Smith v. Trampe

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Smith v. Trampe

95 A.D.3d 992, 943 N.Y.S.2d 768

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMay 8, 2012

StatusPublished

This text of 95 A.D.3d 992 (Smith v. Trampe) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Smith v. Trampe, 95 A.D.3d 992, 943 N.Y.S.2d 768 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2012).

Pincite

Opinion

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Brandveen, J.), entered June 10, 2011, as granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that she did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, [993]*993on the law, with costs, and the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

The defendant met her prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). However, in opposition, the plaintiff submitted competent medical evidence raising a triable issue of fact as to whether the alleged injuries to her right shoulder constituted a serious injury under the permanent consequential limitation of use and/or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Perl v Meher, 18 NY3d 208, 215-218 [2011]; Livia v Atkins, 93 AD3d 766 [2012]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Rivera, J.E, Eng, Chambers, Sgroi and Miller, JJ., concur.

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In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Brandveen, J.), entered June 10, 2011, as granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that she did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, [993]*993on the law, with costs, and the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

The defendant met her prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). However, in opposition, the plaintiff submitted competent medical evidence raising a triable issue of fact as to whether the alleged injuries to her right shoulder constituted a serious injury under the permanent consequential limitation of use and/or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Perl v Meher, 18 NY3d 208, 215-218 [2011]; Livia v Atkins, 93 AD3d 766 [2012]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Rivera, J.E, Eng, Chambers, Sgroi and Miller, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

95 A.D.3d 992, 943 N.Y.S.2d 768, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/smith-v-trampe-nyappdiv-2012.

Opinion

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