Smith v. Starr

99 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7711, 2000 WL 726346
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Arkansas
DecidedMay 18, 2000
Docket3:99-cv-00161
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 99 F. Supp. 2d 1037 (Smith v. Starr) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Smith v. Starr, 99 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7711, 2000 WL 726346 (E.D. Ark. 2000).

Opinion

ORDER

NANGLE, District Judge.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 292(b), Chief Judge Roger L. Wollman, of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, designated this writer to handle the within matter. That designation was necessitated by the action of all of the judges of the Eastern District of Arkansas in recusing themselves on December 21, 1999. The matter before the Court is a September 17, 1999 letter grievance filed by Stephen A. Smith, adopting Francis T. Mandanici’s June 4, 1999 letter grievance (“Mandanici IV”). This Court will now proceed.

*1038 Pursuant to Rule V(A) of the Model Federal Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement and the inherent power of the Court, Smith asks the Court “to appoint counsel to investigate ... whether Kenneth Starr and/or others in the employ of the Office of Independent Counsel solicited or attempted to solicit false testimony” from Smith and others. Smith Grievance at 2. Smith also requests that the Court appoint counsel to investigate the allegations set forth in Mandanici’s grievance. 1 Id. For the following reasons, the Court, in the exercise of its discretion, denies Smith’s request for appointment of investigative counsel.

BACKGROUND

The letter grievance at issue stems from ongoing efforts by Francis T. Mandanici to persuade the judges of the Eastern District of Arkansas to sanction Kenneth Starr and the Office of Independent Counsel (hereinafter “OIC”) for alleged prose-cutorial misconduct in several different matters related to the investigation and subsequent impeachment of President Clinton. For a detailed background of Mandanici’s previous efforts and a detailed analysis of Mandanici’s current allegations set forth in Mandanici IV, see this Court’s Order of this date in In re: Francis T. Mandanici v. Kenneth W. Starr, Mise. No. 99-MC-160. On September 17, 1999, Stephen A. Smith adopted Mandanici IV. Smith asks the Court to appoint counsel to investigate the matters raised in Mandani-ci IV and also requests that the Court “appoint counsel to investigate ... whether Kenneth Starr and/or others in the employ of the Office of Independent Counsel solicited or attempted to solicit false testimony....” Smith Grievance at 2.

SMITH’S CONNECTION

On June 8, 1995, Stephen A. Smith pled guilty to a misdemeanor for conspiring to misapply loan proceeds from a small business investment company in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 657. Smith Grievance, App. A, at 1539 (Transcript of United States v. Susan H. McDougal, No. LR-CR-98-82 (E.D.Ark. Mar.22, 1999)); Gov’t’s Resp. Smith Grievance at 3. Smith diverted the loan proceeds to “pay off a loan to the Worthen Bank for which he, Jim Guy Tucker, and Jim McDougal were personally liable in connection with land purchases in Huntsville, Arkansas.” Gov’t’s Resp. Smith Grievance at 3, Ex. B, at 1581 (Transcript of United States v. Susan H. McDougal, No. LR-CR-98-82 (E.D.Ark. Mar.23, 1999)). Smith testified before the grand jury in July 1995. Smith Grievance, App. A, at 1540. Smith then testified in the 1996 trials of Jim Guy Tucker and Susan and Jim McDougal and appeared again in front of the grand jury on September 17, 1996. Id.

In 1999, Smith testified as a defense witness at Susan McDougal’s subsequent trial. Smith contends that his 1999 testimony demonstrates that the OIC attempted to solicit false testimony from him in preparation for his grand jury testimony in 1995. Smith Grievance at 1, App. A, at 1540-44. Smith alleges that “the actions of the Office of Independent Counsel went beyond providing mere ‘talking points’ to a potential witness in a civil suit[.]” Smith Grievance at 1. Smith asserts, “I was provided a written script, containing false testimony, by the Office of Independent Counsel, and this script was to be read by me as my testimony under oath to a federal grand jury.” Id. Thus, Smith alleges that the Court should appoint counsel to investigate whether Starr and the OIC *1039 attempted to solicit false testimony from Smith.

STANDING

Initially, the Court will address the question of whether Smith has standing. Smith asserts that he has standing because he “ha[s] been investigated and prosecuted by Mr. Starr and the Office of Independent Counsel, and [has] twice appeared before his Grand Juries in the Eastern District of Arkansas and ha[s] testified as a witness for the Office of Independent Counsel at trial in the Eastern District of Arkansas.” Smith Grievance at 1. Further, Smith alleges that he has standing because he testified under oath at Susan McDougal’s 1999 trial. Because Mr. Smith is bringing an ethical grievance pursuant to Rule V(A) of the Model Federal Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement, however, he need not have any more connection with this Court than any other citizen. 2

The Eighth Circuit has held that a citizen has standing to bring an ethics grievance to the attention of the Court, but the citizen’s participation in the investigation stops there. Starr v. Mandanici, 152 F.3d at 748, 750-51. 3 This rule applies even if the informant is a former party to a case where the alleged misconduct occurred. Eaton v. Gerdes, No. 97-2326, 1997 WL 572151, at *1 (8th Cir. Sept16, 1997) (per curiam). In Eaton, the Eighth Circuit held that an informant seeking sanctions against his former attorney “ ‘merely supplied information for the court’s consideration’ ” and “lacked standing to appeal the District Court’s decision not to discipline the attorney.” Id. (citing Mattice v. Meyer, 353 F.2d 316, 319 (8th Cir.1965)). Other circuits have also applied this rule in various situations. See Ramos Colon v. United States- Attorney for the Dist. of P.R., 576 F.2d 1, 2, 6,. 9 (1st Cir.1978) (A former defendant “cannot challenge the court’s decision not to discipline.... It remains for the court to vindicate its authority, if it so chooses.”); see also Application of Phillips, 510 F.2d 126, 126 (2d Cir.1975) (per curiam) (pro se litigant in previous matter could not compel court to sanction opposing counsel because “a private person ... has no standing to participate in a disciplinary proceeding”).

In Starr v. Mandanici, Judge McMillian explained that Rule V(A) does not change this general rule. See Starr v. Mandanici, 152 F.3d at 751 (holding that Rule V(A) does not “elevate[ ] Mandanici’s status above that of an informant”).

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Related

Tucker v. United States
269 F. Supp. 2d 1024 (E.D. Arkansas, 2003)

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Bluebook (online)
99 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7711, 2000 WL 726346, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/smith-v-starr-ared-2000.