Smith v. United States of America

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: March 30, 2011
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2011-0643
• Status: Published

Opinion

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FILED UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MAR 3 a 2011 FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Clerk US 01 . CourtS for U.e ~~ctr/t &t Bankruptcy c of ColumbIa Charmane Smith, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) Civil Action No. 11 0643 ) United States of America, et at., ) ) Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the Court on its initial review of plaintiff s pro se complaint and

application to proceed in forma pauperis. The application will be granted and the case will

be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Under that statute, the Court is required to

dismiss a case "at any time" it determines that the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted or seeks monetary relief from an immune defendant.

Plaintiff is a resident of Memphis, Tennessee, suing the United States and the U.S.

District Court for the Western District of Tennessee for alleged constitutional and civil rights

violations, "personal injury," and breach of contract. Compl. at 2. She seeks $3 billion in

monetary damages. Id. at 8. Plaintiff claims that defendants "conspired to impede, delay, hinder,

sabotage, invalidate, frustrate, weaken, & obstruct lawsuit claims [she] filed[,]" apparently by

dismissing cases in which she provided assistance to federal inmates. See Compl. at 3-5.

Plaintiff also claims that defendants "illegally, unlawfully, & unconstitutionally seized [her]

vehicle, impounded it, & sold it, under false pretense and with unlawful intimidation .... " Id. at

3.

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Plaintiff s claim against the Western District of Tennessee based on the dismissal of cases

and her breach of contract claim lack "arguable bas[ es] in law and fact," and, thus, are subject to

dismissal as frivolous. Brandon v. District a/Columbia Bd. of Parole, 734 F.2d 56, 59 (D.C.

Cir. 1984). Furthermore, judges are absolutely immune from lawsuits predicated, as here, on

their official acts. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 225 (1988); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S.

349,355-57 (1978); Sindram v. Suda, 986 F.2d 1459,1460 (D.C. Cir. 1993).

As for the conversion claim based on the alleged seizure and sale of plaintiff s vehicle, a

claim for monetary damages against the United States is cognizable under the Federal Tort

Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671 et seq. Such a claim is maintainable, however, only

after the plaintiff has exhausted her administrative remedies by "first present[ing] the claim to the

appropriate Federal agency .... " 28 U.S.C. § 2675. This exhaustion requirement is

jurisdictional. See GAF Corp. v. United States, 818 F.2d 901,917-20 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Jackson

v. United States, 730 F.2d 808, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Stokes v. us. Postal Service, 937 F. Supp. 11,14 (D.D.C. 1996). Plaintiff has not indicated that she exhausted her administrative remedies

under the FTCA. Therefore, the Court will dismiss the complaint in its entirety. See

Abdurrahman v. Engstrom, 168 Fed.Appx. 445, 445 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (per curiam) ("[T]he

district court properly dismissed case [based on unexhausted FTC A claim] for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction."). A separate Order of dismissal accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

~J~ Unitei'States District Judge Date: March V~2011