IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA SOUTHERN DIVISION
TOKI MARIE SMITH, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) 2:23-cv-00541-LSC MARTIN O’MALLEY, ) Acting Commissioner, ) Social Security Administration, ) ) Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM OF OPINION I. Introduction On July 20, 2023, Toki Marie Smith (“Smith” or “Plaintiff”) filed with the Clerk of this Court a complaint against the Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner” or “Defendant”). (Doc 1.) This is an appeal from all administrative denials of the Plaintiff’s application for social security benefits. (Tr. at 8.) Plaintiff timely pursued and exhausted her administrative remedies, and the decision of the Commissioner is ripe for judIiIc.i al reBvaieckwg pruorusnuda nt to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3).
Smith obtained a high school education but did not pass the graduation examination. (Tr. at 237.) She has worked as a certified nursing assistant,
housekeeper, receptionist, and babysitter. (Tr. at 262-64, 538, 613, 1106.) Smith was forty-four years old at the time of her application for disability insurance benefits on May 7, 2021. (Tr. at 503.) Upon filing, Smith alleged she
was disabled due to a herniated disk, depression, anxiety disorder, PTSD, piriformis syndrome, sciatica, and carpal tunnel. (Tr. at 537.) The Social Security Administration has established a five-step sequential
evaluation process for determining whetheSre ean individual is disabled and thus seelieg iablsleo fDoor uag phteyr ivo.d A opff edlisability and DIB. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; , 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). The evaluator will follow the steps in order until making a finding of either disabled Soere not
disabled; if no finding is made, the analysis will proceed to the next step. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). The first step requires the evaluator to determIdine whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity
(“SGA”). . §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). If the claimant is not engaged in SGA, the evaluator moves on to the next step. The second step requires the evaluator to consider the combined severiItdy
of the claimant’s medically determinable physical and mental impairments. . §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). An individual impairment or durational requirements outlined inI d20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1509 and 416.909 will
result in a finding of not disabledS. ee .H Tahrte vd. eFciniscihon depends on the medical evidence contained in the record. , 440 F.2d 1340, 1341 (5th Cir. 1971) (concluding that “substantial evidence in the record” adequately
supported the finding that the claimant was not disabled). Similarly, the third step requires the evaluator to consider whether the claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments meets or is medically
equal to one of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the criteria of a listed impairment and the durational requirements set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404Id.1509 and 416.909 are satisfied, the evaluator will make a finding of disabled. .
If the claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments does not meet or medically equal a listed impairment, the evaluator must determine the claimSaenet ’isd r.esidual functional capacity (“RFC”) before proceeding to the fourth
step. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). The fourth step requires the evaluator to determine whether the claimant has the RSeFeC toi dperform the requirements of her past relevant work (“PRW”). . §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv),
416.920(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments does not prevent her fIrdom performing her PRW, the evaluator will make a The fifth and final step requires the evaluator to consider the claimant’s
RFC, age, education, and work experience to deItdermine whether the claimant can make an adjustment to other work. . at §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). If thIed clsaeiem aalnsot can perform other work, the evaluator will
find her not disabled. .; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g). If the claimant cannot perform other work, the evaluator will find her disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 404.1520(g), 416.920(a)(4)(v), 416.920(g).
Applying the sequential evaluation process, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) first established that Plaintiff has not engaged in SGA since her alleged disability onset date, June 23, 2020. (Tr. at 13.) Next, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s degenerative disc disease, major depressive disorder with psychotic
features, posttraumatic stress disorder, obesity, a bone spur in the left clavicle, and piriformis syndrome were “severe impairments.” (Tr. at 13-14.) However, the ALJ found that these impairments neither met nor were medically equal any
of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. at 14.) Specifically, Plaintiff’s impairments, when considered singly and in combination, failed to meeItd .the level of severity in broad areas of functioning
outlined in Paragraph B. Plaintiff hIadd. mild limitations in understanding, remembering, or applying information. The ALJ found moderate limitations pace, and (3) the ability to adapt or manage herself. (Tr. at 14-15.) Following
this determination, the ALJ established that Plaintiff has the following RFC: After careful consideration of the entire record, I find that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except the individual can occasionally climb ramps and stairs, stop, kneel, crouch, and crawl; this individual should never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds; this individual could frequently handle with her bilateral extremities; this individual can occasionally reach overhead with her left non-dominant upper extremity; this individual can have only occasional exposure to extremes of cold as well as full body vibration; this individual should have no exposure to hazards such as unprotected heights and hazardous machinery; this individual would be able to understand, remember and carry out simple instructions and tasks; this person can tolerate changes in the workplace that are infrequent and gradually introduced; and this person can have occasional work-related interaction with supervisors, coworkers, and the general public.
(Tr. at 15-16.) Relying on the testimony of a vocational expert (“VE”), the ALJ determined that Plaintiff is unable to perform any of her past relevant work. (Tr. at 22.) However, the ALJ stated, “[c]onsidering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform,” including garment folder, garment sorter, and merchandise marker. (Tr. at 22-23.) From these findings, the ALJ concluded the five-step evaluation process by stating that Plaintiff “has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from June 23, 2020,” Plaintiff’s original alleged disability
onsIeIIt. datSet, a“tnhdraorudg ho ft hRee dvaietew o f this decision.” (Tr. at 23.)
This Court’s role in reviewing claims brought under the Social Security
Act is a narrow one. The scope of its review is limited to determining (1) whether there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the findings Soef et hSet oCnoem vm. Ciosmsiomn’er ro af nSodc (. 2S)e wc.hether the correct legal standards were
appliedC. rawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. , 544 F. App’x 839, 841 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing , 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004)). This Court gives deference to the factual findings of the Commissioner, provided that those findings are supporSteede bMyi lseus bvs. tCahnatitaelr evidence, but applies
close scrutiny to the legal conclusions. , 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996). Nonetheless, this Court may not decide Dfaycetrs ,v . wBeairgnhh aervtidence, or
substitute its judgment for the CommPhisilsliiposn evr. 'Bsa. rnhart , 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting , 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 n.8 (11th Cir. 2004)). “The substantial evidence standard permits
administrative decision makers to act with considerable latitude, and ‘the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not Parker v. Bowen evidence.’” Consol,o 7 v9. 3F eFd.2. dM 1a1r.7 C7o, m11m8’1n (11th Cir. 1986) (Gibson, J.,
dissenting) (quoting , 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966)). Indeed, even if this Court finds that the proof preponderates against the Commissioner’s decisSieoen ,M iitle smust affirm if the decisMioanr tiins vs. uSpuplliovratned by
substantial evidence. , 84 F.3d at 1400 (citing , 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)). However, no decision is automatic, for “despite th[e] deferential standard
[for review of claims], it is imperative that th[is] Court scrutinize the reBcroirddg eins ivt.s B eonwtiernety to determine the reasonableness of the dAerncioslido nv. rHeeacckhleedr.” , 815 F.2d 622, 624 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing , 732 F.2d 881, 883 (11th Cir. 1984)). MorBeoovweern, vfa. iHluercek letro apply the correct legal
standards is grouWndisg gfoinrs rve. vSecrhswale. iker , 748 F.2d 629, 635 (11th Csuirp.e 1r9se8d4e)d ( ocint iontgh er grounds by Harner, v6. 7S9oc F. .S2edc .1 A3d8m7i, n1.,3 C8o9m (m11’rth Cir. 1982)), , 38 F.4th 892
(11ItVh. CirD. 2i0sc2u2s)s. ion
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s decision should be reversed and remanded
for three reasons: (1) the ALJ failed to properly consider all of the evidence in the Plaintiff’s case in determining the Plaintiff’s severe impairments and consider new evidence that the Plaintiff submitted and erred in denying the
Plaintiff’s request for review; and (3) there was a lack of substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s subjective complaints were not fully credibAle. . T(Dhoec . R6 eacto 3r.)d Supports the ALJ’s Determination of Plaintiff’s Education Level, Mental Impairments, and Physical Impairments
Smith argues that the ALJ failed to properly consider all of the evidence when deciding that the claimant lacks a severe impairment and determining the RFC. Plaintiff points to contradictory evidence regarding the claimant's
education level while also arguing the ALJ improperly discounted the claimant’s medical recoar.d sE danudc aatcitoend Laes vbeolt h a judge and physician. (Doc. 6 at 8-10.)
A claimant’s education level is considered at step five to help determine
whether a claimant can perform substantial gainful work in the economy. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(g). Under the Social Security Regulations, one of the vocational factors used to determine whether a claimant can obtain substantially gainful
employment is the claimant’s education level. 20 C.F.R § 404.1564. The Commissioner uses four mutually exclusive categories for describing the claimant’s education level: (1) illiteracy; (2) marginIdal. education; (3) limited
education; and (4) high school education and above. The numerical grade level that a claimant has completed may nSeoet be
determinative of a claimant’s ability to meet vocational requirements. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1564(a). Other factors an ALJ may consider include past work experience and the responsibilities the claimant had while workingS,e we hiidc.h can
show intellectual abilities even with little formal education. The Regulations require that only “if there is no other evidence to contradict [claimant’s education level], we will use your numerical grade level to
determine your educational abilities.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1564(b). The Regulations provide a clear definition of a high school education: “[h]igh school education and above means abilities in reasoning, arithmetic, and language skills acquired through formal schooling at a 12th-grade level or
above. We generally consider that someone with these educational abilities can do semi-skilled through skilled work.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1564(b)(4). Plaintiff appears to point to evidence that would contradict the ALJ’s
determination that the claimant has “at least a high school education” in that the claimant was enrolled in special education classes asened anlseov err passed the Alabama High School Graduation Exam. (Doc. 6 at 8-9; t . at 237.) In
furtherance of this argument, Plaintiff cites case law that, while relevant, is immaterial. Even though an ALJ must consider all relevant evidence, they are ALJ must connect the evidence to Dtheen tcoonn vc.l uAssitorune . . . [and] he may not ignore
entire lisneees aolfs oc oHnetrnarryy v e. vCidomenmce’s. ”of Soc. Sec., , 596 F.3d 419, 425 (7th Cir. 2010); 802 F.3d 1264, 1267 (11th Cir. 2015).
The record, including Smith’s testimony and reports, amply support this assertion. While failing to pass a graduation exam or being enrolled in special education classes may be contrary evidence, these factors are not
determinative when deciding a claimant’s education level. The ALJ’s conclusion that the claimant has a high school education is supported by the claimant’s testimony and prior work experience. (Tr. at 22, 237.) First, Plaintiff claims she began college after graduatisnege farlosom B hriigghh tsmchoono vl,.
wSohci.c She cw. oAudlmd irne.,q Cuoirmem a ’hr,i gh school education. (Tr. 1106.); 1 743 Fed. App’x 347, 354 (11th Cir. 2018). (Plaintiff’s testimony and report that he had a high school education was substantial evidence to support ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff had a high school education). Second, Smith’s prior work experience and current activitiSeese s upport the ALJ's determinat ion that Plaintiff has a high school education. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1564(b)(4). Plaintiff previously held jobs as a certified nurse assistant, a
1 semi-skilled position, a babysitter, and a housekeeper. (Tr. at 261-63.) Plaintiff
can care for herself, cook, and attend church. (Tr. at 19, 241-42, 770, 774.) Third, although no formal testing was completed during the screening of the claimant, a mental evaluator estimated that the claimant was operating
within the average range of intelligence based on her education, fund of information, and vocabulary. (Tr. at 1108.) For the reasons above, the ALJ properly considered Smith’s level of
education, and substan tial evidence supports the determination that she has a high school ebd. uMcaetniotna.l Impairments
The Plaintiff also alleges that regarding her mental impairments, (1) the
ALJ “glossed over” records from Western Mental Health Center; (2) discounted the findings from Stephen Long in comparison to others and should have given his findings more weight; and (3) the ALJ erred in giving incorrect weight to
each medical opinion. (Doc. 6 at 13-14.) To be found disabled, Plaintiff had to demonstrate that she was unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity because of a medically determinable
physical or mental impairmSeeent expected to result in death or to last twelve or more continuous months. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505. determinable impairment or combination of " severe " impairments.” 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). An impairment or combination of impairments is “severe” within the meaning of the regulations if it significantly limits an individual’s ability to perform basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). An
impairment or combination of impairments is “not severe” when medical and other evidence establishes only a slight abnormality or a combination of slight abnormalities which would have no more than a minimal effect on an
individual’s ability to work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1521, 416.921; Social Security Ruling(s) (“SSR”s) 85-28. The burden of showing that an impairment or combinatTiounr noefr ivm. pCaoimrmme’rn tosf iSso “cs. eSveecr.e” rested at all times with Smith, as the PlaintifJfo. nes v. Apfel , 182 F. App’x 946, 948 (11th Cir. 2006)
(citing , 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999)). Because Plaintiff bore the burden of proving she had a severe impairment, she thus had the burden of establishing the prerequisite for finding a seSveeerDe oimugphatiyrment, i.e., the
existence of a medically determinable impairment. , 245 F.3d at 1280. The record must include evidence from acceptable medicSaele sources to
establish the existence of a medically determinable impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513(a), 416.913(a) (“An individual's statement disability . . .; there must be medical . . . findings, established by medically
acceptable clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques, which show the existence of a medical impairment thats reeesuallstso from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities . . . .”); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502 (defining
symptoms, signs, and laboratory findings). For claims filed after March 27, 2017, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c and 416.920c declare that the ALJ “will not defer or give any specific evidentiary
weight, including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s).” Under this new regulatory scheme, the ALJ is not required to assign more weight to medical opinions from a claimant’s treating source or explain why good cause exists to disregard the treating
source’s opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c. To Plaintiff’s first point, the ALJ is not required to discuss every piece of evidence, so long as the decision is not a “broad rejection” that would prevent
the court fromT friunedsidnegl lt hv.a Ct othmem A’Lr Jo cfo Snosci.d Seerce.d the claimant’s medical condition “as a whole.” , No. 20-13416, 2022 WL 401548 (11th Cir. Feb. 10, 2022). Since Plaintiff filed this claim after March 17, 2017,
the ALJ is not required to “defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) or prior administrative sources.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a), 416.920c(a) (2017). Pertinent case law has
interpreted this regulation and has said an “ALJ need not use any magic words in discussing whether a medical opinion is supported by evidence from the medical source hiTmhsaexltfo ann vd. wKihjaetkhaezri, the opinion is consistent with other
evidence of record.” NO. 1:20-cv-00616-SRW, 2022 WL 983156, at *25-26 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 30, 2022). The ALJ noted that Smith had been treated by Western Medical Health
Center since 2019. (Tr. at 18.) Additionally, the ALJ noted that Western MenItda.)l Health reported Smith was pleasant and cooperative with normal speech. ( Accordingly, the ALJ’s decision explicitly considered evidence from Western Mental Health Center and gave grounds for her decision that were rooted in
other opinions. (Tr. at 18-20.) Next, Smith argues that the ALJ owed more weight to the medical opinions of Dr. Stephen Long, Joanna Koulianos, PhD, and George Grubbs, PsyD.
Per the Regulations discussed above, the ALJ is not required to assign more weight to medical opinions from a claimant’s treating source or Seexep lMaiant ows hvy. gCooomdm c’ra uosf eS oecx. iSsetsc .,t o disregard the treating source’s opinion.
see No. 21-11764, 2022 WL 97144, (11th Cir. Jan. 10, 2022); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a), 416.920c(a). Additionally, even though the ALJ Dr. Long's findings. (Tr. at 21.) Dr. Long’s findings were evaluated in the ALJ’s
decision, andc .t hPehreyfsoircea ln Iomt gpraoiurmndesn ftosr reversal.
Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ failed to consider all of the available
evidence of the claimant’s past medical history involving physical injuries. (Doc. 6 at 17-20.) Specifically, records produced by OrthoAlabama contained an MRI performed on the claimanItd .and Dr. Marquisha Jarmon's opinion regarding the
claimant’s impairments. ( ) Here, the opinion of OrthoAlabama was not outright rejected and was used in the ALJ’s decision. (Tr. at 18.) The ALJ referred to records from OrthoAlabama regarding Smith’s spondylosIids,. )l umbar interverbal disc disorder
with radiculopathy and steroid injections. ( Also, the ALJ referenIcde.d Exhibit 20F, OrthoAlabama records, pertaining to Smith’s lumbar spine. ( ) Per the Regulations described above, the ALJ is not required to give OrthoAlabama’s
records any more weight than other medical opinions foundS eien the record, regardless of whether the physician examined the claimant. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a), 416.920c(a) (2017).
The Plaintiff argues next that the ALJ should not have discounted the findings of Dr. Jarmon’s evaluation and, instead, relied on the findings of Dr. 2017, the ALJ is not required to give any specific evidentiary weight to any
medical opinions. The ALJ considered Dr. Jarmon’s findings, thus no error 2 exists. In conclusion, the ALJ did not make an error in assigning weight to any of the opBin. ioAnpsp feoaulnsd C ionu tnhcei lr eRceovride. w
With few exceptions, a claimant may present new evidencSee eat each stage
of the administrative process, including to the Appeals Council. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.900(b), 416.1400(b). However, the Appeals Council will consider additional evidence only if the Plaintiff demonstrates good cause for not submitting the evidence or informing the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 404.970(b).
The additional evidence must be “new, material, and relates to the period on or before the date of the hearing decision, and there is a reasonable probability that the additional seevei daelsnoce would change the outcome of the decision.” 20
C.F.R. § 404.970(a); 81 FR 90987 (explaining the new rules are effective January 17, 2017). Further, the Commissioner’s internal policy guides the meaning of
“material” and chronolo gical relevance and what it means for the Appeals 2 Spencer v. Heckler Plaintiff cites in their complaint. 765 F.2d 1090 (11th Cir. 1985). This Council to determine whether there is not a reasonable probability that the
additional evidence would change the outcome of the decision. Hearings, Appeals, and Litigation Law Manual (“HALLEX”), § I-3-3-6, 1993 WL 643129 (May 1, 2017). The HALLEX explains that additional evidence is “material” if it
iIsd “relevant, i.e., involves or is directly related to issues adjudicated by the ALJ.” . It explains that additional evidence “relates to the period on or before the date of the hearing decision” (i.e., is chronologically relevant), “if the evidence
is dated on or before the date of the hearing decision, or the evidence post-dates the hearing decision buItd is reasonably related to the time period adjudicated in the hearing decision.” . The HALLEX also explains that the Appeals Council “will evaluate the entire record along with the additional evidence to determine
whether there is a reasonable probaIbdi.lity that the additional evidence will change the outcome of the decision.” NonethelesSse, ethe Appeals Council has discretion to deny review of the ALJ’s decision. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.967,
416.1467. The ALJ issued her decision on November 8, 2022. (Tr. at 23.) Smith subsequently submitted two pieces of evidence to the Appeals Council: (1)
medical records from UAB West Freestanding; and (2) copies of medical records from Alabama Orthopedic Spine and Sports. (Tr. at 2.) The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review based on Itdh.e fact that the new
evidence would not change the outcome of the decision. Plaintiff challenges this determination, claiming that the Appeals Council adopted the findings of the ALJ without adequately evaluating the newly
submitted evidence in light of the decision of the ALJ. (Doc. 6 at 19-20.) The newly submitted additional evidence consists of two records. (Tr. at 2.) First, on October 16, 2021, Plaintiff presented to UAB Medical West to have
a mass on her leg looked at. (Tr. at 984.) The record also indicates that Plaintiff had labeled her back pain as “negative” at this appointment (Tr. at 985.) Second, on March 23, 2022, Plaintiff went to OrthoAlabama with the chief complaint of lower back pain that radiates into her legs with an
“uncontrollable” pain with a level of ten out of ten. (Tr.I da.t) 1121.) A lumbar epidural was later performed on April 13, 2022. ( At a follow-up appointment, Plaintiff reiterated her previous sympItdo.ms: issues with
prolonged standing and issues with sleep and housework. When considered with the whole record, this evidence does not show evidence of a new condition, nor doSeese i tM cirtecahteel la vr.e aCsoomnmabilses ipornoebr aobfi liStoyc tihaal tS tehce.
AAdLmJ iwno. uld change her decision. , 771 F.3d 780, 783 (11th Cir. 2014) (when newly submitt eCdf eMviadnenn cve. Gardner , 380 F.2d, 182, 185-186 (5th Cir. 1967). The record examined by the
ALJ already demonstrated an acknowledgment of generalized lower back pain, such as the claimant's use of a cane while walking and the MRI results taken of the claimant's back. (Tr. at 17-18.) Moreover, the ALJ considered the many
opinions of other medical professionals in her determination regarding the claimant’s back impairments. (Tr. at 18-23.) Since the UAB Freestanding and OrthoAlabama records do not present
substantial new evidence warranting a remand, it is unlikely these records would alter the ALJ's decision, especially given the information already considCe.r eSdu. bTshtuasn, ttihael Eapvpideeanlsc ceo aunndci Cl’sla riemfuasnatl ’iss Tpersotpiemr oannyd no error exists.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ's determination that the claimant’s testimony was not credible lacks support of substantial evidence, and therefore, the entire testimony should be accepted as true. (Doc. 6 at 20-21.)
SmitShe’se subjective complaints alone are insuEfdfwicaierndts vto. Suelsltivaabnlish a disability. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(a), 416.929(a); , 937 F.2d 580, 584 (11th Cir. 1991). Subjective testimony of pain and other
symptoms may establish the pSreeeseFnocoete ovf. Cah adtiesrabling impairment if it is supported by medical evidence. , 67 F.3d 1553, 1561 (11th Plaintiff claims disability due to pain or other subjective symptoms. The
Plaintiff must show (1) evidence of an underlying medical condition and (2) either (a) objective medical evidence that confirms the severity of the alleged symptoms arising from the condition, or (b) that the objectively determined
medical condition is of such seSveeerity that it can reasonably be expected to give rise to the alleged symptoms. 20 C.F.R. §§W 40il4so.1n5 v2. 9B(aar)n, h(ba)r,t 416.929(a), (b); Page 27 of 36 SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029; , 284 F.3d 1219,
1225 (11th Cir. 2002). Before an ALJ can discredit a PlaintifSf’ese sDtayteerments, the ALJ must clearly “Faorotitceulate explicit and adequate reasons.” , 395 F.3d at 1210 (quoting , 67 F.3d at 1561). A credibility determination is a question of fact subject only to limited
rSeeveieHwa nind tvh.e H ceocukrltesr to ensure the finding is supported by substantiavla ecvaitdeedn fcoer. rehe aring en banc , 761 F.2d 1545, 1548–49 (1r1etihn sCtairt.e d1 9su8b5 )n, om Hand v.
Bowen , 774 F.2d 428 (11th Cir. 1985), ., , 793 F.2d 275 (11th Cir. 1986). Courts in the Eleventh Circuit “will not dMiisttcuhrebll va. Ccolemamrly’r , aSrotci.c Suelact. eAdd mfiinnd. ing supported by substantial evidence.” Foote , 771 F.3d 780, 782 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing
, 67 F.3d at 1562). However, a reversal is warranted if the decision contains Sneeo Oinwdeincsa tvi.o Hne ockf lethre proper application of the credibility standard not . . . whether [the] ALJ could have reasonably crediteWd e[Prnlaeirn vti.f Cf’os]m tmes’tri mof oSnoyc.,
bSeuct. ,whether the ALJ was clearly wrong to discredit it.” 421 Fed. App’x 935, 939 (11th Cir. 2011). Here, the ALJ noted that the impairments underlying Plaintiff’s medical
conditions could be reasonably expected to cause some of her alleged symptoms, satisfying the first part of the pain standard. (Tr. at 16.) However, the ALJ found that the claimant’s statements concerning the intensity,
persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidenceI da.n d other evidence in the record for the reasons explained in this decision. The ALJ covered a variety of evidence to support her conclusion, including objective medical evidence and the claimant’s
subjective complaints. (Tr. at 17-21.) Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion in this case. ALJs are not required to “specifically refer to every piece of evidence in his decision, so long as the ALJ’s decision . . . is not a broad
rejection which is not enough to enable [a reviewing court] to Mcoitncchleuldle that the ALJ considered tDhyee crlaimant’s medical condition as a whole.’” , 771 F.3d at 782 (quoting , 395 F.3d at 1211) (alteration in original).
The ALJ begins by noting that the claimant’s application alleges disability based on shoulder and back pain, along with mental illness; hypertension, a diagnosis for piriformis syndrome; left shoulder pain; a herniated disc from
an accident while working that resulted in surgery and that the pain was a ten of a pain scale of zero to ten; failure to do household chores; lumbosacral pain with radiculopathy into her left leg; being unable to sit and stand for prolonged
periods; and experiencing auditory hallucinations. (Tr. at 17-19, 253.) The ALJ noted that Smith sought medical treatment at Alabama Regional Medical Services in 2019 for hypertension, hyperlipidemia, asthma, major
depressive disorder, obesity, and low back pain. (Tr. at 16.) The claimant reported pain relief froIdm. medication and yoga but was later diagnosed with piriformis syndrome. The claimant reported shoulder pain and imaging showing a small ostIedo. phyte formation for which the claimant was prescribed
physical therapy. Mental heath records indicate that at the time of evaluation, the claimant cared for he Ird . grandchildren while their parents worked and handled household chores.
The ALJ notes that in October 2021, the claimant sought medical care from Dr. Timothy Weber for back pain, aIsds. igning the pain a ten out of ten, and that she could not do household chores. The claimIda. nt reported a five-pound
lifting limit from a prior surgerIyd .f or carpal tunnel. Also, Claimant reported anxiety, depression, and PTSD. The claimant was assessed with a herniated Id. anxiety, and PTSD. Dr. Weber also noted that the claimant had no limitation
with sitting or standing andI dli.m ited the claimant to frequent walking and a five- pound carrying limitation. The ALJ noted that the claimant underwent another consultative
examinationI di.n April 2022 by Dr. Marquisha Jarmon and Nurse Practitioner Dana Free. WhIidle. at the examination, the claimant reported chronic back pain and sciatica. Along with the pain, the claimant reported she could not
squat or bend over, that she could only sit for up to ten minutes before needinIdg. to move, and that she could only walk a distance of up to twenty-five feet. The claimanItd .r eported walking hunched over with a cane, which caused her neck pain. The claimant disclosed she never weIndt. to physical therapy
prescribed by Dr. Weber for her piriformis syndrome. The claimant had full grip streIdn.g th, a positive leg raise, and could pick up and manipulate small objects. Id.D r. Jarmon stated that the claimant’s impairments were chronic and
limiting. The ALJ noted that additional records from 2022 show that thIed .c laimant complained of lumbosacral pain with radiculopathy in her left leg. An MRI
showed spondylosis and lumbar intervertebral Id.disc disorder with radiculopathy, and she was given steroid injections. Records showed the Id. demonIsdt. rated normal ambulation. However, the claimant was still using a
cane. As the record contains substantial evidence regarding Plaintiff’s physical impairments, there is adequate support, and no error. Regarding the claimant’s mental conditions, the ALJ noted thatI dt. he
claimant was treated at Western Mental Health Center beginning in 2019. At that time, the claimant admitted to noIdt . receiving mental health treatment in several years and was taking Lexapro. Also, at the time, the claimant spent a
lIodt. of time with her grandchildren, reading books and watching crime shows. Throughout 2020, the claimant kept busy toI dd.i stract herself from depression by cleaning and playing games on her phone. Western Mental Health noted that the Claimant was cIadl.m , pleasant, and cooperative in late 2020 and had a
fluid thought process. In a need to move onI df.r om the death of a family member, the claimant began smoking marijuana. The ALJ noted that in October 2021, the c laimant presented to Stephen
Long for a mental status examination. (Tr. at 19.)The claimant stated she could not perfoIrdm. household chores due to back pain but was able to care for her hygiene. The claimant denied hobbies andId r.e ported watching TV during the
day and playing video games on her phone. The cIlda.imant reported that her depression and anxiety were both a ten out of ten. Mr. Long reported that memory. /d. Mr. Long also noted she had limited concentration but reasonable insight and judgment and diagnosed the claimant with unspecified depressive disorder and unspecified psychotic disorder. Jd. Mr. Long opined that the claimant had moderate to markedly severe limitations. Jd. Again, the record contains substantial evidence regarding the plaintiff's mental impairments, and therefore, there is no error. V. Conclusion Upon review of the administrative record and considering Plaintiff's
argument, this Court finds the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence and in accord with the applicable law. A separate order will be entered.
DONE and ORDERED on June 13, 2024. Xe L. Scott Cooglér United States Dist&ct Judge 215708
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