upon the ground, that all the defendants were not parties to the agreement to refer.

The defendants in the bill are nineteen in number. Thirteen of them appeared before the referees, and put in written answers. Three appeared by attorney, but did not answer in writing. No appearance was entered by the other three. Neither of the six defendants last named executed the agreement to refer the action.

Gilman L. Gale was the only one of those who did not [153]*153sign the agreement, that now interposes any objection to the acceptance of the award. Those who did not appear before the referees have not been prejudiced by the award, upon the hypothesis adopted, in any thing which makes them responsible. The parties who did appear, and who now make objection to the report, cannot be injured by any decree thereon, because their liability is made no greater by the failure of others to become parties to the agreement, or to appear before the referees. One only of those, who did not originally become parties to the reference, has been adjudged liable in any event to contribute towards the sum which is due from the copartnership, beyond the amount of its resources. And he is relieved oil account of his admitted insolvency. By his appearance which is not represented to be limited to any particular purpose, he must be considered as having ratified the agreement, and actually submitted to the jurisdiction of the referees. He stands in the same category with those who authorized the reference.

No other whose name is on the agreement interposes any objection, or manifests any dissatisfaction. The parties to that agreement, having a full knowledge of the omission of some of the defendants to submit the subject-matter of the suit to referees, by their appearance, and a hearing before them upon the merits, have waived that objection and cannot be allowed now to revive it.

2. A further objection to the award is, that the referees did not decide upon all matters submitted, and that they passed upon questions not embraced in the bill, and therefore not in the submission; or in other words, that the award does not follow the submission.

The object of the bill was an adjustment of the affairs between the plaintiffs and the company, and those who are liable to contribution, if the resources of the firm were insufficient to discharge the debts due from it. For this purpose the plaintiffs are as specific in their premises and in the statement of the facts as the knowledge possessed by them would probably allow. This was necessary in order that proof could bo offered in support of all the allegations substantially made.

[154]*154The prayer of the bill is, that the debts due and owing from the company at the time of filing the bill may be ascertained; and also its rights, credits and assets, effects and property, applicable to the payment of its debts, the time when any member or stockholder, party to the bill, became liable for its indebtedness, and when that liability ceased; and what are the extent and amount of his liability; and to order and direct that the rights, credits, assets, effects and property of the company in whosesoever hands, of the members or shareholders, they may be found, so far as liable for the payment of its debts, may be so placed and disposed of as to satisfy and extinguish the claims against the company, to the extent that they are sufficient for that purpose; and in the event that they shall be found insufficient, to ascertain the just and equitable proportion which the several parties to the bill ought to contribute to the payment of the company debts, at the time of filing the bill, and order and decree the payment of the same accordingly. And such other and further relief is prayed, in the premises, as is proper and suited to their case according to the principles and rules of equity.

Every part of the report is upon the matter which constitutes the premises of the bill, and falls within the prayer for relief. The debts due and owing from the company are specifically reported, both in reference to the creditors and the amount to each. ,The referees state the property and its character belonging to the company, which should be applied to the payment of its debts ; they also report, subject to the opinion of the Court upon the facts proved, the time during which any member of the company or shareholder, party to the bill, was • liable for its debts; also the extent and amount •of his liability; and they award that the property of' the company as reported by them, is to be appropriated toward the discharge of its liabilities, so far as it is sufficient, and that the deficiency having been ascertained in just and equitable proportions shall be paid accordingly by those who last composed the copartnership and are solvent.

It is true that an interest in the real estate and personal pro[155]*155perty at one time belonging to the company, which were sold and conveyed by one of the stockholders, is claimed in the bill as being held in trust for the payment of the company’s debts, and for the benefit of the shareholders, successively, and it is denied that any shareholder can legally claim the same or any part thereof for his exclusive benefit.

This is a statement of no fact but what is regarded by the plaintiffs as a principle in equity, applicable to the facts alleged. The principle contended for in the bill may have been erroneous, or the facts proved variant to some extent, from those alleged. Neither could restrict the referees in their duties, or authorize them to come to a conclusion which the facts shown, and the law, would not justify. They found the sale of the interest of one of the stockholders, and instead of the conclusion, that the interest was held in trust for the company by the purchaser, they regarded the copartnership dissolved.

It is further objected that the award does not follow the bill and subject-matter submitted, because it puts upon a portion of the shareholders the payment of all the debts, whereas the bill prays a contribution among the several parties to the bill, in equitable proportions.

The premises and the prayer of the bill do not furnish a basis for this objection. The language of the latter in this respect, is “ to ascertain the just and equitable proportion which the several parties to this bill ought to contribute to the payment of the company debts.” If any party to the bill ought not to contribute to the payment of the company debts at all, it is not a prayer that they shall be decreed to contribute.

Under this head it is contended that the referees having found that in some of the transfers of shares the sellers undertook to indemnify the purchasers against the outstanding debts of the company, the referees should have transferred this liability for such debts to the purchasers, as it was proposed they should do, and was improperly refused. The referees do not undertake to adjust the rights between individuals under the special agreements, but only such as arise under the partnership affairs. Neither does the bill in its frame seek an adjustment inter [156]*156sese among all the partners, but only as between the plaintiffs and defendants. The referees have not in the latter omitted to report upon the subject submitted.

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Bluebook (online)
33 Me. 148, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/smith-v-virgin-me-1851.