Smith v. Southern Foundry Co.

179 S.W. 205, 166 Ky. 208, 1915 Ky. LEXIS 676
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky
DecidedOctober 14, 1915
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 179 S.W. 205 (Smith v. Southern Foundry Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Smith v. Southern Foundry Co., 179 S.W. 205, 166 Ky. 208, 1915 Ky. LEXIS 676 (Ky. Ct. App. 1915).

Opinion

Opinion op the Court by

Judge Nunn.

Affirming.

The question here is whether ownership of a certificate of preferred stock made appellant a corporate creditor or stockholder. The Southern Foundry Company is a Kentucky corporation organized March 9th, 1901. By provision of its charter, its capital stock is fixed at $40,000, consisting of 800 shares of $50 each. These shares are divided into. two classes, viz., common and preferred. The corporation was authorized to issue $25,000 of its capital as common stock, and $15,000 of it as preferred.

We quote clause 6 of the charter:

6. The preferred stock shall constitute a prior and preferred lien on the plant and stock, and all property ¿of the corporation, and it shall he entitled at the end i of each fiscal year to a dividend of 7% and no more. At vthe end of the third fiscal year 10% of said preferred ¡stock shall he redeemed and retired, and at the end of each fiscal year thereafter 10% of said preferred stock shall he redeemed and retired until the entire amount shall have been redeemed and retired. However, it is provided that at the end of second fiscal year the Board [209]*209of Directors of said corporation shall have the option of redeeming and retiring all, or any part, of said preferred stock, provided that said part shall be' equal to 10% of said stock.”

The charter fixes $20,000 as the maximum indebtedness of the corporation, and exempts the private property of the stockholders from the payment of corporate indebtedness otherwise than as provided by Section 547 of the Statute, as it then existed. That is, no more than double liability.

Appellant was not one of the original incorporators. His interest in the corporation -began five years later, the 1st of June, 1906, when the corporation issued to him a certificate for “40 shares of $50 each of preferred capital stock of the Southern Foundry Company, fully paid and non-assessable. ”

The following provision is contained in the certificate :

‘ ‘ The stock is preferred stock and constitutes a prior and preferred lien on the plant and stock, and all the property of the corporation, and bears interest at the rate of 7 per cent, per annum payable annually in the way of dividends, and the holder shall be entitled to.receive said interest in the way of annual dividends, on the 9th day of March in each year, and the payment of said annual interest or dividend, and the payment of the par value of said stock (when same shall be payable) shall have preference over the common stock issued by said corporation, as provided in the articles of incorporation of the company. The said annual dividends shall be paid before any dividends shall be declared or paid on the common stock of said company. And at the end of the third year after organization 10 per cent, of said preferred stock shall be redeemed and retired and each year thereafter 10% of said stock shall be redeemed and restored. After two years from the date of its organization said corporation shall have the right and option to redeem and retire any part or all of said preferred stock, provided said part shall be equal to 10 per cent, of said stock. This stock shall not be entitled to participate in the profits or earnings of said company; or to receive any dividend on said stock in excess of the annual 7 per cent, dividend as aforesaid.”

Appellant brought this suit in equity on the certificate referred to, claiming that thereby the corporation promised and agreed to pay to him the sum of $2,000 with [210]*2107 per cent, interest thereon annually from its date until paid, and also “promised to pay him one-tenth of said principal sum at the end of the third year after the organization of said corporation, and one-tenth at the end of each year thereafter until all of said principal sum was paid. ’ ’ This allegation was made in the face of the fact that the certificate was not issued to him until five years after the corporation was organized. Except the interest up to March 9th, 1908, he alleged that no part of the principal or interest was ever paid. He alleged further that by the certificate the corporation gave to him a prior lien on the plant and all its other property. After describing the corporate' property he alleged that on January 15th, 1909, the corporation executed a mortgage thereon, to H. B. Eagles, as trustee, to secure a bonded indebtedness aggregating $50,000. Averring that he does not know to what extent the bonds have been negotiated or sold, if at all, nor to whom, he asks that the corporation be required to answer and make such disclosures, whereupon he will amend and make the holders parties in order that they may set up their claims. He prays judgment against the corporation for $2,000 and accrued interest at 7 per cent., and that he be adjudged a prior lien on all the corporate property, and that the lien be enforced.

The court sustained demurrer to this petition, and, appellant refusing to plead further, it was dismissed. The appeal is prosecuted'from that judgment.

Waiving the question as to whether his debt, if such it may be called, was due at the time the action was instituted, we take up the real question in the ease, and the one passed upon below, and that is whether the appellant, by virtue of the certificate, became a stockholder or a creditor of the corporation. His petition is framed upon the idea that he was not a stockholder, and that the writing upon which the action was founded, although styled “A Stock Certificate,” was, in fact, a certificate of indebtedness to him on the part of the corporation.

The question is one of' interpretation, and, in this case, depends upon the certificate, charter and statutes of the state. Section 564, Ky. Statutes, authorizes a corporation to classify its capital stock into common and preferred shares, and it may give to each of the several classes such priority of right in the payment of the dividends, and in redemption of the shares, as may be pre[211]*211scribed in the rules and regulations adopted by the shareholders; and on the voluntary or other dissolution of the company, the holders of preferred stock are entitled to have their shares redeemed at par, before any distribution of the assets is made among the holders of common stock. This section was not intended, and must not be construed, to give a stockholder of either class a preference over creditors as to the corporate assets. The charter itself recognized the holders of preferred shares as stockholders in the corporation, for such shares are included within the total capitalization of the company. To construe the charter otherwise would mean to limit the authorized indebtedness of the corporation to $5,000, for, if the $15,000 preferred stock be held to be corporate indebtedness, it would practically nullify the provision for $20,000 indebtedness, elsewhere authorized by the charter. Such an interpretation of the charter would be unreasonable and one which would not be given by any person considering an extension of credit to the company. The authorized $20,000 indebtedness was certainly not intended to embrace any of the capitalization.

Priority as to dividends, liens, and redemptions relate to stockholders, and they are rights which the preferred stockholder has over the common. The charter and certificate must be construed in connection with the statute, and in this state there is no statute giving to the holders of preferred stock a lien upon the property of the company to the prejudice of creditors.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
179 S.W. 205, 166 Ky. 208, 1915 Ky. LEXIS 676, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/smith-v-southern-foundry-co-kyctapp-1915.