Smith v. Snyder

Miami-Dade County Circuit Court

Smith v. Snyder

42 Fla. Supp. 52

CourtCircuit Court of the 11th Judicial Circuit of Florida, Miami-Dade County

DecidedApril 28, 1975

DocketNo. 74-14422

StatusPublished

This text of 42 Fla. Supp. 52 (Smith v. Snyder) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Circuit Court of the 11th Judicial Circuit of Florida, Miami-Dade County primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Smith v. Snyder, 42 Fla. Supp. 52 (Fla. Super. Ct. 1975).

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Opinion

ALAN R. SCHWARTZ, Circuit Judge.

The court has heard oral argument of counsel and considered their memoranda of law concerning the defendant’s pending motion for summary judgment, based upon the claim that the statute of limitations bars the present action.

Upon consideration thereof, it is ordered and adjudged that the motion should be and is denied. The court concludes that the general rule under which the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the physician-patient relationship is terminated, as expressed in such cases as Myers v. Stevenson, 125 Cal. App. 2d 399, 270 P. 2d 885 (1954) and Couillard v. Charles T. Miller Hospital, Inc., 253 Minn. 418. 92 N.W. 2d 96 (1958) is directly applicable in this case. There is no reason for concluding that this rule is not applicable in the state of Florida. The case of City of Miami v. Brooks, Fla. 1954, 70 So.2d 306, cited by the defendant for the contrary proposition, does not consider the issue at all.

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ALAN R. SCHWARTZ, Circuit Judge.

The court has heard oral argument of counsel and considered their memoranda of law concerning the defendant’s pending motion for summary judgment, based upon the claim that the statute of limitations bars the present action.

Upon consideration thereof, it is ordered and adjudged that the motion should be and is denied. The court concludes that the general rule under which the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the physician-patient relationship is terminated, as expressed in such cases as Myers v. Stevenson, 125 Cal. App. 2d 399, 270 P. 2d 885 (1954) and Couillard v. Charles T. Miller Hospital, Inc., 253 Minn. 418. 92 N.W. 2d 96 (1958) is directly applicable in this case. There is no reason for concluding that this rule is not applicable in the state of Florida. The case of City of Miami v. Brooks, Fla. 1954, 70 So.2d 306, cited by the defendant for the contrary proposition, does not consider the issue at all.

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Bluebook (online)

42 Fla. Supp. 52, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/smith-v-snyder-flacirct11mia-1975.

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