Smith v. Sullivan
This text of 986 F.2d 232 (Smith v. Sullivan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Bobby Smith, the recipient of social security benefits, and Anthony W. Bartels, his lawyer, appeal from a magistrate judge’s1 order stating that the federal courts did not have authority to award attorneys’ fees for a claimant’s administrative level representation, see 42 U.S.C.A. § 406. (1991), and awarding attorneys’ fees in an amount that was less, than twenty-five percent of past-due benefits. We affirm.2
After the Secretary denied Smith’s application for social security benefits, Smith . successfully appealed to the district court. The district court remanded the case to the Secretary with instructions to award' Smith past-due benefits. Bartels then applied to the district court for attorneys’ fees in an amount equal to twenty-five percent of Smith’s past-due benefits. Bartels’ itemization of hours spent on the case included hours spent representing Smith at the administrative level, as well as before the district court. The magistrate judge determined that he could not award attorneys’ fees for services rendered at the administrative level. The magistrate judge then awarded $100 per hour for services rendered at the district court level, provided that amount ($1,900 total) did not exceed twenty-five percent of Smith’s' past-due benefits. This appeal followed.
Relying on Webb v. Richardson, 472 F.2d 529 (6th Cir.1972), and Dearing v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 815 F.2d 1082 (6th Cir.1987), Bartels argues that the tribunal which upholds a claim for disability benefits is the tribunal that should award attorneys’ fees for all services rendered, including those at the administrative level. We have already addressed this issue in Fenix v. Finch, 436 F.2d 831, 838 (8th Cir.1971). We held that the federal courts do not have jurisdiction to award fees for administrative level services. Id. We are required to follow Fénix, and therefore, must reject Bartels’ arguments. See Deviries v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., [234]*234805 F.2d 326, 328 (8th Cir.1986); see also United States v. Lewellyn, 723 F.2d 615, 616 (8th Cir.1983) (“Only the court en banc is empowered to change an existing rule of law.”). We also note that six circuits3 agree with Fénix, and only the Sixth Circuit has adopted Bartels’ proposal.
We credit Bartels, however, for he makes a telling argument about the difficulties of obtaining fees
Bartels also argues that the total attorneys’ fee award for all levels of representation should be a standard twenty-five percent of past-due benefits, unless that amount results in a “windfall.” As we stated above, the district court may award fees for representation only at its level, not all levels. The magistrate judge’s award here is consistent with Cotter v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 359, 363-65 (8th Cir.1989), and therefore, is not erroneous.
We affirm the order of the magistrate judge.
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986 F.2d 232, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 2309, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/smith-v-sullivan-ca8-1993.