Smith v. Sanchez

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedApril 2, 2021
Docket1:21-cv-00242
StatusUnknown

This text of Smith v. Sanchez (Smith v. Sanchez) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Smith v. Sanchez, (E.D. Wis. 2021).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

CORNELL SMITH,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 21-C-242

SANCHEZ, et al.,

Defendants.

SCREENING ORDER

Plaintiff Cornell Smith, a state prisoner who is currently representing himself, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that his civil rights were violated. His complaint is more than 200 pages long and names nearly 30 defendants. Smith also filed a motion for leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee (in forma pauperis), along with a certified copy of his prison trust account statement for the six months prior to him filing his complaint. Smith paid a $20.96 initial partial filing fee on March 30, 2021. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), a prisoner may not bring a civil action or appeal a civil judgment in forma pauperis if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.

28 U.S.C. §1915(g). When determining whether a prisoner has acquired three “strikes” under §1915(g), a court “must consider prisoner actions dismissed on any of the three enumerated grounds both before and after the enactment of the PLRA.” Evans v. Ill. Dep’t of Corrs., 150 F.3d 810, 811 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing Abdul–Wadood v. Nathan, 91 F.3d 1023, 1025 (7th Cir. 1996)). Court records indicate that Smith has accumulated at least three strikes, including: 1) Smith v. Winning, Case No. 93-C-1009, Dkt. Nos. 11, 22 (E.D. Wis. July 5, 1994) (dismissed for failure

to state a claim); 2) Smith v. Huibregtse, Case No. 00-cv-1117, Dkt. No. 14 (E.D. Wis. June 6, 2001) (dismissed as frivolous); and 3) Smith v. Erickson, Case No. 13-cv-600, Dkt. Nos. 6, 29 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 16, 2016) (dismissed for failure to state a claim). Because Smith has previously filed at least three actions which were dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim, the Court will deny his motion for leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee unless he is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. In order to meet the imminent danger requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), a plaintiff must allege a physical injury that is imminent or occurring at the time the complaint is filed, and the threat or prison condition causing the physical injury must be real and proximate. Ciarpaglini v. Saini, 352 F.3d 328, 330 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Lewis v. Sullivan, 279 F.3d 526, 529 (7th Cir.

2002); Heimermann v. Litscher, 337 F.3d 781 (7th Cir. 2003)). “Allegations of past harm do not suffice” to show imminent danger. Id. Generally, courts “deny leave to proceed IFP when a prisoner’s claims of imminent danger are conclusory or ridiculous.” Id. at 331 (citing Heimermann, 337 F.3d at 782). The Court is unable to determine whether Smith may proceed in forma pauperis because his complaint violates Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, making it impossible to determine if he states claims of imminent danger. To state a claim under the federal notice pleading system, a plaintiff must provide a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that [he] is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A plaintiff should not plead every fact supporting his claims; he only has to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). There is a reason that the rule specifies a “short and plain” statement. “Rule 8(a) requires parties to make their pleadings straightforward, so that judges and adverse parties need

not try to fish a gold coin from a bucket of mud.” U.S. ex rel. Garst v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 328 F.3d 374, 378 (7th Cir. 2003). “[L]ength may make a complaint unintelligible, by scattering and concealing in a morass of irrelevancies the few allegations that matter.” Kadamovas v. Stevens, 706 F.3d 843, 844 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting U.S. ex rel. Garst, 328 F.3d 374, 378 (7th Cir. 2003)). “District judges are busy, and therefore have a right to dismiss a complaint that is so long that it imposes an undue burden on the judge, to the prejudice of other litigants seeking the judge’s attention.” Id. Smith’s complaint does not include “a short plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” as the rule requires. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Instead, it rambles on for more than 220 pages and names nearly thirty individuals as defendants. The allegations are

repetitive and unclear as to who did what, when and what happened as a result. Smith’s complaint also appears to run afoul of the rule against joining multiple unrelated claims against different defendants in the same pleading. “Unrelated claims against different defendants belong in different suits,” so as to prevent prisoners from dodging the fee payment or three strikes provision in the Prison Litigation Reform Act. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). Specifically, Rule 18(a) provides that “[a] party asserting a claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim may join, as independent or alternate claims, as many claims as it has against an opposing party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a). Under this rule, “multiple claims against a single party are fine, but Claim A against Defendant 1 should not be joined with unrelated Claim B against Defendant 2.” George, 507 F.3d at 607. Also, under Rule 20, joinder of multiple defendants into one action is proper only if “any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and any question of law or fact common to all defendants

will arise in the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

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Bluebook (online)
Smith v. Sanchez, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/smith-v-sanchez-wied-2021.