Smith v. Steinrauf

36 P.2d 995, 140 Kan. 407, 1934 Kan. LEXIS 76
CourtSupreme Court of Kansas
DecidedNovember 3, 1934
DocketNo. 31,800
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 36 P.2d 995 (Smith v. Steinrauf) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Kansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Smith v. Steinrauf, 36 P.2d 995, 140 Kan. 407, 1934 Kan. LEXIS 76 (kan 1934).

Opinion

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Burch, J.:

The action was one to enjoin enforcement against plaintiff of an ordinance of the city of Topeka relating to the keeping of cats. A demurrer to the petition was sustained, and plaintiff appeals. A copy of the ordinance is appended hereto.

Defendants are the chief of police and the police judge of the city. The petition alleged plaintiff kept more than five cats more than six months old, and, at the argument, it was stated the number was eight. The petition alleged that, unless enforcement of the ordinance against plaintiff was enjoined, he would be arrested and fined, and the demurrer admitted these facts.

The petition alleged plaintiff’s cats are kept at his residence, consisting of a two-story, nine-room dwelling house, situated on three lots at the corner of Eleventh and Harrison streets, a residential portion of the city of Topeka. There is a basement under the entire house, which contains the laundry and four additional rooms. All of plaintiff’s cats were born in the residence described, were never permitted to run at large, and had not been at any time outside the residence. The cats were reared as pets, were well trained, and [408]*408neither interfere with nor annoy any person living within 250 feet of plaintiff’s residence.

There is no question the city has power to pass ordinances denouncing conditions which interfere with the general health, comfort and security, and consequently may regulate the keeping of animals within the city. The keeping of animals may even be forbidden when the circumstances are such that the keeping constitutes a nuisance, but a city may not proscribe as a nuisance a condition which is not a nuisance in fact.

Not so long ago city dwellers kept driving horses. The alleys of residential districts were lined with barns. Especially in certain kinds of weather, characteristic odors would be quite pervading. Conditions could be regulated, but to forbid the keeping of a horse would have been- unthinkable. One dog may be a nuisance in a neighborhood, but an ordinance forbidding the keeping of any dog would now be unthinkable. Wully killed sheep; the gray dog had no such atavistic lapses. The result is, ordinances must be prepared with discrimination, having regard to the nature of the animal and the purpose, manner and consequences of its keeping. Unless this be done, it may be discovered property rights have been invaded.

While at common law the concession was made that a dog was property, Blackstone said it was a “base property,” and that pretty effectively classified dogs in the law for a long time.

In the case of Harrington v. Miles, 11 Kan. 480, decided in 1873, the subject of property in dogs was considered in the light of the statutes of the state, and of the common law. In the opinion it was said:

“It seems impossible in the light of these legislative and judicial expressions to decide that a dog is not property, nor a thing of value. ... We are constrained therefore to hold that a dog is property; that the stealing of one is larceny; and that words charging the stealing of a dog are actionable per se.” (p. 484.)

In the opinion in the case of City of Independence v. Trouvalle, 15 Kan. 70, decided in 1875, it was said, however, property in dogs was of such a low character it was hardly considered property at all. In the case of State, ex rel., v. City of Topeka, 36 Kan. 76, 12 Pac. 310, decided in 1886, it was conceded the dog was the subject of property, but it was stated again the property was not of high character. Blackstone was cited, and it was said dogs seldom have market value.

[409]*409At the present time, the breeding of what may be called standard breeds of dogs is engaged in as a gainful occupation by many persons, and prices are quoted in their advertisements. The same is true of cats. Good quality kittens of favorite breeds, without pedigree, may be had for five dollars each; with pedigree, ten to twenty-five dollars.

The subject of property in dogs is treated'in 3 C. J. 16 and pages •following, where decisions are collated. The text concludes with the statement that the drift of modern decisions and of legislation is toward the rule that the dog is as much the subject of absolute property right as are other domestic animals.

It 'was doubtless fortunate for the cat that, while the judiciary were “kickin’ the dog around,” the cat kept out of court. In “The Fireside Sphinx,” by Agnes Repplier, appears the following:

“In the year of 1865 a juge de paix of Fontainebleau, from whom several householders had demanded legal protection for their cats, pronounced this admirable judgment:
“ ‘That the domestic cat is not a thing of naught, but the property of its master, and as such, entitled to the shelter of the law; . . .”’ (p. 179.)

In the case of Thurston v. Carter, 112 Me. 361 (1914), plaintiff sued defendant for damages for killing plaintiff’s foxhound. Defendant justified on the ground the dog was chasing and worrying defendant’s cat, on defendant’s land. A verdict was directed for defendant, and plaintiff excepted. On appeal it was held a cat is a domestic animal, the subject of absolute property, and the exception was overruled.

The story of the cat, authentic and legendary, has been told by experts, scientific, historical, and literary, and will not be repeated here. “The Fireside Sphinx” just referred to is a fascinating book. Helen M. Winslow’s book, “Concerning Cats,” is pleasing and informative. Carl Van Vechten’s book, “The Tiger in the House” (1920), is a monument to the cat speqies. A short' account of the cat as a marketable animal, o.f breeds of cats, of breeding-associations, cat societies and cat shows, and of the cat in literature and art, by Nelson Antrim Crawford, of Topeka, Kan., appears in “The American Mercury,” volume 29, page 327 (1933).

One period of cat history must be noted.

In the witches’ cauldron scene in “Macbeth,” the first signal that it was time the witches should begin their obscene rite was given by a cat: “Thrice the brinded cat hath mew’d.”

[410]*410From deification in Egypt, the cat fell in the middle ages to the lowest depths of superstitious disrepute. The cat was the consort and agent of witches, and sometimes Satan himself took the form of a cat. Accounts of the cat’s weird wickedness are found in the folklore of all the countries of Europe. That was natural enough when belief in association and compact with the Prince of the Power of Darkness was part of the common culture. But the astounding thing is that superstitions regarding the cat and its potency for evil persist and govern human conduct to this day. Woe to the cat which must be dealt with by some court or legislative body, with this survival lurking in the back of its mind.

In the case of Sentell v. New Orleans &c. Railroad Co., 166 U. S. 698, decided in 1897, the court said the fact dogs are without the protection of the criminal laws shows that “property in dogs is of an imperfect or qualified nature.” (p.

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Bluebook (online)
36 P.2d 995, 140 Kan. 407, 1934 Kan. LEXIS 76, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/smith-v-steinrauf-kan-1934.