UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
JOHN SMITH, et al.,
Plaintiff, v. Civil Action No. 25-183 (JEB)
MARCO RUBIO, et al.,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs John Smith and John Doe challenge the delay in the State Department’s
adjudication of their immigrant-visa applications. See ECF No. 2 (Mot.). Plaintiffs are both
dual nationals of Russia and Israel living separately in Kazakhstan (Smith) and Israel (Doe), and
they desire to emigrate for various political, social, and economic reasons. Id. at 1–2, 4; ECF
No. 2-2 (John Smith Decl.). Smith has petitioned for an EB-1A immigrant visa for extraordinary
ability — he is an aviation professional experienced in training new pilots and with expertise in
Full Flight Simulator Type D. See Mot. at 1–2. Doe is Smith’s husband and a derivative
immigrant-visa applicant on the EB-1A. Id. at 2. Their visa applications have faced delayed
administrative processing. Id. at 1–2. Fearing for their personal safety, their emotional and
financial well-being, and the legality of their marriage, Plaintiffs move the Court to proceed
pseudonymously in this dispute. As they have made the detailed showing required to overcome
the presumption in favor of disclosure, the Court will grant the Motion. See LCvR 40.7(f)
(providing that Chief Judge shall “hear and determine . . . motion[s] to file a pseudonymous
complaint”).
1 I. Legal Standard
Generally, a complaint must identify the plaintiff. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a); LCvR
5.1(c)(1). This identification requirement reflects the “presumption in favor of disclosure [of
litigants’ identities], which stems from the ‘general public interest in the openness of
governmental processes,’ and, more specifically, from the tradition of open judicial
proceedings.” In re Sealed Case, 931 F.3d 92, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (quoting Wash. Legal Found.
v. U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, 89 F.3d 897, 899 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). A party moving to proceed
pseudonymously thus “bears the weighty burden of both demonstrating a concrete need for such
secrecy[] and identifying the consequences that would likely befall it if forced to proceed in its
own name.” In re Sealed Case, 971 F.3d 324, 326 (D.C. Cir. 2020). As a result, the court must
“‘balance the litigant’s legitimate interest in anonymity against countervailing interests in full
disclosure’” by applying a “flexible and fact driven” balancing test. Id. (quoting In re Sealed
Case, 931 F.3d at 96). That test assesses “five non-exhaustive factors”:
[1] whether the justification asserted by the requesting party is merely to avoid the annoyance and criticism that may attend any litigation or is to preserve privacy in a matter of [a] sensitive and highly personal nature;
[2] whether identification poses a risk of retaliatory physical or mental harm to the requesting party or[,] even more critically, to innocent non-parties;
[3] the ages of the persons whose privacy interests are sought to be protected;
[4] whether the action is against a governmental or private party; and, relatedly,
[5] the risk of unfairness to the opposing party from allowing an action against it to proceed anonymously.
Id. at 326–27 (quoting In re Sealed Case, 931 F.3d at 97) (first alteration in original).
2 II. Analysis
Plaintiffs have met their burden to show that their privacy interests outweigh the public’s
presumptive and substantial interest in learning their identities. The Court will address each of
the five factors.
A. Factor 1
Smith and Doe make clear that the request to proceed under a pseudonym is not “merely
to avoid the annoyance and criticism that may attend any litigation,” but to “preserve privacy in a
matter of [a] sensitive and highly personal nature.” Id. at 326 (quoting In re Sealed Case, 931
F.3d at 97) (alteration in original). Plaintiffs are a same-sex couple seeking to maintain the
privacy of their sexual orientation in the face of possible repercussions in Russia and
Kazakhstan. See Mot. at 4; Smith Decl. at ¶ 9. This is precisely the type of “intimate or
sensitive personal information . . . traditionally recognized under this factor.” Doe v. Rogers,
2023 WL 1470007, at *2 (D.D.C. Feb. 2, 2023) (quoting Doe v. Bogan, 542 F. Supp. 3d 19, 23
(D.D.C. 2021)) (internal quotations omitted).
B. Factor 2
The second factor also weighs in favor of proceeding pseudonymously, as there is a clear
“risk of retaliatory physical or mental harm” to Plaintiffs. See In re Sealed Case, 971 F.3d at 326
(quoting In re Sealed Case, 931 F.3d at 97). They are two homosexual men, which they contend
could “trigger[] physical retaliation and mental harm” if they were to be identified as such. See
Mot. at 4. Although this fear of retaliation is unsubstantiated for Doe while residing in Israel,
Plaintiffs’ declarations narrate the dangers the men could meet in Kazakhstan and Russia. See
Smith Decl., ¶¶ 6, 11; ECF No. 2-3 (John Doe Decl.), ¶ 5. As the Russian government has
designated LGBTQ+ identity as “extremism,” Plaintiffs could face persecution or loss of
3 employment. See Mot. at 4. Same sex marriage is not recognized in Kazakhstan either, causing
Plaintiff Smith to fear retaliatory job loss if his marital status was to become public knowledge.
See Mot. at 4.
In addition to these threats, Plaintiffs have offered numerous examples of the
psychological harm they experience from their situation. See Mot. at 5. Living under such fear
and the prolonged separation from his husband has resulted in Plaintiff Doe being diagnosed
with depression. Id. at 5. The Court finds that the detailed allegations in the Motion and both
declarations are sufficient to conclude that revealing the names of Plaintiffs could subject them
to negative consequences at the hands of the governments of Russia and Kazakhstan. See J.K.A.
v. United States, No. 23-2273, ECF No 7 (Mem. Op.) at 3–4 (D.D.C. Aug. 10, 2023) (second
factor favors pseudonymity when plaintiffs experienced abuse by, and faced further “threats of
retaliation” from, foreign government).
C. Factor 3
Plaintiffs concede that the third factor weighs against pseudonymity, as the two men are
not minors. See Mot. at 5; In re Sealed Case, 971 F.3d at 326.
D. Factor 4
The fourth factor supports the Motion. “[A]nonymous litigation is more acceptable when
the defendant is a governmental body because government defendants ‘do not share the concerns
about “reputation” that private individuals have when they are publicly charged with
wrongdoing.’” J.W. v. District of Columbia, 318 F.R.D. 196, 201 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting Doe v.
Cabrera, 307 F.R.D. 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2014)); see also Doe 1 v. George Wash. Univ., 369 F. Supp. 3d
49, 66 (D.D.C. 2019). In addition, Plaintiffs here are seeking individualized relief. In such
cases, courts have generally favored pseudonymity. See, e.g., Doe v. Blinken, No. 24-1629, ECF
4 No. 3 (Mem. Op.) at 5 (D.D.C. June 11, 2024) (“When a plaintiff requests individualized relief
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
JOHN SMITH, et al.,
Plaintiff, v. Civil Action No. 25-183 (JEB)
MARCO RUBIO, et al.,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs John Smith and John Doe challenge the delay in the State Department’s
adjudication of their immigrant-visa applications. See ECF No. 2 (Mot.). Plaintiffs are both
dual nationals of Russia and Israel living separately in Kazakhstan (Smith) and Israel (Doe), and
they desire to emigrate for various political, social, and economic reasons. Id. at 1–2, 4; ECF
No. 2-2 (John Smith Decl.). Smith has petitioned for an EB-1A immigrant visa for extraordinary
ability — he is an aviation professional experienced in training new pilots and with expertise in
Full Flight Simulator Type D. See Mot. at 1–2. Doe is Smith’s husband and a derivative
immigrant-visa applicant on the EB-1A. Id. at 2. Their visa applications have faced delayed
administrative processing. Id. at 1–2. Fearing for their personal safety, their emotional and
financial well-being, and the legality of their marriage, Plaintiffs move the Court to proceed
pseudonymously in this dispute. As they have made the detailed showing required to overcome
the presumption in favor of disclosure, the Court will grant the Motion. See LCvR 40.7(f)
(providing that Chief Judge shall “hear and determine . . . motion[s] to file a pseudonymous
complaint”).
1 I. Legal Standard
Generally, a complaint must identify the plaintiff. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a); LCvR
5.1(c)(1). This identification requirement reflects the “presumption in favor of disclosure [of
litigants’ identities], which stems from the ‘general public interest in the openness of
governmental processes,’ and, more specifically, from the tradition of open judicial
proceedings.” In re Sealed Case, 931 F.3d 92, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (quoting Wash. Legal Found.
v. U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, 89 F.3d 897, 899 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). A party moving to proceed
pseudonymously thus “bears the weighty burden of both demonstrating a concrete need for such
secrecy[] and identifying the consequences that would likely befall it if forced to proceed in its
own name.” In re Sealed Case, 971 F.3d 324, 326 (D.C. Cir. 2020). As a result, the court must
“‘balance the litigant’s legitimate interest in anonymity against countervailing interests in full
disclosure’” by applying a “flexible and fact driven” balancing test. Id. (quoting In re Sealed
Case, 931 F.3d at 96). That test assesses “five non-exhaustive factors”:
[1] whether the justification asserted by the requesting party is merely to avoid the annoyance and criticism that may attend any litigation or is to preserve privacy in a matter of [a] sensitive and highly personal nature;
[2] whether identification poses a risk of retaliatory physical or mental harm to the requesting party or[,] even more critically, to innocent non-parties;
[3] the ages of the persons whose privacy interests are sought to be protected;
[4] whether the action is against a governmental or private party; and, relatedly,
[5] the risk of unfairness to the opposing party from allowing an action against it to proceed anonymously.
Id. at 326–27 (quoting In re Sealed Case, 931 F.3d at 97) (first alteration in original).
2 II. Analysis
Plaintiffs have met their burden to show that their privacy interests outweigh the public’s
presumptive and substantial interest in learning their identities. The Court will address each of
the five factors.
A. Factor 1
Smith and Doe make clear that the request to proceed under a pseudonym is not “merely
to avoid the annoyance and criticism that may attend any litigation,” but to “preserve privacy in a
matter of [a] sensitive and highly personal nature.” Id. at 326 (quoting In re Sealed Case, 931
F.3d at 97) (alteration in original). Plaintiffs are a same-sex couple seeking to maintain the
privacy of their sexual orientation in the face of possible repercussions in Russia and
Kazakhstan. See Mot. at 4; Smith Decl. at ¶ 9. This is precisely the type of “intimate or
sensitive personal information . . . traditionally recognized under this factor.” Doe v. Rogers,
2023 WL 1470007, at *2 (D.D.C. Feb. 2, 2023) (quoting Doe v. Bogan, 542 F. Supp. 3d 19, 23
(D.D.C. 2021)) (internal quotations omitted).
B. Factor 2
The second factor also weighs in favor of proceeding pseudonymously, as there is a clear
“risk of retaliatory physical or mental harm” to Plaintiffs. See In re Sealed Case, 971 F.3d at 326
(quoting In re Sealed Case, 931 F.3d at 97). They are two homosexual men, which they contend
could “trigger[] physical retaliation and mental harm” if they were to be identified as such. See
Mot. at 4. Although this fear of retaliation is unsubstantiated for Doe while residing in Israel,
Plaintiffs’ declarations narrate the dangers the men could meet in Kazakhstan and Russia. See
Smith Decl., ¶¶ 6, 11; ECF No. 2-3 (John Doe Decl.), ¶ 5. As the Russian government has
designated LGBTQ+ identity as “extremism,” Plaintiffs could face persecution or loss of
3 employment. See Mot. at 4. Same sex marriage is not recognized in Kazakhstan either, causing
Plaintiff Smith to fear retaliatory job loss if his marital status was to become public knowledge.
See Mot. at 4.
In addition to these threats, Plaintiffs have offered numerous examples of the
psychological harm they experience from their situation. See Mot. at 5. Living under such fear
and the prolonged separation from his husband has resulted in Plaintiff Doe being diagnosed
with depression. Id. at 5. The Court finds that the detailed allegations in the Motion and both
declarations are sufficient to conclude that revealing the names of Plaintiffs could subject them
to negative consequences at the hands of the governments of Russia and Kazakhstan. See J.K.A.
v. United States, No. 23-2273, ECF No 7 (Mem. Op.) at 3–4 (D.D.C. Aug. 10, 2023) (second
factor favors pseudonymity when plaintiffs experienced abuse by, and faced further “threats of
retaliation” from, foreign government).
C. Factor 3
Plaintiffs concede that the third factor weighs against pseudonymity, as the two men are
not minors. See Mot. at 5; In re Sealed Case, 971 F.3d at 326.
D. Factor 4
The fourth factor supports the Motion. “[A]nonymous litigation is more acceptable when
the defendant is a governmental body because government defendants ‘do not share the concerns
about “reputation” that private individuals have when they are publicly charged with
wrongdoing.’” J.W. v. District of Columbia, 318 F.R.D. 196, 201 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting Doe v.
Cabrera, 307 F.R.D. 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2014)); see also Doe 1 v. George Wash. Univ., 369 F. Supp. 3d
49, 66 (D.D.C. 2019). In addition, Plaintiffs here are seeking individualized relief. In such
cases, courts have generally favored pseudonymity. See, e.g., Doe v. Blinken, No. 24-1629, ECF
4 No. 3 (Mem. Op.) at 5 (D.D.C. June 11, 2024) (“When a plaintiff requests individualized relief
against a government defendant — as here, where Doe challenges a yearlong delay in
adjudicating his SIV application — the fourth factor favors pseudonymity.”) (citation omitted);
see also Am. Foreign Serv. Ass’n v. State, No. 24-3385, ECF No. 8 (Mem. Op) at 5–6 (D.D.C.
Dec. 11, 2024) (fourth factor favors pseudonymity where plaintiffs sought review of individual
benefit denials).
E. Factor 5
The fifth and final factor weighs in favor of allowing Plaintiffs to proceed
pseudonymously. The Government would suffer no unfairness since it is already aware of
Plaintiffs’ identities through their immigrant-visa applications. See Mot. at 5; In re Sealed Case,
971 F.3d at 326 n.1 (explaining that this factor is “not implicated” where defendant knows
plaintiff’s identity).
III. Conclusion
The Court accordingly ORDERS that:
1. Plaintiffs’ [2] Motion to Proceed Under Pseudonyms is GRANTED, subject to any
further consideration by the United States District Judge to whom this case is randomly
assigned;
2. All parties shall use the pseudonyms listed in the Complaint in all documents filed in this
action; and
3. Within fourteen days of this Order, Plaintiffs shall file on the public docket:
i. A pseudonymous version of their [2] Motion and any attachments; and
ii. A sealed declaration containing their real names and residential addresses.
5 /s/ James E. Boasberg JAMES E. BOASBERG Chief Judge Date: January 30, 2025