Smith v. Snohomish County

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 5 AT TACOMA 6 TROY SMITH, Case No. 2:24-cv-00288-TLF 7 Plaintiff, v. ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 8 FOR RECONSIDERATION (DKT. SNOHOMISH COUNTY , et al., 58) 9 Defendants. 10

11 This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Troy Smith’s “Opposing 12 Statement in Response to the Order on Summary Judgment and Plaintiff’s Motion to 13 Supplement the Record”. Dkt. 581. Mr. Smith asks the Court to overturn a previous 14 order: the Court’s Order dated February 27, 2025, granting Defendants’ summary 15 judgment motion, denying Mr. Smith’s summary judgment motion, and dismissing Mr. 16 Smith’s case with prejudice. Dkts. 56, 57. 17 Mr. Smith states he brings this motion under Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil 18 Procedure, which states: within 14 days after being served with a copy of the 19 recommended disposition, a party may serve and file specific written objections to the 20

21 1 On March 14, 2025, Mr. Smith filed a “State for Complaint of Judicial Misconduct,” which the Court interpreted as a motion requesting Magistrate Judge Theresa L. Fricke to recuse herself from this case. 22 Dkt. 60. Mr. Smith’s recusal request was referred to Chief United States District Judge David Estudillo on March 24, 2025. Dkt. 61. Chief Judge Estudillo denied Mr. Smith’s motion, finding the request for recusal did not identify any facts about Judge Fricke’s conduct that would suggest impartiality was lacking. Dkt. 23 64. 24 1 proposed findings and recommendations. A party may respond to another party's 2 objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. Unless the district judge orders 3 otherwise, the objecting party must promptly arrange for transcribing the record, or 4 whatever portions of it the parties agree to or the magistrate judge considers sufficient.

5 Fed. R. Civ. P 72(b)(1). 6 Under 28 U.S.C. 636(c)(1), a magistrate judge, with the parties’ consent, can 7 “conduct any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter and order the entry of 8 judgment in the case, when specially designated to exercise such jurisdiction by the 9 district court or courts he serves.” Subsection (c)(3) provides: “Upon entry of judgment 10 in any case referred under paragraph (1) of this subsection, an aggrieved party may 11 appeal directly to the appropriate United States court of appeals from the judgment of 12 the magistrate judge in the same manner as an appeal from any other judgment of a 13 district court. The consent of the parties allows a magistrate judge designated to 14 exercise civil jurisdiction under paragraph (1) of this subsection to direct the entry of a

15 judgment of the district court in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” 16 Because the parties consented to the undersigned’s jurisdiction, Rule 72(b) does 17 not apply. Dkt. 11 (consent); Dkt. 13 at 2 (Joint Status Report). Mr. Smith can and has 18 appealed the Court’s Order to the Ninth Circuit. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3); Fed. R. Civ. 19 P. 73(c). Dkt. 62.2 20 Although Mr. Smith states he makes this request under Rule 72 of the Federal 21 Rules of Civil Procedure, the motion can be interpreted as a request for reconsideration 22 23 2 Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 62.1(a)(2), this Court may enter an order denying reconsideration, even though 24 Mr. Smith has filed a notice of appeal. 1 under Western District of Washington Local Civil Rule (LCR) 7(h). Under LCR 7(h)(1), 2 motions for reconsideration are disfavored and will ordinarily be denied unless there is a 3 showing of: (1) manifest error in the ruling, or (2) new facts or legal authority that could 4 not have been brought to the attention of the court earlier, through reasonable diligence.

5 LCR 7(h)(1). Motions for reconsideration serve a limited function. “ ‘[T]he major grounds 6 that justify reconsideration involve an intervening change of controlling law, the 7 availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest 8 injustice.’ ” Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Hodel, 882 F.2d 364, 369 n.5 (9th Cir. 1989) 9 (alteration in original) (quoting 18 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice, 10 and Procedure § 4478 at 790). 11 Mr. Smith has not shown that there was a manifest error, injustice, or new facts 12 or legal authority that could not have been brought to the attention of the Court earlier. 13 Mr. Smith states the Court should not have dismissed his malicious prosecution 14 claim as barred by the statute of limitations. His complaint alleges causes of action

15 under 42 U.S.C. § 1982, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a claim for violation of equal protection 16 under the Fourteenth Amendment, a Fifth Amendment claim for taking property without 17 just compensation, a Fourth Amendment claim for unlawful search and seizure, a 18 Monell claim, and two state law claims: outrage and negligence. Dkt. 21, First Amended 19 Complaint, at 7-12. These claims were dismissed with prejudice. 20 “Malicious prosecution, by itself, does not constitute a due process violation. . .” 21 Freeman v. City of Santa Anna, 68 F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 1995). To prevail on a 22 Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim, under the Due Process Clause, plaintiff is 23 required to “show that the defendants prosecuted [him] . . . for the purpose of denying

24 1 [him] equal protection or another specific constitutional right.” Awabdy v. City of 2 Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 066 (99thCir. 2004). Plaintiff must also show the defendants 3 acted with malice, and lacked probable cause to prosecute him. Freeman, 68 F.3d at 4 1189.

5 In addition to these elements, federal courts, in considering whether plaintiff has 6 stated the elements of a malicious prosecution claim, look to state law. Mills v City of 7 Covina, 921 F.3d 1161, 1169 (9th Cir. 2019). Under Washington law, there are five 8 elements that plaintiff must prove: “(1) the defendant began or continued a prosecution; 9 (2) without probable cause; (3) with malice; (4) in a proceeding terminated in the 10 plaintiff’s favor; (5) to plaintiff’s injury.” Lassiter v. City of Bremerton, 556 F.3d 1049, 11 1054 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Clark v. Baines, 150 Wn.2d 905, 911 (2004)). 12 Mr. Smith did not raise a malicious prosecution claim in his complaint; this claim 13 was not ruled upon by the Court, as it was not raised in the complaint. It is 14 impermissible to add a new claim or assert a new legal theory for the first time at the

15 summary judgment stage. See Echlin v. PeaceHealth, 887 F.3d 967, 977–78 (9th Cir. 16 2018). The First Amended Complaint did not allege that the police or the prosecuting 17 attorney lacked probable cause for the criminal charges; the factual allegation was that 18 “criminal charges were dismissed based on governmental mismanagement”. Dkt. 21, at 19 6. 20 // 21 // 22 // 23 //

24 1 The Court did not address Mr. Smith’s malicious prosecution claim, as it was not 2 raised in his First Amended Complaint (Dkt. 21). Because Mr. Smith has not met his 3 burden under LCR 7(h), the motion for reconsideration is DENIED. 4

5 6 Dated this 15th day of April, 2025. 7 8 9 A

Theresa L. Fricke 10 United States Magistrate Judge

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