Smith v. Vaughn

2002 MT 342N
CourtMontana Supreme Court
DecidedDecember 23, 2002
Docket02-590
StatusPublished

This text of 2002 MT 342N (Smith v. Vaughn) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Montana Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Smith v. Vaughn, 2002 MT 342N (Mo. 2002).

Opinion

No. 02-590

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

2002 MT 342N

VICTOR ALLAN SMITH,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

RICK VAUGHN, CENTURY 21 AGENT, CENTURY 21 REAL ESTATE CO., et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twenty-First Judicial District, In and for the County of Ravalli, The Honorable Jeffrey H. Langton, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

Victor Allan Smith (pro se), Shelby, Montana

For Respondents:

(No Respondents' brief filed)

Submitted on Briefs: December 13, 2002

Decided: December 23, 2002 Filed:

__________________________________________ Clerk Justice Jim Regnier delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court

1996 Internal Operating Rules, the following decision shall not be

cited as precedent but shall be filed as a public document with the

Clerk of the Supreme Court and shall be reported by case title,

Supreme Court cause number, and result to the State Reporter

Publishing Company and to West Group in the quarterly table of

noncitable cases issued by this Court.

¶2 Appellant Victor Smith appeals from the order of the Twenty-

First Judicial District Court, Ravalli County, which dismissed his

complaint against the Respondents, Rick Vaughn and Century 21 Real

Estate Co., et al. We reverse and remand.

¶3 The sole issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred

when it dismissed Smith’s cause of action.

BACKGROUND

¶4 On June 7, 2000, Smith, appearing pro se, filed a complaint

against the Respondents which stated, “Plaintiff alleges ‘deceptive

practices’ and the ‘illegal’ confiscation of real property by the

defendants.” Smith sought compensatory and punitive damages from the Respondents. On the same day Smith filed the complaint, he

also filed a “Motion For Leave to File a Supplemental Complaint.”

The District Court granted Smith leave to file a “supplemental”

complaint as well as two subsequent extensions of time to file the

same.

¶5 On August 25, 2000, Smith filed two motions with the District

Court, a motion for leave to obtain a subpoena duces tecum and a

“Motion For Leave for All Copies of the Court Minutes and

Transcripts” from a criminal proceeding in which Smith pled guilty

2 to aggravated assault. The District Court granted Smith’s first

motion and directed Smith to submit a proposed subpoena to the

court. The District Court denied Smith’s second motion. In the

ensuing months, Smith filed similar motions and proposed orders

which the District Court denied.

¶6 On August 8, 2001, Smith submitted a letter to the District

Court seeking advice on how to proceed. Smith claimed that “as a

Pro-Se litigant . . . [he] should be held to less stringent

standards of law” and sought counsel on how “to expedite this

matter.” On September 14, 2001, the District Court issued a

Memorandum in response to Smith’s letter. The Memorandum

summarized the procedural history of the case and concluded with

the following: This action is a civil suit somehow concerning a transaction involving real property. Under Montana Law, Smith is perfectly entitled to represent himself in this case, but he has not shown that he should be held to any lesser standards of legal knowledge and conduct than that expected of licensed attorneys at law. In addition, Montana judges are not allowed to render legal advice or engage in ex parte communications with litigants.

Since the Plaintiff has neglected to amend or “supplement” his complaint to specify his claimed cause of action against the Defendants and has neglected to show why [he] needs discovery from third parties to do so, the Court is left to speculate as to why this discovery is necessary.

The Plaintiff is hereby granted one final extension until October 10, 2001, to amend his complaint to state specific causes of action against the Defendants sufficient to comply with Rule 8(a), M.R.Civ.P. In addition, if the Plaintiff continues to seek discovery from third parties, the Plaintiff must make showing that such discovery is necessary to the effective presentation of his case and is not otherwise obtainable. Moreover, the Plaintiff needs to be aware that he is not entitled to preparation of transcripts of court proceedings at public expense for use in a civil case of this nature. This is particularly true when Plaintiff has made no effort to show how there is even any relationship between

3 the two cases.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff file an Amended Complaint that fully complies with Rule 8(a), M.R.Civ.P., on or before October 10, 2001, or this case will be dismissed.

The District Court sent this Memorandum to Smith at the Missoula

Regional Prison via certified mail.

¶7 Soon thereafter, Smith filed a “Motion For Copy of

District Court File.” Smith acknowledged the October 10, 2001,

deadline but submitted that he could not comply with the order

without the information requested in the motion. The District

Court denied the motion on October 22, 2001. Smith did not file a

“supplemental” complaint within the time allotted and, on October

25, 2001, the District Court entered the following order: Plaintiff having failed to file an Amended Complaint within the time allowed by this Court in its Memorandum Order filed September 20, 2001, and no extension of that time having been requested or granted, and good cause otherwise appearing,

IT IS ORDERED that this case is hereby DISMISSED.

Smith appeals from the District Court’s order of dismissal.

DISCUSSION

¶8 Did the District Court err when it dismissed Smith’s

cause of action?

¶9 The facts of this case make it somewhat difficult to apply a

traditional standard of review analysis. As provided in the

Montana Rules of Civil Procedure, a district court may dismiss a

complaint for various reasons. Rule 12(b)(6), M.R.Civ.P.,

authorizes a district court to dismiss a complaint for failure to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We review such

dismissals to determine whether the court’s interpretation of the

4 law is correct. DuBray v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 2001 MT 251, ¶ 8,

307 Mont. 134, ¶ 8, 36 P.3d 897, ¶ 8. Rule 41(b), M.R.Civ.P.,

authorizes a district court to dismiss an action for failure “to

prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of court . . .

.” We review orders in the nature of a Rule 41(b), M.R.Civ.P.,

dismissal for an abuse of discretion. McKenzie v. Scheeler (1997),

285 Mont. 500, 507, 949 P.2d 1168, 1172.

¶10 Here, the Respondents clearly did not file a Rule 12(b)(6),

M.R.Civ.P., motion or any other motion to dismiss for that matter.

Further, the District Court did not indicate in its Memorandum or

order of dismissal a justification for dismissing the action. ¶11 In its September 14, 2001, Memorandum, the District Court

warned Smith that if he failed to file an amended complaint “on or

before October 10, 2001 . . . this case will be dismissed.” The

District Court cited no authority for the proposed action. In a

subsequent motion, Smith acknowledged the admonition stating,

“Currently, the Court has ordered that the Plaintiff Amend his

complaint on or before October 10, 2001.” Nevertheless, Smith

failed to file the amended complaint within the time allowed.

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Related

McKenzie v. Scheeler
949 P.2d 1168 (Montana Supreme Court, 1997)
DuBray v. Farmers Insurance Exchange
2001 MT 251 (Montana Supreme Court, 2001)

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2002 MT 342N, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/smith-v-vaughn-mont-2002.