SMITH v. REAGLE

District Court, S.D. Indiana·Decided June 9, 2021·No. 1:20-cv-03151·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

COREY JAMES SMITH, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) No. 1:20-cv-03151-JPH-MPB ) REAGLE Warden; at Pendleton ISR, et al. ) ) Defendants. )

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISREGARD FILING, GRANTING MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT, SCREENING AMENDED COMPLAINT, AND DIRECTING SERVICE OF PROCESS

On April 6, 2021, the plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file an amended complaint with an attached proposed amended complaint. Dkt. 20. Before the Court screened the amended complaint, the plaintiff filed another amended complaint on May 6, 2021. Dkt. 27. On May 11, 2021, the plaintiff filed a motion to correct error and disregard the amended complaint filed on May 6, 2021. That motion, dkt. [28], is granted. The amended complaint filed on May 6, 2021, is disregarded and of no effect. The plaintiff's motion for leave to amend his complaint, dkt. [20], is granted. The clerk is directed to redocket the proposed amended complaint at dkt. 20-1 as the Amended Complaint which is now the operative complaint in this action. The Court now screens the amended complaint and makes the following rulings. I. The Amended Complaint

The Court previously screened the plaintiff's original complaint and allowed Fourteenth Amendment claims to proceed against four defendants at Pendleton Correctional Facility (PCF) based on the plaintiff's allegations that he was confined in long-term segregation without due process. Dkt. 15. The amended complaint's caption names 34 defendants: the four current PCF defendants, thirteen additional employees of PCF, five employees of Indiana Department of Correction (IDOC) Central Office, five employees of Wabash Valley Correctional Facility (WVCF), four employees of Westville Control Unit (WCU), and three employees of Indiana State

Prison (ISP). The amended complaint also names two additional defendants who were not included in the caption: WVCF Warden Frank Vanihel, and PCF Unit Team Manager Grayhouse. The following allegations are set forth in the plaintiff's amended complaint. The plaintiff was placed in restrictive housing in June 2013 while he was incarcerated at ISP. His placement in restrictive housing was in retaliation for his refusal to intervene in ongoing gang hostilities in the prison. Within days, he was transferred to WCU where he stayed for two years before being transferred to WVCF's Secured Housing Unit. After approximately six months, the plaintiff was again transferred, this time to PCF, where he remained in segregation through the filing of his original complaint. The conditions of segregation at PCF were harsh. Inmates often set fires to get attention

and the ventilation system was inadequate to clear the smoke in the air. Excessive noise interfered with the plaintiff's ability to think and sleep and damaged his hearing. The unit is infested with mice, rats, cockroaches, pigeons, and bugs. The unit is also filthy and smells of urine and human feces. It is extremely cold in the winter and too hot in the summer. The plaintiff was at risk of assault by other inmates. He was denied an opportunity for recreation and out-of-cell exercise for thirteen months. The plaintiff was denied transfer to general population and access to the facility's step- down program even though he had previously completed four phases of the program at a previous facility. In six years of segregation at PCF, he received only one 30-day review which was a sham. Defendants Carter, Lemmon, and Basinger were the IDOC Commissioners during the plaintiff's time in PCF's segregation unit. Defendant Hendrix was the IDOC Director of Classification during that time. Defendants Reagle and Zantecky were Wardens of PCF and defendant Dixon was the Supervisor of Classification at PCF during that time. The plaintiff

contends that these defendants maintained unconstitutional policies and practices that allowed the plaintiff to remain in segregation at PCF without periodic reviews. Defendant John Stafford was the Unit Team Director of the PCF segregation unit and defendant Ashe was the Program Director. Defendants Brown, McQuire, Jones, Vickov, Grayhouse, Evans, Shepard, Ross, Amburn, Cook, Martin, and Arnold were case managers and counselors at PCF while the plaintiff was denied 30-day and 90-day reviews. On February 12, 2021, the plaintiff was transferred back to WVCF and placed in the secured housing unit on department-wide administrative segregation. Conditions at WVCF are comparable to those the plaintiff experienced at PCF. The plaintiff has suffered severe psychological harm as a result of his years in segregation. He seeks compensatory and punitive

damages. II. Discussion of Claims

Applying the screening standard to the factual allegations in the amended complaint, certain claims are dismissed while other claims shall proceed as submitted. First, all claims against defendants employed at ISP and WCU, as well as the plaintiff's claims arising from his first stay at WVCF in 2015, are barred by the statute of limitations. Suits under § 1983 use the statute of limitations and tolling rules that states employ for personal-injury claims. In Indiana, the applicable statute of limitations period is two years. See Richards v. Mitcheff, 696 F.3d 635, 637 (7th Cir. 2012); Ind. Code § 34–11–2–4. The original complaint in this action was signed on November 15, 2020, several years after the expiration of Indiana's 2-year statute of limitations for those claims. The plaintiff argues that the older claims are not barred due to the doctrine of continuing harm. Dkt. 20-1 at 32. As the Seventh Circuit recently explained,

The continuing violation doctrine ... is aimed at ensuring that illegal conduct is punished by preventing a defendant from invoking the earliest manifestation of its wrongdoing as a means of running out the limitations clock on a course of misconduct that persisted over time; the doctrine serves that end by treating the defendant's misconduct as a continuing wrong and deeming an action timely so long as the last act evidencing a defendant's violation falls within the limitations period. ... Thus, where the violation at issue can be characterized as a continuing wrong, the limitations period begins to run not when an action on the violation could first be brought, but when the course of illegal conduct is complete.

United States v. Spectrum Brands, 924 F.3d 337, 350 (7th Cir. 2019) (internal citations omitted). "A violation is continuing where it would be unreasonable to require or even permit [a prisoner] to sue separately over every incident of the defendant's unlawful conduct." Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 651 (7th Cir. 2013). For a continuing harm, the statute of limitations begins to run on the last occurrence of the harm. Id. Thus, the plaintiff's claims against the ISP defendants accrued by no later than June 2013, when he was transferred from ISP to WCU. The ISP defendants could no longer be responsible for any harm to the plaintiff after he was transferred away from their facility. See Wilson v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 932 F.3d 513, 517–18 (7th Cir. 2019). Similarly, his claims against the WCU defendants and his claims based on his time in WVCF during 2015 accrued no later than the unspecified dates in 2015 when he was transferred to WVCF and later to PCF.

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SMITH v. REAGLE, (S.D. Ind. 2021).

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