Smith v. United States

D.C. Circuit

Smith v. United States

180 F.2d 775, 86 U.S. App. D.C. 195, 1950 U.S. App. LEXIS 2498

CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit

DecidedFebruary 20, 1950

Docket10088

StatusPublished

Cited by19 cases

This text of 180 F.2d 775 (Smith v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Smith v. United States, 180 F.2d 775, 86 U.S. App. D.C. 195, 1950 U.S. App. LEXIS 2498 (D.C. Cir. 1950).

Pincite

Opinion

PROCTOR, Circuit Judge.

Appellant was convicted on seven counts of an eight count indictment, each charging her with receiving money in arranging for a named female to engage in prostitution, etc., in violation of D.CJCode (1940) § 22 — 2707. Four counts related to one female, three to another. Here, on appeal from the judgment and sentence, she complains as to: (1) joinder of offenses; (2) refusal of the court to direct acquittal on all counts for insufficient proof; (3) admission of evidence as to conditions at her house when she was arrested; (4) presence of government employees and women on the jury.

We think there is no merit to any point raised. 1. The offenses charged in the several counts were of the same character, therefore, joinder was permissible. Rule 8(a), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C.A. Failure to object to the joinder before trial constituted a waiver. Rule 12(b) (2), Federal Rules of Crim *776 inal Procedure. ■ 2. The record reveáis ample evidence to justify submission of the seven counts to the jury. 3. Evidence of conditions at appellant’s ■ house (details omitted here) at the time of her arrest, which established presence of the two women referred to in the indictment, was competent and relevant in proof of an element of each offense, i. e., their “engagement” in prostitution. 4. Government employees •and women are legally qualified for' jury .service. As to government employees, see: D.C.Code (1940) § 11 — 1420; U. S. v. Woods, 1936, 299 U.S. 123, 57 S.Ct. 177, 81 L.Ed. 78; Frazier v. U. S., 1947, 82 U.S.App.D.C. 332, 163 F.2d 817, affirmed 1948, 335 U.S. 497, 69 S.Ct. 201, 93 L.Ed. 187. As to women jurors, see: DJC.Code (1940) § 11 — 1418. Bias was not to be implied as to either class of. jurors. Bias in fact was not shown as to any juror. So far as appears from the record, the panel fulfilled constitutional requirements of an impartial jury. United States Constitution, Sixth Amendment. See above cases. The judgment is affirmed.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

PROCTOR, Circuit Judge.

Appellant was convicted on seven counts of an eight count indictment, each charging her with receiving money in arranging for a named female to engage in prostitution, etc., in violation of D.CJCode (1940) § 22 — 2707. Four counts related to one female, three to another. Here, on appeal from the judgment and sentence, she complains as to: (1) joinder of offenses; (2) refusal of the court to direct acquittal on all counts for insufficient proof; (3) admission of evidence as to conditions at her house when she was arrested; (4) presence of government employees and women on the jury.

We think there is no merit to any point raised. 1. The offenses charged in the several counts were of the same character, therefore, joinder was permissible. Rule 8(a), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C.A. Failure to object to the joinder before trial constituted a waiver. Rule 12(b) (2), Federal Rules of Crim *776 inal Procedure. ■ 2. The record reveáis ample evidence to justify submission of the seven counts to the jury. 3. Evidence of conditions at appellant’s ■ house (details omitted here) at the time of her arrest, which established presence of the two women referred to in the indictment, was competent and relevant in proof of an element of each offense, i. e., their “engagement” in prostitution. 4. Government employees •and women are legally qualified for' jury .service. As to government employees, see: D.C.Code (1940) § 11 — 1420; U. S. v. Woods, 1936, 299 U.S. 123, 57 S.Ct. 177, 81 L.Ed. 78; Frazier v. U. S., 1947, 82 U.S.App.D.C. 332, 163 F.2d 817, affirmed 1948, 335 U.S. 497, 69 S.Ct. 201, 93 L.Ed. 187. As to women jurors, see: DJC.Code (1940) § 11 — 1418. Bias was not to be implied as to either class of. jurors. Bias in fact was not shown as to any juror. So far as appears from the record, the panel fulfilled constitutional requirements of an impartial jury. United States Constitution, Sixth Amendment. See above cases. The judgment is affirmed.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

180 F.2d 775, 86 U.S. App. D.C. 195, 1950 U.S. App. LEXIS 2498, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/smith-v-united-states-cadc-1950.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack