Smith v. Travelers Insurance Company

174 So. 2d 241, 1965 La. App. LEXIS 4299
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedMarch 24, 1965
Docket1375
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 174 So. 2d 241 (Smith v. Travelers Insurance Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Smith v. Travelers Insurance Company, 174 So. 2d 241, 1965 La. App. LEXIS 4299 (La. Ct. App. 1965).

Opinion

174 So.2d 241 (1965)

Arthur SMITH, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 1375.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.

March 24, 1965.

Tate & Tate, by Paul C. Tate, Mamou, for plaintiff-appellant.

Dubuisson & Dubuisson, by James G. Dubuisson, Opelousas, for defendant-appellee.

Before TATE, FRUGE, and SAVOY, JJ.

TATE, Judge.

The plaintiff Smith appeals from judgment dismissing his workmen's compensation suit for total and permanent disability *242 benefits. The defendant is the employer's insurer.

Smith was injured while working as a derrickman on a drilling rig. His work-caused injury greatly weakens his grasp, so that, according to the great preponderance of the testimony, it is no longer safe for either Smith or his fellow workers below for him to work as derrickman aloft in the drilling rig, required as such to handle and manipulate with precision, heavy tools, drilling pipe, and heavy machinery. However, Smith's injuries do not incapacitate him from performing the functions of a "floor" or ground roughneck, even though he is no longer able to secure employment as a derrickman; and Smith has in fact been able to obtain employment as ground roughneck since reaching maximum recovery from his hand-crushing injuries some six months after the accident.

The question is whether Smith is entitled to workmen's compensation benefits for total and permanent disability because he is no longer able to work as a derrickman, although still employable in other types of oilfield drilling work. Because of the different tests of disability enunciated for skilled or semi-skilled workers as distinguished from a common laborer, a subsidiary question involves a determination of whether the plaintiff's occupation as derrickman should be construed as skilled labor under the sometimes confusing workmen's compensation jurisprudence on the subject. In denying the plaintiff's claim, the trial court held that the plaintiff's work as derrickman should be classified as common labor under Anderson v. Rowan Drilling Co., La.App. 3 Cir., 150 So.2d 828, so that the plaintiff was not disabled under the act since his disability did not prevent him from securing employment in the common labor market.

I.

The plaintiff Smith suffered a crushing injury to his left hand. As a result, the last joint of his ring finger was amputated, and there is some sensitivity in the scar tissue of his hand. Prior to the injury, plaintiff had the full use and strength of his left hand, even though he had several years before suffered an injury to his little finger. The practically uncontradicted medical testimony shows that, with the additional injury and loss of flexion of his ring finger, the plaintiff now has a substantially weakened grasp, even though the disability of the left hand as a whole is estimated at only about thirteen percent.

The testimony of the attending physician, of an examining orthopedist, and of another general medical practitioner (who also testified as an expert in oilfield disability, based upon not only his medical experience but also on seven years of pre-medical experience in oilfields, including being a graduate petroleum engineer), as well as of the plaintiff himself, is that the weakened grasp renders it unsafe for the plaintiff to work aloft as a derrickman. (Another orthopedist felt that the weakened grasp did not so disable him.)

The evidence shows that the work of a derrickman involves his working aloft with drilling-pipe, placing it in and taking it out of the drilling hole. At such times, the work required of a derrickman is fast, coordinated, and precise, requiring him to manipulate 1500-pound lengths of drilling-pipe with both hands and placing them with split-second precision in elevator-arms of moving machinery. According to the evidence, the work requires the use of and strong grasp in both hands in other duties also, including the clambering aloft, the use of heavy pipe wrenches and sledge hammers, the grasp of ropes guiding drilling-pipe, the clinging to the derrick with one hand while the other is manipulating drilling pipe or using tools, etc.

The vast preponderance of the evidence thus proves, as the trial court indicated, that the plaintiff is no longer able to work as a derrickman because of his weakened grasp and the consequent danger to himself *243 and the ground workers involved in his attempting to perform the derrickman's duties aloft on the drilling rig. The legal question is whether this entitles him to workmen's compensation, in view of the fact that he can still perform the duties of a floor roughneck and has been able to secure employment as such.

To a great extent, this involves the determination of whether the work as derrickman is considered skilled labor for purposes of the disability jurisprudence under the workmen's compensation statute.

II.

As recently re-stated in Lawes v. Houston Fire and Casualty Insurance Co., 242 La. 251, 135 So.2d 920, 921: "`Our jurisprudence is settled that the clause "disability to do work of any reasonable character", as contained in the compensation statute, means disability to perform work of the same or similar description, kind or character (not necessarily the identical position) to that which the claimant was accustomed to perform or was undertaking when the injury occurred.' * * * `There is, of course, no hard and fast rule that can be laid down for guidance in the application of this rule to the limitless variations of fact presented to the courts. Each case must stand on its own peculiar facts. * * *'"

A skilled or semi-skilled employee "is regarded as totally disabled whenever an accident causes the loss of those physical faculties which had enabled him to earn a living at his chosen calling, and this is true even though he is able to qualify for a job of a different nature." Malone, Louisiana Workmen's Compensation (1951), Section 275, p. 334; Olivier v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 241 La. 745, 131 So.2d 50; Brannon v. Jurich General Accident and Liability Insurance Co., 224 La. 161, 69 So.2d 1. On the other hand, if the employee is a common laborer, inability to do "work of any reasonable character" means that the employee cannot do work "reasonably similar" to the occupation in which injured, or that because of his work-caused condition he is substantially handicapped in competing in the general labor market to secure such reasonably similar work. Lawes v. Houston Fire and Casualty Insurance Co., cited above; Olivier v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., cited above; Bean v. Higgins Inc., 230 La. 211, 88 So.2d 30; Anderson v. Rowan Drilling Co., La.App. 3 Cir., 150 So.2d 828.

As the Anderson decision notes, 150 So.2d 832, quoting from Professor Malone's treatise: "`As the extent of skill required in the work performed prior to accident increases, there should be a correspondingly increased insistence that the new work closely resemble the old.'" See also Glidden v. Alexandria Concrete Co., 242 La. 625, 137 So.2d 894.

III.

The present plaintiff is a 47-year-old workman who has been employed in oil field drilling work since 1945, starting as a ground floor roughneck. For the last several years, the plaintiff has been employed as a derrickman. The evidence reveals this to be slightly higher paid work than that of roughneck, entrusted only to more experienced oilfield workers. While ground floor roughnecks often are called for short periods to spell the derrickman proper at work aloft, it is then necessary to run the rigs slower to prevent mishap unless a skilled derrickman is utilized.

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Bluebook (online)
174 So. 2d 241, 1965 La. App. LEXIS 4299, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/smith-v-travelers-insurance-company-lactapp-1965.